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USSR Deputies' Club Discusses Models for Future Federation

90UN1830A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 19, 9 May 90 p 13

[Article by O. Moroz: "Chamber of Nationalities: Federation? Confederation? Concord? Community...Notes from the People's Deputies Club Conference"]

[Text] At the end of April, under the chairmanship of F. Burlatskiy, a conference of the People's Deputies Club took place, where the question about the future of our federation was discussed.

The Great Rus joined the indissoluble union of free republics forever.

The indissoluble union...this indissoluble union did not come about. Today it is clear to everyone—not only due to the sharp declaration about Lithuania's secession, but due to the general growth, as people are fond of saying, in centrifugal sentiments.

What happened? What so terrible has come to light in the Union, that for many has transformed it into an alien, objectionable shore, from which they strive to unhitch their canoe?

It is clear that to a great extent it is the present centrifugal forces—sharp reaction to past inept politics in national relations, when republics located almost on opposite ends of the earth, with completely different history, customs, morals, traditions, and social structure, put in place identical standardized orders, corroborated by profound theories about the unavoidable and forthcoming merging of nations.

How can it be? What is to be done? Look around—how people live. The first business is to look back at the past.

Since our childhood we learned that pre-October Russia was a prison of peoples. This categorical thesis kept us from examining ourselves: maybe there is, in this prison structure, something the matter, that in our free home would not be bad for us to have? Indeed, how did it come about that the Russian empire could unite not only Slavic and not only Christian peoples and States, but also peoples of different primary religions and states, which existed for centuries—thousands of years? Apparently, the breadth of approach played the main role, with versatility and diversity of forms in the structuring of relations with other peoples. In Finland, which was formerly part of the Russian empire, as is known, parliament was preserved; Poland, which was also part of it, had its Sejm; the emir of Bukhara continued to reside in Bukhara...

"We are all the time trying to come up with some sort of one single law, similar to Newton's law of gravitation, and spread it to all nations, hoping that it will unite all," says D. Kugultikov. "As a matter of fact, just as all people are different, so are nations. One must seek not a

general formula for all, but for each try to find a special key. There is no one single formula."

One can say much about the sorrows and misfortunes of various nations. People are saying that. Together with that, now everyone has the sensation of some excessiveness—exaggeration—of everything connected with the understanding of "nation," that does not at all come from real life problems. Nation, nation, nation...Nation—above all! But is it really above all? Already it is apparent: the usual overkill, like the overkill we used to have with the classes.

One must admit, that to a large extent, with what is entailed in the word "nation," we brought in a hopeless mess. The very formula "right of nations to self-determination" is understood in various ways. If one follows it literally and with this implies under a nation a certain ethical common character, a great open-field system awaits us in the future. Every nation—whether big or small—should have a right to fence off its kitchen garden, and be separated by a border from neighbors.

It is clear, that actually this madness is not realized: the majority of peoples since the times of Babel intermingled on the sinful earth. Borders will have to be built not only along the outskirts of cities and villages, but also along the boundaries of quarters; here and there even quarters must be divided into parts. Nevertheless the striving for this "right of nations," no matter what the cost to implement, we see, is at work, is intensifying, and is giving rise to ever more conflicts.

In the whole world under the right of nations to self-determination, something else is intended here—corresponding citizens' rights, but not ethical associations. Indeed the majority of contemporary States was formed in this way. Take the French—they were not ethnically homogeneous. In their composition there are still Bretons, Alsatians and Corsicans...Nevertheless—France, Frenchmen. In each country of Latin America there are Indians, descendants of Spaniards, the Portuguese, African blacks...In Africa, as is known, there are hundreds of ethnic associations, but once again they were not self-determined, but actually citizens' associations. Citizens' association is implied in the whole world under the word "nation," proof of which is in the very title—Organization of United Nations.

The director of the Ethnography Institute V. Tishkov, having spoken about this at the Deputies' Club conference, in a thesis about the right of nations to self-determination (implied under a nation's ethnic association) called it the greatest delusion of 19th century socialist thought, spread to the 20th century. This delusion drove us to the present impasse. We drove ourselves to it.

Finally one shifting of consciousness took place: the main reason for aggravation of the national problem, odd as it may seem, apparently does not lie in the plane of national relations at all; the reason—the totalitarian

system, which oppressed all; all were at a loss, all were no better off than at the start, and all now blame each other.

"People like to think that two main factors are the basis in our Union—economic necessity and collective security," said L. Arutyunyan. "And now one and the other are doubtful. All peoples say that they are getting robbed, but what is surprising—not one is getting rich. It is a startling phenomenon. No one knows where it all disappears to. What concerns collective security is that the Union does not secure it. More than that, the Union can stimulate danger. Proof of this is the war going on now between Armenia and Azerbaijan."

The Union does not secure the collective security...Was that said in all seriousness? What, let's imagine, would it be like, in separate kingdoms and principalities—we will begin everything from zero, since the times of Genghis Khan. Sometime, through hundreds of years, we realize the necessity to again join each other...And then...We will draw such an historic sine curve...If we survive, of course, under the whine of nuclear spears and arrows.

"Russia already had the experience, when separate principalities divided," remembered M. Bocharov. "And we know, with what this ended—with three centuries of slavery. There is such an experiment in Russian history. Undoubtedly, one does not have to forget history."

D. Kuguldinov remembered how his people came to Russia—the Kalmyks: they asked for asylum, defended their southern borders and were defended themselves. It would be good if historians would remember about other peoples—how a given annexation came about, and would record it all honestly and objectively, without an intentional social agenda, which forces one to think that everything is ceremonious and noble. We have to know this nowadays.

Of course, now is quite another time, but security—it is such a business. It is not worth approaching lightly. We are only just beginning to shovel mountains of rockets and tanks, and here is already complete carelessness.

What concerns economic necessity...This aspect is the hardest point to refute. Impoverished one way or another. Impoverished together and separately. Nonetheless there is a glimmer of hope that sometime the cart will budge, the chatter will end, and business will begin. What finally gives one the heart to push off from the swampy quaggy shore and to set out swimming in search of genuine terra firma? It is at that time when we are in need of unity. Somehow economically the country built itself like a single whole—in the hope that this very indissoluble Union would exist eternally. Building principles have been known to us since school: specialization and cooperation. And what now? Like the Uzbeks intend to prosper separately with their cotton specialization, and Moldavians with tomatoes?

We are told—Lithuanians say especially persistently—that economic ties after separation remain indissoluble. Fully, and at once, within the framework of a single

power, supply is at the height of confusion and slovenliness. And what will happen if customs stations are still erected on these supply routes? Obeying the call of reason, one must undoubtedly have everything in the reverse—first of all take apart like a clock the general economic mechanism, and after that, if one wishes, conduct experiments on its disassembling and scattering of separate parts to various corners, making sure, however, that it continues to work during this nonstop.

There is no doubt about one thing: the thirst for division speaks about the discontent with the condition of our Union. As the unforgettable classic said—what is it that we want?

Our favorite occupation is imitating a fakir—snake charmer. We devise some sort of verbal formula and begin to play the fife, in the childish hope that it will depict something like this—marvelous—about which we ourselves cannot guess. One must supplement understanding of "federation" with new content. True, but how do you pour new wine into old wineskins?

"Is the form of a federation irreproachable?" Asked K. Khallik at the Deputies' Club conference. "My belief keeps growing stronger, that it lacks vital capacity. A State, whose separate parts possess so many differences, in the previous federal form can hold out only under conditions of a totalitarian regime. Even authoritarian forms of government already cannot retain this system."

What else, if not a federation? Further, to the degree of weakening of central power and strengthening of the role of separate parts, the tendency is toward confederation, concord, community...Where will it end? Undoubtedly, it is nothing more stupid than putting one's finger on a choice and saying: "Let's build it." We already made an historic mistake, having planned the building of socialism according to specific plans and drafts.

One must ask the people what they want, and see where life goes. Try to separate healthy trends from those that are hopelessly rotten (not obeying, for example, hysterical appeals to build a certain symbiosis from Stalinist socialism and "original" Old Russia).

With this, of course, it would be good to have some kind of final reference point, which could see even if in the distance, even if in fog, so as not to trust only one wandering in the complex labyrinth of contradictory life according to the "trial and error" method. In the Deputies' Club several such reference points were named. The first of these is the nightmare of the ideological guardians—the USA model. Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov, as is known, on more than one occasion made reference to this example and dreamed—in one form or another—of transferring this model to our country. The arrangement is tempting: they divided the country into equal states, granted them equal rights, left to the central power that which does not disturb living in each state separately, and—everyone is satisfied. Of course, to mechanically transfer this model to our conditions is impossible—we

have no states, but independent States—but nevertheless some principles we can adopt; undoubtedly we can.

The other possible reference point is Yugoslavia. True, if two years ago this was only so attractive an example, right now it still is—warned from Yugoslavia's experience, it is well visible what comes with the granting of major rights to separate republics without preliminary breakage of the command-administrative system.

However the majority of Deputies' Club participants named the most attractive reference point for the future as the European Economic Community.

Of course, the EEC model—it is a separate reference point. God save us from solemnly proclaiming that this model will be erected in such-and-such a year or that in general the present generation of Soviet people will live under... We know how painfully difficult it was for the "Common Market" to form (remember how we took delight in their misfortune on this count?). This is where the Common Market countries have already outdistanced us in economic standard, cultural standard—in civilization standard generally.

Especially valuable is that EEC gives those who wish to teach themselves not only a certain structural model, but also a model of successive annexation of States in various levels of development, in view of the so-called associated members or somehow else. Unfortunately, we have almost no works in which there is a thorough analysis of the structure of this organization, its more than 30-year history, and a bulk of articles, dissertations, and monographs, filled with its "scientific" criticism; here is, they say, a clear example of the last stage in the decay of capitalism.

Finally, what is important is that the EEC model is capable of evolution; it is not some kind of a structure etched in steel. The economic rapprochement of incoming countries is accompanied by, as is known, political rapprochement. In one of his statements during a recent trip to the Urals, M. S. Gorbachev cited words addressed to him by the former French President Giscard d'Estaing: "Soon you will have business with the European Federation." Why, maybe in such a case we finally will come to perceive more clearly the content which ought to fulfill this understanding—"federation"—if indeed we all decide to preserve this form of the Union.

Democratic Union Chairperson Interviewed

90UN2174A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Valeriya Ilinichna Novodvorskaya, leader of the Democratic Union, by S. Sokolov: "Impatience"]

[Text] "Spetsnaz, I beg of you! Spetsnaz, come here!" A woman stood with a small placard in her hands at the center of Moscow near the monument to Prince Yuryi

Dolgorukiy. "All Power to the Constituent Assembly!" The rally organized by this woman was raging about. By her standards, it was in full swing: the rally was dispersed by the spetsnaz. "Go away, go away, they will arrest you," a policeman warned her, apparently feeling sorry for this woman. The woman did not even react. Finally, three lads in white protective helmets and leather jackets arrived. "Secret police! What are you doing?" people shouted from the crowd, who 5 minutes ago were simply passers-by who had stopped to have a look at the unusual unsanctioned measure. The lads in the white helmets became even more enraged by these shouts and began snatching from the crowd not only the organizers of the rally but also the most actively outraged onlookers.

One of the leaders of the organization which 2 years ago declared itself to be the party of the transitional period, the Democratic Union [DS], and member of the coordination council of the DS, Valeriya Ilinichna Novodvorskaya, translator of technical literature at the Library of the Medical Institute No 2, did not see all of this. In the shaky police bus she was preparing for the next stage in the revolutionary struggle after the rally—the trial and 15 days in the special isolation ward.

During these 2 years, Valeriya Ilinichna had become a pure demon for the Moscow law enforcement agencies. Depending on their temperament, not only every policeman on duty but also every militia general would jump or shudder at the mention of her name. It is not by chance that the duty instructions explaining to policemen how to use the radios during rallies and whom they were to observe constantly during them, Novodvorskaya was given an honorable first place under the code "201", surpassing in importance even the people's deputies, who all together were encoded in the instructions by the word "seamen."

It is high time for the period of slips of the tongue "allegedly" democratic or "so-called party" to be over. Serious comprehension is required. We know nothing about the program of the Democratic Union. Meanwhile, if you analyze the DS program compiled 2 years ago, you will discover that almost two-thirds of it is being talked about, carried out, and discussed... in the Council of Ministers, at sessions of the Supreme Soviet, and in the CPSU Central Committee. Judge for yourself: revival of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!"; repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution; a multiparty system; condemnation of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan; condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; withdrawal of military contingents from the socialist countries; the possibility of alternative service in the army; proclamation of the Declaration of Human Rights; the need for laws on state security; the need for diversity in forms of ownership, especially private ownership; a market economy; protection of farms and, incidentally, a warning against forced decollectivization; the right to declare one's own language the official language; and so on and so forth...

Radicalism 2 years ahead of the official point of view. Furthermore, the DS openly states that its primary task is

the peaceful, non-violent changing of the social and political system in the USSR in order to create a representative parliamentary democracy and create an economically and spiritually healthy and, consequently, non-totalitarian state. In doing so, they assure that the DS is not trying to take power. But for the sake of triumph of the idea, they created an "opposition political party with respect to totalitarianism."

Valeriya Ilinichna Novodvorskaya calls this activity a revolutionary struggle. At the same time, her political credo is indicated on her membership card by two words—liberal democrat.

[Sokolov] Valeriya Ilinichna, which do you consider yourself to be more—a radical or still a liberal?

[Novodvorskaya] A liberal or a radical? You know, I am completely confused with the definitions. I am a westerner with a Russian, Slavic bias. And I am a radical, if by radicalism you mean a special idealism in politics. D.S. Merezhkovskiy explained it this way: "We do not have a city of today, but are searching for the city of the future." And I constantly feel in myself this refusal to live for today, but just for tomorrow. This is rebelliousness, purely Russian rebelliousness that has two pluses: absolute servility, on the one hand, and dissidence and irreconcilability of Avakum, on the other. And I understand perfectly well that we simply will not be able to live in a western-type society with such a composition. We will tear to pieces any reasonable, well-thought-out structure... It is understandable that under parliamentarianism we will have to abandon our rebellious habits and adopt a more patient, sober, western mentality.

But I myself, I personally, am certain that I will not be able to live this way. I have become accustomed to fighting. Unfortunately, these 20 years have deprived me of the possibility to live simply. I have become accustomed to defending something, saving someone, and am already unfit for a normal human life.

It would have been very easy for me to write about Novodvorskaya if she stopped in her radical development at the 1985 level and she had not called our society today totalitarian, concealing its bloody claws under the veil of democratization. It is tempting to talk about her 20-year, uncompromising, now already honorable dissidence, but how to explain her uncompromising nature and irreconcilability today? Dissidence despite glasnost; dissent despite perestroyka. And here "socialist realism," so disliked by Valeriya Ilinichna and by me, too, comes to the aid.

Remember how the literature textbook taught—"the surroundings and book education had a tremendous influence on forming the character of a hero in the young years." In Novodvorskaya's case, books played a secondary role, and it was mainly the "surroundings," or more accurately the genes of her great-grandfather and grandfather, that were responsible. Her great-grandfather ran away from a wealthy manor house and set out for professional revolutionaries. He founded the first social-democrat printing

house in Smolensk. Her grandfather was born in the Tobolsk jail. According to family legends, he, fighting in Budenny's cavalry during the Civil War, tried to read Kant to the Red Army soldiers. True, later on, an entire generation of Novodvorskaya's lived quietly. There were no repressed or offended persons in the family. Valeriya Ilinichna's parents are members of the CPSU, gentle, intelligent people, and quite adapted to the "system."

[Novodvorskaya] Funny as it may sound now, but such anti-collectivism and such rare individualism became apparent in me back at a tender, immature age that they did not take me either to nurseries or to kindergarten, and they even chased me out of all children's clinics, where I was treated for asthma.

[Sokolov] For political reasons? Down with the chief physician!?

[Novodvorskaya] Well, you are laughing. I refused to obey what I did not understand.

The situation was the same in school. I studied by myself, as if separated from the Soviet system of education.

[Sokolov] Certainly you did not yet know such words at that time.

[Novodvorskaya] No, but I had some instinctive actions against things.

Although I understand now that my teachers from the regular secondary school were deeply decent people—they did not write to any levels of authority and excused my youthful ardor. They gave me excellent marks, despite everything. Even when they were fully within their rights to expel me from school for refusing to attend labor instruction classes, I was given a dash in my diploma—supposedly for health reasons.

[Sokolov] Is this why the item about the voluntary nature of labor instruction of students appeared in the DS program?

[Novodvorskaya] Possibly.

[Sokolov] Perhaps the refusal of a student to study sewing can be called the first act of civil disobedience in the biography of V.I. Novodvorskaya? Twenty years later you linked the principle of non-violence, the principle of civil disobedience with the tactics of the Democratic Union—only rallies and demonstrations, only boycotts and political strikes, and only non-violent actions. The great humanistic principle of non-violence of Mahatma Gandhi enabled India to achieve independence without firing a shot. But does the Democratic Union understand this humanistic idea in this way? Is it not being transformed by the programmed refusal of the DS to have anything to do with the "ruling system?" And if a DS rally is prohibited in Pushkin Square but authorized in Luzhniki, do your uncompromising trips to the Pushkin Monument not violate that shaky balance between the parliamentarianism being born and the state

weighted down by the past? Proclaiming a great idea and defending democratic freedoms, you throw yourself under the club of the spetsnaz. Is such political masochism justified, if in the present explosive situation it may again injure and evoke the state to brutality? And is this not cruel not only to those who are hitting and those who are being hit, but also to those who simply watch these gladiator fight?

[Novodvorskaya] First of all, the main characteristic of non-violence as a form of political struggle is to conduct civil disobedience campaigns—rallies, marches, boycotts—but never to answer force with force when doing so. The side which strives for democracy, which is guided by humanitarian categories, and which is above the idea of hatred and vengeance uses non-violence as a method of broad influence of the masses in order to change the structure that is unworthy, unreasonable, and degrading for a person.

Secondly, you are wrong in saying that civil disobedience is purely an Indian idea. Mankind simply assimilated it thanks to Gandhi, since Gandhi alone was able to prevail over his enemies and was able to actually resolve the idea of national liberation on the level of non-violence. Actually, the method of absolute moral opposition to armed evil was practiced in Russia beginning in the 13th century. For me, the first action of this sort was the act by Prince Mikhail Chernigovskiy, who loudly refused at Ord to accept coronation as prince from the hands of the enslavers.

[Sokolov] Valeriya Ilinichna, when did you personally become a supporter of the idea of non-violence?

[Novodvorskaya] I became aware of it after I ended up in the Kazanskiy Special Psychiatric Prison at the age of 19 for creating an underground student group at the Institute of Foreign Languages. I emphasize, it was namely after I went through the investigatory isolation ward at Lefortov and the humiliation in the special prison. Because before this, when I was 19, being crazy about the "Narodnaya Volya" [People's Freedom], I agreed with members of the group even about an armed revolt against the regime.

The revolutionary romanticism, with which all our literature is saturated, is a generally infectious thing. And it is quite natural that if at 15 a girl ran through all the raykoms of the Komsomol and the military commissariats, asking to be a volunteer to Vietnam, at 18 she simply could not create an underground student organization. Especially in 1968, during the Prague Spring.

The group included just over 10 students, mainly children of high-ranking parents. They had their own charter and their own program, which, strange as it may seem, already had an anti-communist orientation. It is strange because at that time the "conspirators" still had not read any classical literature besides the works of Lenin, Plekhanov, Engels, and a little of Marx... The "samizdat" [underground publication of manuscripts] was not accessible to them. By the middle of her second year, Novodvorskaya

was terribly bored with pasting up appeals, writing declarations, and turning seminars on the history of the CPSU into political debates. Especially since many instructors had transferred to the Institute of Foreign Languages from the famous IFLI—the Institute of Philosophy, Literature, and History, disbanded for free-thinking. She wanted something bigger and more notorious.

That is when Valeriya Novodvorskaya suggested to her organization to go to a holiday concert at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses and throw leaflets from the balcony, and then to speak out in open judicial proceedings and expose this system.

Each of the conspirators found an urgent matter: someone was completing a course, someone was preparing for a practical training abroad, someone said that all this was good, but "if we save ourselves, we will do more." Naturally, Novodvorskaya headed for the Kremlin Palace of Congresses alone. In her handbag she had about 100 handwritten leaflets with an appeal for an uprising and a poem of her own composition "Thank You, Party." This was a poetic essay of the history of the CPSU: "Thank you, party, for all that you have done and are doing. Thank you, party, for our present hatred." In general, she composed an unbelievably long poem. And it ended in an altogether different spirit than the present DS program: "Thank you, party, for the weight of the found truth and for the shots of future battles, thank you, party!"

On 5 December 1969, several minutes before the start of the opera "Oktyabr", the leaflets flew into the orchestra. The scattered into the air very well—like a fan; the long rehearsals at home paid off.

[Novodvorskaya] Of course, it was very difficult to live after being released. It was hardly possible to return to a serene attitude after such a thing.

[Sokolov] Valeriya Ilinichna, with whose fates are you concerned, and do there exist any authorities in literature or politics for you?

[Novodvorskaya] Yes, Allende. Actually, despite what he did with the Chilean economy, I continue to respect him now. Namely for refusing to use violence. From Russian history, it is primarily the populists, Sofya Borodina, for example. Then there is Metropolitan Filipp Kolychev and Radishchev. The members of the "Narodnaya Volya" also were my idols. Incidentally, I like them very much today, too. I understand what moved them. They did not so much want to kill as to hurt themselves against this wall before the eyes of everyone. They deliberately committed suicide.

[Sokolov] But not it is clear what a bloody path they blazed for Russian society with their terrorist acts...

[Novodvorskaya] Unquestionably, this led to terrible consequences. The ideas of Red terror sprouted from the experience of the "Narodnaya Volya." But they were worthwhile people. I cannot renounce them, Perovskaya, Zhelyabov, although, of course, I never would have acted

the same way. They committed something irreparable—they taught the intelligentsia to be captivated by blood and forced the Russian society to sympathize with itself. To sympathize with murder.

Yuriy Trifonov wrote a wise book on the members of the "Narodnaya Volya." In "Impatience" [Neterpeniye] he separated the idea of terror from its bearers. I soon hope to publish Albert Camus' play "Righteous Men," in which Camus, in my view, supplements Trifonov. The members of the "Narodnaya Volya" were real people, but they did a terrible deed, which they themselves did not realize.

[Sokolov] Yes, but were they the only ones. How many people in the past and in today have trampled us with their good intentions, if not on the road to Hell then on the road towards Hell. Therefore, I want to ask following Solzhenitsin: "...is a consistently moral action in history accomplishable at all. Or what kind of moral maturity of society should must there be for such activities?" How realistic today is a middle, centrist line in politics, how likely is consolidation of our society? That line which the Octoberists Dmitriy Shipov and Aleksandr Guchkov tried to implement beginning in 1905?

[Novodvorskaya] Morality is possible only in a policy that rejects violence. But morality does not have to be combined with moderation or with a refusal to decisively state one's views. Actually, the situation is very recognizable: the Octoberists who enthusiastically and loyally united around the tsarist manifesto of 17 October resemble somewhat those forces in our present-day political configuration who with the same enthusiasm and loyalty are uniting around Gorbachev. This is a sufficiently powerful, but interesting tendency. It seems to me that we have already been taking the paths of "revolution from above." It is assumed that the Russian intelligentsia was successful in its acts and intentions only when it joined in an alliance with state power.

It was nearing midnight. Our conversation had long ago ran past the 2 hours I had planned for the interview. Actually, Russian people can talk unbelievably long about politics, about Russia, and about the state—and still never agree or understand one another.

Non-violence, freedom...but for some reason I cannot perceive the DS as anything other than irreconcilable fighters, sort of Bolsheviks of today, who are capable of everything and cannot be stopped by anything. And when in the newspapers we see Novodvorskaya tearing up a portrait of Lenin or Gorbachev, what can come to the reader's mind besides the thought of her irreconcilability and readiness for violence? Are only the journalists and the mass media guilty of such an erroneous perception that follows from the DS program? After all, only after detailed explanations by Valeriya Ilinichna did it become understandable that, having torn up the portraits with ease, the DS does not ever attack living people. That her gesture was only shock therapy.

Dissent is becoming more authorized in our country. It looks as if opposition will turn into a profession and finally acquire civilized forms, for which, by her own admission, the "revolutionary democrat" Valeriya Ilinichna Novodvorskaya is no longer suited. The term "revolution" should remain forever in the 20th century—even if in the variation of the Democratic Union it sounds like "Long live non-violent democratic revolution." But has the time not come for us for simply EVOLUTION?

Maybe I am mistaken, these are my personal difficulties, but I am convinced: super-radicalism, irreconcilability, not wishing to have anything to do with "this system," and impatience finally, if they dart out on the square, irreversibly strike a spark. And we all represent a large stack of dry hay. And here even the most humane ideas of non-violence will not help.

Lines from the "Peterburškiy romans" [St. Petersburg Romance] by Aleksandr Galich are written as an epigraph on the DS membership card.

And everything is the same, not simpler,

Our time tests us—

Can you go to the square,

Will you dare to go to the square,

...At that appointed hour?!

This poem was written on 22 August 1968. Since that time we have learned to go to the square. Now, it seems, we have a different problem—what comes after the square? And how to leave this square? Lech Walesa, it seems, is most concerned by this now...

RSFSR People's Deputies Quit Party

90UN2433A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 29, 21-27 Jul 90 p 4

[Declaration by RSFSR People's Deputies—CPSU Members]

[Text] The 28th CPSU Congress did not live up to the expectations of democratic forces in the party and society. The hopes of transforming the CPSU into a parliamentary democratic party turned out to be illusory. The party, which has brought the country to a most severe economic, social, and political crisis, retains its command structures in state bodies and does not wish to give up its monopoly on political power. Trampling on the laws and standards of morality, the CPSU leadership retains property which rightfully should belong to the people. The most important decisions of the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies on sovereignty and power may be blocked at any time based on decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress—submitting to them, we will not be able to carry out our deputy duties and the electors' mandate.

All this dictates a clear choice to us. On moral and political grounds, we believe it is impossible to continue to remain in the ranks of such a party.

We call upon all supporters of democratic renewal of the country to unite in the broad social movement "Democratic Russia." We propose to hold a Democratic Congress in the fall of 1990 to create a broad political coalition capable of protecting the vital interests of the peoples of Russia.

1. Adrov, A.N.	70 T.O.*	Moscow Oblast
2. Alekseyev, G.A.	384 T.O.	Irkutsk Oblast
3. Ambartsumov, Ye.A.	53 T.O.	City of Moscow
4. Anokhin, V.M.	464 T.O.	Kuybyshev Oblast
5. Artyunov, M.G.	48 T.O.	City of Moscow
6. Balala, V.A.	337 T.O.	Voronezh Oblast
7. Belov, V.I.	407 T.O.	Kalinin Oblast
8. Bogayenko, N.V.	521 T.O.	Novosibirsk Oblast
9. Bondarev, G.S.	89 T.O.	Moscow Oblast
10. Bocharov, M.A.	17 T.O.	City of Moscow
11. Vaynshteyn, V.Kh.	56 N.T.O.**	Novgorod Oblast
12. Varov, V.K.	121 T.O.	City of Leningrad
13. Gorban, S.F.	114 N.T.O.	Mari ASSR
14. Gorelov, G.V.	83 T.O.	Moscow Oblast
15. Gosporyan, F.G.	298 T.O.	Bryansk Oblast
16. Yeskop, Yu.A.	91 T.O.	Moscow Oblast
17. Zakharov, M.L.	13 T.O.	City of Moscow
18. Zinov'yev, B.A.	119 T.O.	City of Leningrad
19. Zolotukhin, B.A.	46 T.O.	City of Moscow
20. Ivanilov, Yu.P.	79 T.O.	Moscow Oblast

21. Ikonnikov, V.I.	313 T.O.	Volgograd Oblast
22. Kachanov, O.Yu.	167 T.O.	Krasnodar Kray
23. Kim, Ye.N.	735 T.O.	Ulyanovsk Oblast
24. Klimenok, A.L.	571 T.O.	Penza Oblast
25. Klyuvgant, V.V.	758 T.O.	Chelyabinsk Oblast
26. Kozhokin, Ye.M.	21 T.O.	City of Moscow
27. Komchatov, V.F.	59 T.O.	City of Moscow
28. Kononov, A.L.	31 T.O.	City of Moscow
29. Kopeyka, A.K.	20 N.T.O.	Maritime Kray
30. Kosopkin, A.S.	751 T.O.	Chelyabinsk Oblast
31. Kuznetsov, V.M.	27 T.O.	City of Moscow
32. Lunin, V.V.	1 T.O.	City of Moscow
33. Lysenko, V.N.	28 T.O.	City of Moscow
34. Medvedev, A.N.	29 T.O.	City of Moscow
35. Mikhaylov, S.A.	648 T.O.	Sakhalin Oblast
36. Oleynik, V.I.	4 N.T.O.	City of Moscow
37. Pekarskaya, T.K.	467 T.O.	Kuybyshev Oblast
38. Paramonov, A.R.	81 T.O.	Moscow Oblast
39. Pekhotin, A.V.	666 T.O.	Sverdlovsk Oblast
40. Rebrikov, V.A.	23 T.O.	City of Moscow
41. Sidorenko, Yu.S.	601 T.O.	Rostov Oblast
42. Surkov, A.P.	40 T.O.	City of Moscow
43. Tarasov, Ye.A.	600 T.O.	Rostov Oblast
44. Tikhomirov, A.N.	8 N.T.O.	Moscow Oblast
45. Tikhonov, V.A.	198 T.O.	Krasnoyarsk Kray
46. Travnikov, V.N.	115 T.O.	City of Leningrad
47. Tumov, M.M.	100 N.T.O.	Kabardino-Balkar ASSR
48. Utkin, A.K.	356 T.O.	Gorkiy Oblast
49. Filatov, S.A.	24 T.O.	City of Moscow
50. Khramchenkov, Yu.P.	421 T.O.	Kaluga Oblast
51. Sheynis, V.L.	47 T.O.	City of Moscow
52. Yushenkov, S.N.	20 T.O.	City of Moscow
53. Yakimenko, N.T.	219 T.O.	Maritime Kray
54. Yakovlev, V.B.	110 N.T.O.	Komi ASSR

* territorial okrug

** national territorial okrug

We call upon democrats of all the country's republics to unite.

Moscow, 14 July 1990

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Factions Profiled

90UN2431A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 29, 21-27 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by L. Yefimova, A. Sobyanin, and D. Yuryev, members of the Constituents Club, USSR Academy of

Sciences, under the rubric "Election Results at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies": "Are the People and the Nomenklatura One and United?"]

[Text] The RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies revealed a demarcation within the body of deputies into two large groups, one of which is consolidating behind the "democratic Russian platform, while the other supports the position of the "Communists of Russia" group. What actual social conflicts lie at the root of this demarcation?

We could base an analysis on the voting pattern of the individual deputies, in votes on issues of fundamental significance.

The figures we have on the results of the individual voting by 1,060 RSFSR people's deputies enable us to place a rigorous quantitative foundation under the unconstructive, purely emotional criteria of "democratic" or "Communist." In the following table the socio-professional makeup of the Congress participants (according to the classification of A. K. Nazimova and RSFSR people's deputy V. L. Sheynis; see ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 17, 1990) is compared with the results of individually-tallied votes on 10 items (on giving precedence to republic laws over USSR laws, on suspending Article 6 of the RSFSR Constitution, and on a number of other issues on which the deputies' votes were divided approximately equally and on which there was practically total unity within each of the two blocs). The following are given for each socioprofessional group: the percentage of votes by a group's deputies cast from the position of the "Democratic Russia" [DR] bloc (); the percentage of votes cast from the position of the "Communists of Russia" [CR] bloc ()�

	DR (%)	CR (%)
1. Top-echelon political leadership	4	96
2. Upper administrative echelon	8	90
of that:		
Secretaries of CPSU oblast committees and city committees of large cities	13	86
CPSU Central Committee executive officials	0	100
Chairmen of councils of ministers of autonomous republics, their deputies, ministers of the USSR, RSFSR, and autonomous republics, ministry executive officials	24	72
Chairmen of kray executive committees, oblast executive committees, executive committees of large cities, and their deputies	16	82
Military leadership—top echelon	16	82
KGB leadership—top echelon	6	94
MVD leadership—top echelon	40	60
Armed Forces leadership, autonomous republics	9	91
3. Middle administrative echelon	45	51

	DR (%)	CR (%)
of that:		
Secretaries of CPSU rayon committees, city committees of medium-size and small cities, department chiefs of CPSU oblast committees	37	60
Chairmen of rayon executive committees, executive committees of medium-size and small cities, oblast executive committee department-level executives	42	54
Military leadership—middle echelon	63	37
KGB leadership—middle echelon	27	65
MVD leadership—middle echelon	55	42
Enterprise managers, their deputies, chief specialist personnel	50	46
Sovkhoz directors, their deputies, chief specialist personnel	40	56
Kolkhoz chairmen, their deputies, chief specialist personnel	39	57
Scientific research institute directors, higher educational institution rectors and their deputies	62	35
Chiefs of main administrations and territorial administrations of krays and oblasts	46	50
4. Lower administrative echelon	74	23
of that:		
Party committee secretaries	84	15
Military leadership—lower echelon	73	22
MVD leadership—lower echelon	86	11
Enterprise shop and section supervisors, their deputies, foremen	71	25
Kolkhoz and sovkhoz subdivision heads	35	59
Subdivision heads at scientific research institutes, higher educational institutions, and their deputies	82	17
School principals and their deputies	77	20
Administrative heads of medical establishments and their deputies	69	28
5. Workers and kolkhoz farmers	74	24
of that:		
Industrial workers	75	23
Kolkhoz farmers and sovkhoz workers	60	35
6. Intellectual workers	87	11
of that:		
Engineers, technicians	92	8
Teachers	86	14
Doctors	66	23
Scientific workers and higher educational institution faculty	92	7
Journalists	82	13
Legal profession	85	14

The bar graphs below [not reproduced] graphically show the basic results of our analysis, reflecting the correlation of positions within large social groups as well as within certain professional groups which are of particular interest.

These figures compel one to entertain serious doubts (those who have not yet done so) about the claim that the disposition of forces at the Congress fairly faithfully reflects the polarization of political views ("pluralism of opinions") which has allegedly formed within society. In actual fact the invisible line separating opposing forces, which runs through all societal structures, is defined by the incompatibility of sociopolitical interests between the bulk of society and the top-level executive echelon. The table and the bar graphs clearly show where the principal line of political demarcation runs: workers and intellectuals, kolkhoz farmers and military officers, policemen and former dissidents, enterprise party committee secretaries and party-unaffiliated unofficial organizations—that is, all those on whom attempts are periodically made to set one group against the other or to "defend" one group from another—turn out to be together, "on the same side of the barricades." On the other side we find the dedicated fighters for the cause of our society's directing and guiding nomenklatura, that is, those from whom in fact all of us must be defended. This is essential, because rigid oversight by the apparatus and the undemocratic nature of the electoral laws have guaranteed for the top echelon almost as many slots at the congress as go to all the rest of the people combined, and consequently this has enabled them to block radical political decisions to the benefit of a tiny little group of nomenklatura bureaucrats.

Gidashev at Leningrad Party Conference

90UN2439A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech at party conference: "Speech by B. V. Gidashev"]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! The CPSU oblast committee plenum which was held a few days ago confirmed the urgent need to hold a special session of our conference. This decision was dictated by two circumstances. First of all, by the extremely acute and varying reaction on the part of Communists and party-unaffiliated as well as the mass media, caused by the results of the first phase of the Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Secondly, by the endeavor on the part of the Leningrad delegation to confer additionally with you on a number of matters, including matters of tactics and cadres, prior to departing for the impending 28th CPSU Congress.

The members of the party oblast committee bureau who, while in Moscow, held what one might call an unprecedented "field" session, also were unanimous in the opinion that such extensive consultation is extremely important in view of the complicated situation which has developed.

In this briefing I shall endeavor to summarize the exchange of opinions among the members of the oblast committee bureau, the debate and discussion at the oblast committee plenum, and the stated opinions of the members of your delegation and other delegations at the Constituent Congress.

First of all I should state that without question a major, out-of-the-ordinary event has taken place. At the same time the congress definitely provided more than enough serious food for thought and reason for anxious concern. There were clearly too few speeches of a constructive, substantial nature, endeavoring to respond to the issues stirring the emotions of every party member in this republic. What should be the political countenance of a reborn Communist Party of the Russian Federation? How should its relations with the CPSU be formed? How could the situation change in connection with the functioning of a new political structure? There prevailed an unceasing desire on the part of the majority of delegates, under the effect of deputy and parliamentary battles, to let loose a powerful broadside of criticism at deficiencies in the work performance at the central echelon, to share one's local misfortunes and problems, and to elect officers as quickly as possible. Some of the speeches frankly provoked a storm of charges leveled at the congress, charges of conservatism and a mass political rally atmosphere.

There are substantial grounds for this.

One can agree with the reasoned critical comments made by some of the delegates, but one must sharply condemn the peremptory, unreasoned attacks leveled at the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, which by implication cast doubt on the very need for growth in perestroika processes.

One can acknowledge the fundamental importance of the question of the special place of the worker class within the party. But one cannot accept an oversimplified treatment of the worker issue without considering the general changes in the social structures of developed countries and Soviet society, caused in particular by the integration of science and production and by economic reforms. Such a deliberately simplified approach fosters an unhealthy setting off of the workers against the intelligentsia and hinders consolidation of society at a sharp historical turning point.

Attempts by those who took part in the Initiative Congress of Russian [RSFSR] Communists to seek in the past prescriptions for reforming the party which are not always acceptable, as well as the nihilistic attitude toward the history of the CPSU and Soviet society on the part of many, although not all, of the representatives of the Democratic Platform led to a polarization of positions, a sharp demarcation of views, and outspoken clashes of group arrogance and passions. This was intolerable for such a serious political forum, at a critical

moment for the fate of the party, and evoked justified negative reaction on the part of many Communists.

The course of debate and discussion and work on the documents of the Constituent Congress clearly revealed major "gaps" in comprehension of theoretical points pertaining to development of the CPSU and organization of a Communist Party of the RSFSR. Nor did the keynote address, which on the whole teemed with well-known points, make a significant contribution toward resolution of these issues.

These issues are being stated with increasing acuteness by primary party organizations and by practical realities. We can see, for example, how lagging behind in theory places party committees and party members in an impasse in the handling of specific practical activities.

The problem of interrelations between state and party and their structures has been little studied. This is having a negative impact on the work performance of Communists in the Soviets and with the Soviets. And there are many who have only the vaguest notion of how one should act in a constructive manner in conditions of parliamentary opposition.

Party policy and the functioning of party structures in conditions of a market-oriented economy is another question the answer to which must be sought right today, without postponement. It would not be a good thing to fall behind events, when many functions, such as those of production- entity party organizations, appear in fairly vague form at present.

We frequently talk about problems of the immediate present and concentrate our attention, figuratively speaking, on the visible portion of the iceberg. Genuine forecasting, situation prediction grounded on scientific approaches, is frequently relegated to a secondary level of importance. The party, which has been the target of many critical comments, including valid comments, has seen time and again where this leads. It is high time, as they say, to draw the appropriate conclusions from this criticism. These conclusions, however, are once again late in coming, as was demonstrated by the course of discussion of problems at the Constituent Congress.

Here too I would like to say some positive words about the Democratic Platform, the supporters of which, although purely empirically, constantly endeavor in their proposals to take into consideration the possible development of events and to look to tomorrow. All of us need to embrace such an endeavor, bolstering it with a thorough analysis of the processes of perestroika.

I would like to make reference to the following fact in connection with what has been stated. One of the speeches at the congress contained the statement that we must take a closer look at the interaction between the party and the system of presidential authority which has begun to form in this country. This idea, which is extremely important as I view things, was not further developed. And yet we are dealing here with one of the

basic strategic issues. And if I am able to speak at the 28th CPSU Congress, I shall definitely endeavor to address this major problem.

Unfortunately I must state that the level of preparation for the Russian Party Conference, which became the Constituent Congress, left much to be desired. In any case we did not receive in advance for familiarization purposes either the text of the keynote address or the draft documents.

In this situation those materials which had been prepared at the regional level in the course of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress in many respects saved the day. I would mention in particular the political documents of the Moscow, Leningrad, and certain other party organizations. They found expression, although in reduced form, in the congress resolution entitled "On the Present Moment and Priority Tasks of the Communist Party of the RSFSR." Those harsh accusations and complaints leveled at the participants in the Constituent Congress by its opponents are a subject for separate discussion. It is essentially a question of the authority to transform the Russian Party Conference into a congress and the establishment of a republic Communist Party prior to the 28th CPSU Congress in the absence of program and bylaws documents. The question of creating a party of "new rightists" is importunately brought forward. And, finally, clearly ringing out in the chorus of critics is a refusal to accept the results of the election of the Central Committee first secretary.

I shall discuss these items one at a time.

First item: did the conference have the right and authority to bestow on itself the status of Constituent Congress, and who authorized it to do so?

We might recall M. S. Gorbachev's keynote address at the conference. He clearly stated that the powers and authority of the delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress entitle them to make any, I emphasize, any decision, including pertaining to the organizational arrangement of the party. This point is fully in conformity with the CPSU Party Rules.

As for the discussion of the need to establish a party of Russian [RSFSR] Communists, as you know, the overall discussion had been in progress for months, including in the Leningrad party organization. I might mention the results of the referendum held by the oblast party committee. The results unequivocally confirmed that the overwhelming majority were for establishing such a party.

We were witnesses to the fact that stifling this idea at the central echelon led to a powerful movement from the grass-roots level and to the holding of an Initiative Congress of Russian Communists in Leningrad.

In this situation there was formed both in the Russian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and on the Russian Party Conference preparations committee a

quite definite opinion to the effect that time was of the essence in forming a republic Communist Party. This position was published in print in advance and failed to evoke a negative reaction. At least the party oblast committee received no such reactions.

I suppose that if the matter had been put off once again, its resolution would have taken place at the grass-roots level, and this would only have complicated things within the CPSU.

This is confirmed if only by the fact that more than 90 percent of the delegates, many of whom were acting on the direct instructions of the party members who had elected them, spoke out in favor of making the conference into a constituent congress.

Second: the opinion that a party without program and without bylaws was created at the Constituent Congress would seem to be unfounded. The resolution passed by the delegates calling for the forming of a Communist Party of the RSFSR clearly stated that it shall be a component part of the CPSU, shall be guided by CPSU program documents and Party Rules, and shall have a common party card. Thus essentially what happened at the congress was the organizational establishment of an autonomous party organization of the Russian Federation, constituting part of the CPSU and mirror-reflecting its current problems and efforts. Everyone should be clearly aware of this.

Third: is the assessment of the congress as a forum of "new rightists," which dealt a blow to the policy of radical reforms, valid? This view is dominant in the foreign press, which is replete with the most somber predictions. It was hastily seized upon by all those who seek to evoke a new wave of stress and tension in and around the party.

Is this true? Did there indeed take place a return to an orthodox model of the party and to a distorted view of its role in societal development? Let us endeavor to rise above emotions and to analyze everything calmly, steering clear of one-sided assessments.

In the search for an answer let us turn to the documents adopted by the Congress: they indicate the opposite. They indicate a desire to consolidate healthy forces of the party and the peoples of the republic on a platform of perestroika, to cooperate constructively with the Soviets at all levels in implementing urgent political and socio-economic tasks, to ensure unity within the CPSU, and to be on an equal status with the party organizations of the other union republics. The points of the draft Program Declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Party Rules are supported for the most part in the specially adopted resolution.

There is also another argument supporting the above thesis. Sufficient time was made available at the congress following M. S. Gorbachev's keynote address for representatives of various views and currents within the party, including the Democratic Platform, to speak.

All of them were able to state and substantiate their point of view. This very fact is quite noteworthy. It fails to jibe with the thesis claiming a swing to the right by RSFSR Communists, a thesis which is being foisted on the public. Consequently this thesis cannot be considered convincing, let alone indisputable.

Obviously the election of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR should be discussed separately. It is clear that the majority adopted a decision with which some take issue, which evoked conflictive responses and even some claims that the position of the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary had weakened, that the conservatives were launching an offensive on the reformers, and other such excessively emotional assessments.

But how should one treat the election of I. K. Polozkov to a high party office? I would imagine that it should be treated first and foremost as a political reality. It is high time for all of us to stop our talk about political maneuvering within the apparatus, about cabinet intrigues, and other such attributes of the past. Democratic processes are in motion in this country and in the CPSU. All issues—today we are encountering this practically every day—are resolved by a vote. Regardless of whether we like a given choice, it is a decision of the majority, a democratic decision. It is a decision which must at least be respected if we claim to advocate democratic standards. And we must also understand that Moscow and Leningrad are not all of Russia, no matter how great the importance of these acknowledged centers for the affairs of the entire republic.

Now: what are the possible consequences of what has happened? Many opinions and apprehensions are stated on this score. Many Communists believe, for example, that the party could turn from the road of radical reforms and roll back to former positions, that today a split within the party is becoming inevitable. Behind all of this looms that same shadow of days of the distant past, when the one foremost individual in the party was deemed to personify the party.

One must understand, comrades, that the times have fundamentally changed. Today the CPSU oblast committee and its bureau, as you can see, are constantly conferring with you, with the primary party organizations, in working out one decision or another. This is becoming an inalterable standard of party internal affairs at that moment when the consciousness of many Communists has not been freed of old stereotypes. Today we and you express our disagreement on a number of issues with the opinion of the General Secretary, Politburo, and Central Committee, and sometimes we successfully carry through our view. This is an entirely normal phenomenon in the party.

I am convinced that the influence of party organizations and individual Communists is also causing substantial changes in I. V. Polozkov's position on a number of issues and will be taken into consideration by him in his

work, as is attested by his speech at the congress. Nor could things be otherwise as regards serious policy and the policy line he is implementing.

A great deal will also depend on the position taken by the country's major party organizations, including the Leningrad organization. The majority of its representatives, judging from the assessments we have heard, worked constructively at the congress and displayed a fairly radical line. At the same time we must realize that our delegation is heterogeneous in its makeup and reflects a broad and diverse spectrum of movements and opinions within the party.

Now the task consists in additionally electing the most highly-respected individuals to the central bodies of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, persons capable of championing within these bodies the position of the people of Leningrad and party members.

There is another matter: what should be the procedure of election to the Central Committee? We insisted that Central Committee members from Leningrad and the oblast should be elected at an oblast party conference. We also succeeded in obtaining our fair share of slots—six persons, that is one for every 100,000 party members.

We can do more, however. There will also be a list of candidates to be elected by the congress. We should also bear this in mind. In short, we must have a highly serious attitude toward this matter, considering the weight of the Leningrad party organization in formulating the policy of the republic Central Committee.

The situation is somewhat different as regards electing party members to the CPSU central bodies. But this will be presented in an additional briefing session, in view of the need to confer.

Thus our approach is to strengthen radical trends in the Communist Party of the RSFSR through maximum possible Leningrad representation in its central elected bodies. Proceeding from this, one should also seek an answer to the following question: would it not be advisable for the oblast party organization and its primary elements to refrain until a certain time from entering the republic Communist Party, while at the same time remaining in the CPSU?

Here one must bear in mind the following. First of all, the Communist Party of the RSFSR, as already noted, is a component part of the CPSU, and failure to recognize it could be interpreted as refusal to acknowledge the organizational and ideological foundations of the party as a whole. Secondly, absence of the Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and certain other of the most radically-inclined party organizations from the republic Communist Party could have a negative effect on development of the new political entity and cause it to shift sharply in the direction of intensification of conservative tendencies.

I feel that we should not ignore these realities when making a decision on such a fundamental issue.

Addressing the matter of apprehensions about a possible mass exodus from the CPSU following the republic congress, we must consider these apprehensions in our course of action. At the same time I am convinced that it is primarily those who have already parted ways with the party in their thoughts and deeds and who now are merely looking for a pretext to turn in their party cards who will leave party ranks.

I have repeatedly stated my position in this regard and shall state it once again. We do not join a party of a specific individual, even if he is a highly eminent politician and major personality. We join a party because we support its tasks and strategic goals, because we are convinced supporters of the party. The deformations of the past led to violation of this fundamental principle, the consequences of which are acutely felt to this day.

A Communist Party of the RSFSR has been formed: that is an accomplished fact. We must clearly perceive, however, that only the first step has been taken on the road to organizational establishment of a new political force.

Serious, painstaking work on forming and shaping the foundations of its activities is just now beginning. It is clear that this should be a radical party armed with a constructive program of specific practical actions and attractive positive ideas, a party comprising a component part of a common, unified CPSU.

In this connection I believe that there is no need to alter the basic approaches and positions hammered out collectively during the second phase of the Leningrad Party Conference. The main idea of the Political Declaration by Leningrad Communists—the idea of a civil peace and active work by the party toward its establishment—was unequivocally supported at the Constituent Congress and is reflected in its documents. It is another matter that the road from a theoretical understanding of this thesis to its practical implementation will in all probability prove to be difficult. The fact is that the congress itself provided a good deal of evidence of this.

Its important lessons must be fully taken into consideration during the 28th CPSU Congress. We must not allow termination of constructive discussion and debate.

Apparently the not entirely successful experience of the dress rehearsal for the all-party forum has caused a number of party organizations to suggest postponement of the date for convening the 28th CPSU Congress. I would like to hear the opinion of the conference delegates on this matter. To our knowledge many party members responded negatively to this suggestion. Fairly weighty arguments are presented. The general public is placing high hopes on the forthcoming conference as regards further reform of the party in the process of perestroika, and it should not be postponed "to a later date."

In addition, the Leningrad delegation is prepared for political discussion and debate and to defend its principled position regarding the fundamental directions of CPSU activity. Our Political Declaration to the 28th CPSU Congress was forged out in frank and firm comradely debate with the participation of representatives of at times diametrically opposed views. It is time to implement these points, which were formulated on the basis of a consensus.

Today it is important once more jointly to consider our tactical actions at the congress. I feel, for example, that we should insist on the opportunity to review in advance a number of basic congress documents and to confer with Leningrad party members on the contents of these documents. It might make sense to form a working group made up of members of the CPSU oblast committee, a group which would enable the Leningrad delegation, when in Moscow, to determine the opinions and attitudes of the primary party organizations on various key issues.

I would also like to hear appropriate suggestions by conference delegates on how best to organize our work during this period.

In conclusion I feel that it is essential to stress that right now is not the time to give in to pessimism, to engage in somber predictions and to give up. Let us rather give thought to our collective responsibility for the fate of the Communist Party, for the values and priorities of our chosen socialist course of development, and for *perestroyka*. Having become fully aware of our collective responsibility, we shall move forward, sweeping aside the old and blazing a trail for the new.

Prokofyev on Russian Party Congress

90UN2438A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev, CPSU Moscow City Committee first secretary, by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA reporter V. Yevseyev, under the rubric "In Response to Your Letters and Calls: Monthly Get-Togethers at the City Party Committee": "June, Moscow, the Political Thermometer at the Boiling Point"]

[Text] **Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the CPSU Moscow City Committee, comments on reader letters and phone calls in an interview with a MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent.**

The beginning of this summer did not bring us hot weather. But if a political thermometer were placed in the capital during these June days, the mercury would perhaps rise practically to the boiling point.

Before Muscovites were able fully to assess the results of the city party conference, which our newspaper, evidently with precipitous optimism, called a dress rehearsal for the

28th CPSU Congress, another newspaper, with greater justification although for more regrettable reasons, applied this comparison to another party forum.

The results of the Russian Party Conference, which ended its proceedings in the status of a Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, results which were both anticipated and predicted, suddenly turned out to be unexpected and unpredictable. They evoked about as broad a spectrum of opinions as ever occurs: from total approval to turning in one's party card.

And if this republic congress constitutes a dress rehearsal for the all-union party conference, one is concerned indeed. Will there be enough time to assimilate its lessons and to change anything at all? After all, it is only hours to the opening of the 28th CPSU Congress.

Who Determined the Fate of the Congress?

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] **Yuriy Anatolyevich, let us begin with the shortest and probably the most offensive letter the editors have received following the Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Here it is. It essentially consists of a single line: "One is staggered at the intellectual level of those assembled."**

[Prokofyev] Well, one can understand the writer's irritation. But another thing is incomprehensible and unpleasant: why did the author print his message [to avoid using his handwriting], and why did he not give his name and address? Incidentally, this is one more confirmation of how closely the new and the old are still interwoven in our lives, the desire to be ultra-bold, and fundamental cowardice.

However, I have encountered such an opinion, and expressed by no means anonymously, both in the press and in conversations. Indeed, many persons who are dissatisfied with the results of the congress seek a reason for this in the qualitative makeup of the body of delegates.

Let us take everything as it is, however. We Russian Communists chose our own representatives. And the overwhelming majority of delegates were elected in the new manner: in party districts, by direct secret ballot, with contesting candidates. That is, in the most democratic manner.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Nevertheless many of our readers—engineer S. Polevoy, retired persons L. Antipina and V. Boguslavskiy, and Sverdlovsk student L. Sergeyev, for example—are of the opinion that this congress was a congress of apparatchiks. In fact, 1,171 of the 2,768 delegates are party workers....

[Prokofyev] Well, in the first place not all party workers are apparatchiks. In the second place, I repeat, the party members themselves elected them. Incidentally, with the former system of elections, there would have been considerably fewer party workers at the congress. In any case

a situation such as occurred here in Moscow, where three party rayon committee secretaries were elected from a single rayon, simply could not have happened. I am convinced that there would have been considerably more representatives of both the intelligentsia and workers....

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you have nostalgia for those times when elections were based on a list of candidate allocations?

[Prokofyev] Of course not. But in my opinion what we have here are shortcomings pertaining to elections by party district. That is, the new electoral system requires additional thoughtful consideration and improvement. But that is a matter for the future. For the time being the choice has been made. And it was made by party members themselves, in an entirely democratic fashion.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] The choice has been made. But does the makeup of the congress adequately represent the disposition of forces within RSFSR party organizations? Does it reflect the correlation of views and the correlation of current policy positions?

[Prokofyev] I believe that it essentially does. Like it or not, these are current realities. They cannot be ignored.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] In their letters a number of readers frankly question the legal authority of the Constituent Congress. We elected delegates to the CPSU Congress, knowing that they would be discussing the question of establishing a republic party, but we did not elect delegates to a Constituent Congress, and we did not instruct them to form a party and to elect its central bodies. Many demand that the results of this congress simply be declared null and void. What is your view on this matter, Yuriy Anatolyevich?

[Prokofyev] I hope those who hold that view will forgive me for my harsh candor, but I would call their arguments apparat games. In what is still the recent past the old apparat used precisely such attempts, clinging to the canvas of a fait accompli with their bureaucratic hooks, in an attempt to exert influence on that fait accompli if it was not to their liking.

We might recall that the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum, when it adopted the decision to hold a Russian Party Conference, quite specifically defined its agenda. Therefore RSFSR party members, in electing delegates to the CPSU Congress and simultaneously to their republic conference, knew that this matter—the question of forming a Russian Communist Party—would be on the agenda at this conference. And the delegates, elected in conformity with a representative standard specifying one delegate for every 4,000 party members, were empowered to make this decision.

In addition, the question of forming a Russian Communist Party was discussed at many regional party conferences. Even a special resolution was adopted at our Moscow city conference, calling on Muscovites and the delegates to the Russian Party Conference to support

transformation of this conference into a constituent congress and to support the forming of a Russian Communist Party. It is another matter altogether that we suggested that elections of party central bodies be held during the second phase of the conference.

I recently spoke with a comrade from an interclub party group. He brought up the same issue—the question of the legal authority of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party. I said to him: be honest, if the results of this congress had been different, would you have brought up the question? He replied: no. In my opinion many people should themselves answer this question just as honestly.

In my opinion attempts to declare an adopted decision unlawful merely because it is not to our liking are an unhealthy phenomenon.

Why Did They Attack Perestroyka?

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, how do you assess the results of the Constituent Congress? Did they take you by surprise?

[Prokofyev] MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA readers probably recall—and from our conversations in particular—that until fairly recently I was opposed to forming a Communist Party of the RSFSR, believing that this would only intensify centrifugal tendencies in society and would bring up a number of new problems, such as, for example, the status of the party organizations of autonomous entities within the RSFSR, in front of which there would appear one more step on the way to the center, to the party Central Committee. This would give the party a federalist character, but I nevertheless felt—and I still do feel!—that a unified political force, embodied in the CPSU, is necessary in order to recover from the crisis in which our country finds itself.

But events were developing in such a manner that the situation had changed. And in spite of the negative elements which establishment of the RSFSR Communist Party will, I am convinced, bring to the political situation in this country, nevertheless its creation was needed. First of all because a genuine multiparty system had already begun to form in Russia, and in these conditions the absence of a republic Communist Party meant loss of political initiative. Secondly, Russia has proclaimed economic and political sovereignty. This means that it also needs a strong political organization embracing the republic as a whole. But all the new parties are quite weak at the present time and lack developed structures. Only a republic Communist Party could become such a strong political organization.

All this overcame my doubts about establishment of an RSFSR Communist Party. At the same time I well understood that this would not be a constituent congress of a new Communist Party. No such task was being formulated. The sole agenda was integration, integration of the republic's regional party organizations into a

single republic organization operating within the framework of the CPSU. Therefore I was expecting from this congress nothing other than a declaration of the establishment of a republic Communist Party. Nor could anything else have been expected, since pre-congress preparations had been minimal to say the least, purely of an organizational nature. For this reason I view the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party purely as a unifying congress.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] And in this sense did it live up to your hopes?

[Prokofyev] In this sense, yes. A republic Communist Party was established.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] And in other respects?

[Prokofyev] Quite a bit has recently been said about the nature of this congress. There is probably no point in repeating what has already been said or in commenting on any specific points. I have already said that the situation which has developed in society is a crisis situation, caused not only by what we have inherited from the past but also by mistakes made in the course of perestroika—all this certainly could have caused a swing to the right. But what in fact took place at the congress in my opinion exceeded all predictions.

I shall state quite frankly that I simply was not expecting to hear in the statements made by some of the delegates such a lack of comprehension of the processes taking place in this country or to feel such nostalgia, I would call it, for the past, such a devotion to a dogmatic interpretation of Marxist theory and to state-administrative socialism. It constituted a powerful blow from the right at the policy of perestroika.

Unquestionably this country's political leadership deserves criticism. Just as all of us leaders of regional party organizations merit criticism. But in this case it seems to me that the cutting edge of criticism was directed not at specific errors and mistakes but rather at the very policy line, at the very course being taken toward political and economic renewal of society, at those new forces which want to democratize party affairs and to give the party contemporary respect and authority in the eyes of the people, before whom the party indeed bears blame in many regards.

Unfortunately this was one of the principal, regrettable results of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Election of the leadership of the RSFSR Communist Party was also one of the key elements in the congress proceedings....

[Prokofyev] Yes. Here as well the position of the Moscow City Party Conference and correspondingly of the Moscow delegation at the congress sharply differed from the position approved by the congress majority. We felt then and we feel now that the elected bodies should have been formed at a second stage of proceedings, after

the 28th CPSU Congress. This is the decision we reached in the city party organization, and this is what we proposed to the Russian Congress.

What was our reasoning? Our point was that the party as yet lacks a firm, defined policy line. We have draft program documents, and we have statements by the Central Committee, but a congress and only a congress can determine a political platform and Party Rules. And prior to this point it is simply unwise and premature to elect a party organization leadership. We advocated this view at the congress, but we were supported only by a few delegations which, just as us, had decided to nominate their representatives to the Russian Central Committee during a second stage of RSFSR Communist Party Congress proceedings.

Does a Polozkov Party Exist?

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, it is no secret that many people are presently calling the RSFSR Communist Party "Polozkov's Party," and in a clearly negative way, for recently I. K. Polozkov, alongside Ye. K. Ligachev and Nina Andreyeva, has become the embodiment of the extreme right wing in the party....

[Prokofyev] There is probably a considerable degree of exaggeration in this statement. As far as I know, I. K. Polozkov never shared the positions taken by Nina Andreyeva and did not support her. But there is no question that he became a repugnant figure following his well-known public statements. Incidentally, he himself is also aware of this fact. This is one of the reasons he voluntarily withdrew his candidacy at the conference of representatives, feeling that his election would complicate the situation not only within the republic but also in the CPSU as a whole. Nor is Polozkov to blame for the fact that the congress elected him first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] It is not Polozkov's fault, but it is the misfortune of the congress....

[Prokofyev] It is our common misfortune that we suffer from an acute shortage of leaders.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, in this connection I have a question for you as member of the already-existing Russian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee. On the eve of the congress did the bureau really fail to consider the question of a possible leader of a new party? Were there really no recommendations?

[Prokofyev] This question was addressed both in the Russian Bureau and at the conference of representatives of congress delegations. Such individuals as N. I. Ryzhkov and V. V. Bakatin were also named. I, for example, am convinced that if Bakatin had not withdrawn his candidacy, he would have been a worthy leader of the Russian Communists.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Forgive me, Yuriy Anatolyevich, but that seems somewhat frivolous to me: the

Central Committee Bureau recommends people for such an important position, as it turns out, without even discussing the matter with them, since they voluntarily withdraw their name from candidacy.

[Prokofyev] Yes, there was no genuine cadre work done. It is recorded in the congress resolution that the Central Committee Russian Bureau had done an unsatisfactory job. And that is correct. I must state this in a self-critical manner. On the other hand, a great deal could not have been expected from such a bureau: it was not elected by RSFSR Communists but was formed at the Central Committee plenum.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] You have stated that in your view the makeup of delegates at the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party essentially reflects the disposition of forces among RSFSR Communists. But if we posit a situation where Polozkov's candidacy for the post of first secretary is submitted to an RSFSR party referendum, would he make it?

[Prokofyev] He could make it. Because today not only Moscow and Leningrad determine the situation within the Russian Communist Party.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] And how in this connection do you assess the proposals which have already been adopted by a number of party organizations: that the entire Moscow city CPSU organization not join the RSFSR Communist Party? Or this proposal: that the matter of membership in the RSFSR Communist Party should be decided exclusively on an individual basis by each party member? Or take the letter sent to the newspaper by Moscow State University scientific associate V. Privalov, and I quote: "I did not join Polozkov's party, and therefore I do not consider myself a member of this party." I must say that one can hear many such statements today. How do you feel about it?

[Prokofyev] I can understand how they feel. But at the same time I feel that it is my duty to warn party members against rash or hasty steps. Just what is "Polozkov's party"? Is there really such a party? It is not Polozkov who will determine the character of the RSFSR Communist Party. There will be a second phase of congress proceedings, program documents will be hammered out, and a Central Committee and Politburo will be definitively formed. After that one will be able to judge what kind of a party it is. And one will be able to judge not from the position of an outside observer but from that of a Communist to whom both Russia and the party are dear.

Yes, voices are being heard which are calling upon the Communists of Moscow and Leningrad not to join this party. But imagine: not joining the party will be those organizations which perhaps have moved somewhat ahead in their democratization and politicization, and what will be the result? As a result we shall have in Russia the kind of party which they wanted to establish at the initiative congress in Leningrad, that is, adhering to the positions of dogmatic Marxism.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] So let there be such a party. If there are conservative Communists, rightists, as we say, then they can have their own party. A party of right-wingers.

[Prokofyev] That is the way to a split in the party, to that which is extremely undesirable at the present time. Particularly since this would be not simply a split into "rightists" and "leftists," but rather a split between regions; this would break Russia up into several parts. And in addition, this would in many respects be a split between the worker class and the intelligentsia.

Right now we should be working to obtain adoption of democratic Party Rules, program points in conformity with the spirit of perestroika, and exerting as firm an influence as possible on the situation within the party not by leaving the party but rather by working within it.

Here is a comparison. At one time the party organizations of Moscow State University, the Moscow Institute of Architecture, and certain others stood out within the Moscow Party Organization by their radicalism and striving toward greater democracy. In a great many things they were unable to find common ground with the city party committee at that time. But what would have happened if they had left the Moscow organization and had formed their own mini-parties? This would only have set the Moscow Party Organization back. But the fact that they remained within the organization, worked within it, disseminated their own ideas—this is what in the final analysis enabled the entire city organization to move forward. There should always be collective leaders who pull along the rest of the membership.

Once again I should like to appeal to all Moscow Communists through your paper. I understand your feelings, but I appeal to you not to yield to emotions. Let us examine the situation soberly and rationally. This is the present disposition of forces in Russia. And we must continue the struggle for democratization of the party, for implementation of needed reforms; let us not panic, and let us not posture. Otherwise the result could be like in the embellishment on the Russian tale: I shall put my eye out, so that my mother-in-law will have a one-eyed son-in-law.

Will There Be a Great Confrontation?

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] The questions currently being received by the editors include many in which two names figure: Yeltsin and Polozkov. Will this "great confrontation" promote stabilization of the situation in our republic? Will these Russian leaders be able to cooperate with each other?

[Prokofyev] Perhaps it would be better to ask these questions of Boris Nikolayevich and Ivan Kuzmich. And I too would be very much interested in hearing their replies. But I shall nevertheless state my opinion.

There are those for whom the election of Yeltsin as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is not to their

liking. There are those who do not like to see Polozkov as first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. And neither of them won by a landslide. That is, the correlation of forces, between the "left" and the "right," let us say, is approximately equal. This is a complex and disturbing situation. Does "confrontation," as you put it, between the two leaders make things any simpler? Of course not. Rather the contrary.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] So in your view we cannot count on a unity of opposites?

[Prokofyev] I would very much like to hope for this, to hope that both of them, for the sake of Russia, would be capable of rising above personal likes and dislikes. In addition, as strange as this might appear at first glance, it seems to me that they also have a great deal in common. At least in character and personality. Both of them are rather purposeful, goal-directed individuals, persons of strong will, capable of making decisions, men of action. Perhaps this will help them gain mutual understanding in the course of affairs.

What Can Save Us From Idle Talk?

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, this interview has been devoted virtually in its entirety to party internal affairs. This is understandable. The situation which has developed following the congress of the RSFSR Communist Party has sharply heightened reader interest in this topic. But there is also another aspect to be considered. A. Raskutin, a CPSU member since 1939, wrote us a letter after he became apprised of the Position of the Moscow City Party Organization. But his letter did not deal only with this document. "I understand the Position," he writes, "as instructions, as the view of Moscow Communists regarding the essence of the problem. But it does not even in an elementary fashion substantiate the role and significance of the party in the new conditions, and it fails to address the party's relations with the people and with all domains of contemporary society. The impression is created that the entire proposed work efforts of the renewed party will be conducted within the party, between party members, solely in the interests of Communists. In short, a party for the party."

Is such a situation in fact not developing? Just as our economy at one time was operating for its own benefit, so the party now is engaged primarily in dealing with its own problems?

[Prokofyev] I agree that the party in fact has today to a certain degree retreated within itself. There are two reasons for this. First, various currents or movements have appeared within the party, which are engaged in struggle with one another to have their own viewpoint on the development of the party and society take precedence rather than somebody else's. This diverts certain forces. But I feel that this is inevitable in the turning-point period. The second reason is directly linked with change in Article 6 of the Constitution. The party had become accustomed to directly running the economy.

But now, in the new conditions, the party has not yet found ways to influence the resolution of socioeconomic issues.

But this is only an explanation which, I can understand, can be satisfactory to few. But if the party fails to formulate its own socioeconomic policy, if it is unable to convince society of the advisability of this policy, and then fails to find a way to implement this policy via party members and through its representatives in agencies of authority, the party will depart from the political arena. It will simply no longer be needed. Only that party which is able to propose an intelligent socioeconomic policy which is to the liking of society or to the majority of society will enter the arena.

For this reason we are presently preparing in the city party organization proposals pertaining to the socioeconomic development of Moscow. This is the main thing in the final analysis. And we realize that without it we may end up being nothing but political windbags.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Very soon the 28th Party Congress will be upon us. As you know, shortly before the congress our newspaper submitted to a number of delegates a pre-congress questionnaire containing three questions. Could you respond to these questions?

[Prokofyev] Yes.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] However, we are hoping to hear directly from the congress speaker's platform your reply to the first question: what would you talk about if you were able to address the congress? Are you planning to speak?

[Prokofyev] I shall request the opportunity to speak.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] The second question: how do you appraise the present situation in the Moscow City Party Organization?

[Prokofyev] I am not so much an optimist as to appraise it as actually a good situation. Perhaps it should receive a mark of satisfactory. Yes, we have succeeded so far in avoiding a split within the city party organization. But I am very concerned by a trend which shows the worker class leaving the party. I am also very concerned by the fact that the city party organization does not yet have its own clearly-defined socioeconomic program.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] The third question pertains to a prediction about the party congress. Is a split in the party inevitable?

[Prokofyev] In order to reply to this question, we must go back somewhat. I had pictured the Russian Congress somewhat differently. For this reason my view on the 28th Congress is also presently undergoing change. I had believed that it would be primarily the elements of the radical left which would move toward a split in the party. As it turned out, the conservative elements in fact moved more vigorously in this direction. In view of this fact, I believe that at the 28th Congress as well the center of

gravity could shift toward the conservative side. I believe, however, that the party will come out of the congress united. It would be a most serious political mistake to carry out a split directly at the congress. I feel that it would be a more correct course of action to wait until later to assess one's position vis-a-vis the party, with a free exchange of party documents. But a maximum effort must be made to preserve the party. This can be done. In my opinion both the "Democratic Platform" and the "Marxist Platform" are rivulets of a common stream. And at the congress it is necessary to make sure that they do not flow in different directions. We must cast aside purely theoretical disagreements and somewhat different views of paths of development and concentrate on what unifies us. This is essential in the interests of the entire country.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Yuriy Anatolyevich, since you did not have to reply to the first question in the editors' questionnaire, may I ask you a couple of additional ones?

[Prokofyev] Go ahead.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] How about a prediction? In your opinion, in the post-congress exchange of party cards, what percentage of party members may not confirm their party membership?

[Prokofyev] That is a very difficult question. But I shall go out on a limb and say that as many as 30 percent of party members may leave the party.

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] At the present time there is a lot of debate about whether an individual should or should not hold both a top government and party position. There is also a good deal of debate over party leader candidacy. What is your opinion?

[Prokofyev] In principle I am against holding two such posts concurrently. In addition to all else, it is simply beyond one person's capabilities. Right now, however, in a period of transition, when there has not yet occurred a complete division of functions between party and soviets, when the emergence of a new political structure is just in progress, I feel that such a concurrent holding of high posts is necessary. Otherwise there could occur a dangerous confrontation between soviets and party. Therefore I would propose our country's President for the role of party leader. But at the same time the party leadership should include an individual who would handle all the day-to-day work—it is not important what he is called: cochairman, deputy chairman, or first secretary....

[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA] Thank you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, for the interview. I would like to wish you and the entire Moscow delegation success at the 28th Party Congress.

[Prokofyev] Thank you. Until the next time we meet, sometime after the congress.

Polozkov on RSFSR CPD, Party Congress
90UN2363A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*
in Russian No 26, 29 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, first secretary of the Russian Federation CP Central Committee, by *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* reporter P. Yemelin, under the rubric "LR Interview": "Ivan Polozkov: 'I Shall Not Be Without Work....'"]

[Text] As I was heading for this interview with Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, I was expecting to see a rather tired individual. After all! The entire country had been following that "parliamentary duel," and everybody knew who had emerged victorious.... And Ivan Kuzmich himself, in conversations with friends, either in jest or in all seriousness, had been talking about mushroom hunting and fishing, and had recalled an elderly beekeeper acquaintance at whose place one can find repose from all of life's tribulations. As soon as I switched on the dictating machine, however, as soon as we began the interview, Polozkov became instantly transformed and was ready for "action"....

The Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR took place several days after the interview. I. K. Polozkov was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation

* * *

[*LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*] Ivan Kuzmich, I would like our conversation to be extremely candid and straightforward. My first question is a mundane one. How are you feeling? How are you making it through these days?

[Polozkov] I feel fine, no problem. There is plenty to ponder over, and here is why. When I was just beginning my campaign to be elected RSFSR people's deputy, I was not thinking at all about any parliamentary posts or positions. I had the desire to work in Russia, in the interests of Russia. And then suddenly people began calling my candidacy a run for the position of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet....

[*LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*] Why "suddenly"? Did you and M. S. Gorbachev not discuss the subject?

[Polozkov] We had no specific conversation on the matter.

[*LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*] You say that the nomination took you by surprise, and yet both you and A. V. Vlasov were viewed as "the apparatus men." Isn't it true that in all likelihood the chairmanship was discussed at a meeting of Communist deputies at the CPSU Central Committee?

[Polozkov] Yes, but I—and I would like to emphasize this—did not take part in any deputy conferences. I knew about them only from B. G. Kibirev, leader of the Krasnodar deputy group.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Soberly weighing all the factors and assessing your abilities in a self-critical manner, were you prepared to assume such a responsible position?

[Polozkov] Internally I was preparing myself for this. Particularly after my candidacy was announced. I know Russia well, its problems and troubles. Not a week goes by that I do not visit a Cossack or Adygei village, do not share a meal in a peasant home, or simply drop in and have a heart-to-heart talk....

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] I believe that Russia's troubles are presently apparent to everybody. I want to ask you about something else. How productively in your opinion were urgent problems addressed at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies? Where would you begin?

[Polozkov] In my opinion the agenda of the RSFSR Congress should not have been any different. The congress was convened for the purpose of constituting authority. It was with great satisfaction that I voted for the Declaration of Sovereignty. All other items are organizational matters, so to speak. We must form a Supreme Soviet, its commissions and committees....

There are differences of opinion as regards approach. They are quite evident. There are those who single out and constantly try to bring into clash these deputy groups: "Communists of Russia" and "Democratic Russia."

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Does this not mean that the "Communists of Russia" group is becoming a parliamentary opposition?

[Polozkov] I feel that it should become that nucleus around which all those will congregate who sincerely wish Russia well, who have come to the "deputies" and to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet not only to satisfy personal ambition, not for their own political career, and particularly not for the sake of obtaining some position. But let us not be naive. Working for Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin were many factions and various elements, which have long since united into the "Democratic Russia" bloc. They did a great deal to ensure that he obtained deputy credentials, and even more to make him Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. This is reality. In my opinion it will be very difficult for Boris Nikolayevich to pay off his debt to these groups and to carry out the declaration he made after becoming chairman that he would leave "Democratic Russia," that he might suspend his membership in the CPSU, and that he would endeavor to treat all deputy groups with maximum objectivity and would serve only the truth. You can understand that his assurance inspires hopes, and his first steps were taken in this direction, when at the very beginning of his chairmanship he gathered together representatives of the autonomous republics and territories in order to confer with them on how to end to the stress and tension which had been manifested at the

congress. Among the ranks of "democrats" there are also many today who realize that confrontation is not the way to go.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Strenuous attempts were made at the congress to divide the deputies into "left" and "right," into "conservatives" and "radicals." How do you feel about such a classification?

[Polozkov] This is a deliberate division in the interests of certain elements. There are those for whom it is advantageous to create the "image of an enemy," in order to conceal one's own unseemly doings, to whip up people's dissatisfaction, and to stay afloat. They have proclaimed pluralism of opinions, democracy, and glasnost. After all, what could be simpler? Each individual has the right to state his own opinion, even if it does not agree with the general view and in some aspects does not correspond to the needs of the majority. Why start pinning labels right at the outset? You know, this smells a bit of the worst times of our past. It seems to me that the acceleration of political forces in our society today is such that some of our radicals have swung so far to the left that they have ended up to the right of the most right-wing elements.

Our scientists, and our politicians as well, have not determined how we are to develop society today, after having purged socialism of deformations. For this reason they have begun turning to the Swedish model, to the Chinese model, and then they point to the Principality of Monaco, where our "perestroika" liberals obtain the bulk of their information about their own people. They wave it in our faces: this, they say, is how people live; there is simply no comparing us with them. But they forget to add that those people's freedom and prosperity were paid for in spades by the suffering and blood of the Russian soldier, who pulled Europe from under the fascist boot. They forget to add that nobody hastened to offer us a "Marshall Plan" when Russia was lying in ruins after the war. And after the war, as we know, the Soviet Union was forced to pay for the tranquillity they needed in order to adopt that very market-economy model in which they are now so loudly bragging about.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Yes, market has become a synonym for progress, and now they are calling you a conservative. It is apparently not particularly pleasant to hear such things said about you.

[Polozkov] I have been told that no civilized country can get along without conservatives, in the positive meaning of the word. But this is for the purpose of consoling. The fact is that it is unpleasant. I, as they say nowadays, am a party apparatchik. I am not ashamed of what I have accomplished during these five years. Krasnodar Kray is developing in a stable manner and moving forward, both in its economy and culture. There is increased bread and meat production. Production of sales of meat have increased by 30 percent. We only from Krasnodar how many health care facilities have been built. We have built a new sports stadium, and we

have built an exhibition hall, one of the finest in Russia, and probably one of the finest in the Soviet Union; we are building studios for painters and sculptors, and we have completed a building for people in the creative arts.

I feel uncomfortable praising myself. After all, all this was accomplished together with others. But judge for yourself: I have recently been elected six times in contested elections, and I have always received a majority of the votes cast. I visit various workforces; people understand me, and people follow me. Am I a conservative? Well, fine, I shall not object to the appellation if my actions and my ideas reflect people's attitudes and wishes.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Ivan Kuzmich, you did not work a single day with Medunov, but you probably were unable to avoid an encounter with the "Medunov regime."

[Polozkov] I had a closer encounter than anybody else. The fact is that pursuant to a decision by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, which was signed at the time by Yu. V. Andropov, I was named to a team tasked with investigating the doings of Medunov. Our five-person group worked almost two years on this case. On the basis of the materials of our investigation, 1,705 officials were expelled from the party and made to answer criminal charges. It is true that some succeeded in avoiding punishment, and today they are claiming to have been victims of the "Medunov regime." Many, having served their time in prison, have returned, are consolidating, and are opposing the local authorities.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] In the "radical" press you are portrayed as enemy number one, an oppressor of the cooperative movement....

[Polozkov] That is pure bull! In Krasnodar Kray more than 2,600 cooperatives were registered in the last year alone, while only 324 shut down.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] According to your information, what is the present status of the ANT affair?

[Polozkov] In my opinion every effort is being made to gloss over the ANT affair, to sweep it under the rug and to conceal it from the public. I myself have seen several prepared criminal cases which could be sent to trial. But no court is as yet willing to take them. They returned the tanks to the manufacturer, while a lot of items—lumber, brass, pipe, sheet steel, tungsten and molybdenum powder (the latter is also used for spray-coating rocket nozzles)—still remain at Novorossiysk Seaport. If the tanks were being sold as tanks, nobody would have raised any questions. But when tank guns and machine-guns are being sold as scrapped space heaters, that is something else altogether.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Has involvement by top-ranking Soviet officials in the ANT affair been confirmed?

[Polozkov] No. In my opinion there is no way N. I. Ryzhkov or V. K. Gusev could be involved in this affair. The ANT people obtained from Gusev authorization to export scrap materials, bypassing customs inspection. I have already stated what kind of items they were exporting. In my opinion lower-ranking officials knew what was going on. They must have known. Krasnodar deputies have twice addressed a query to the government regarding the ANT affair, but as yet nobody has responded.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Ivan Kuzmich, let us proceed from cooperative to party matters. How do you explain the mass shift by party apparatchiks to Soviets? What is this, a withdrawal to preprepared positions? Desertion? Or what?

[Polozkov] There are various factors involved. The main factor is vagueness and uncertainty of the situation: what will happen to the CPSU? The fact is that people, and particularly young specialist personnel, want to feel certainty about their future. I would advise them to remain in party agencies, particularly those who have the ability to persuade, who have gone through this mass political rally wave. But if somebody is really drawn to a production-area position, we shall not hold them.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] When you were not elected chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, some people felt that was the end of your political career....

[Polozkov] In the first place, I did not lose, and I am sure that if I had not withdrawn my candidacy, the campaign would have continued. In addition, I was confident of victory. However, just as Boris Nikolayevich, I would have won with a very small margin of victory. This was my greatest cause for concern. The congress would have split into two halves, and not just during the time of election but beyond as well.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] The supporters of "Democratic Russia" were stressing that Yeltsin had the support and faith of the people. Did you feel you had the support of the people?

[Polozkov] Definitely! I was receiving telegrams and letters, and strangers would come up to me and ask me not to withdraw my candidacy.... I am aware of the fact that Boris Nikolayevich was incomparably more popular than me. I was unable to appear on television, and not one single newspaper other than SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA allowed me to state my position in print. An open campaign to discredit and blackmail me began a few days before the election. Just take the Nina Andreyeva interview in the magazine INTERFAKS, which came out on 25 May, just before the chairmanship election, and was handed out to practically every deputy. And there is also a piece by Vitaliy Korotich in that same issue....

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] "Take, for example, that same Polozkov. He sees that perestroika is proceeding forward, that his chair is getting wobbly...." What about that chair, Ivan Kuzmich?

[Polozkov] My position is solid. Therefore Vitaliy Korotich is wrong: I am not threatened by unemployment.

I also was able to interview I. K. Polozkov after the Constituent Congress....

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] As you see it, what is the principal role of the Communist Party of the RSFSR today?

[Polozkov] I am certain that the Russian Communist Party will constitute a decisive supporting element in the consolidation of all healthy forces and all societal movements for perestroika.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Many people, judging from statements made, do not see a genuine renewal of the Communist Party....

[Polozkov] He who does not want to see, does not see. Giving up its monopoly of power, cooperation on a partnership basis with other societal movements and parties in the Soviets, and democratization of party internal affairs.... Is this not renewal? Yes, the party still contains a great deal from the past. But in real life nothing is accomplished instantaneously.

[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA] Ivan Kuzmich, how did you feel about the criticism leveled against you at the congress and afterwards?

[Polozkov] I try not to get upset. Because I was being criticized by those who had not worked with me, who were judging me on the basis of hearsay, influenced by certain media. And these latter certainly "tried hard to think that when the dust settles everything will take a different place, and even those who think bad of me and the present time will fundamentally change their attitude if we have the occasion to work together. And there is plenty of work to be done.

Europe's Indifference to Baltics Viewed
90UN2328. Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 9 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Aleksey Cheynin, under the rubric "Latvia-Europe", dateline Stockholm-Riga: "View From Across the Sea"]

[Text] "Baltic Independence: European Security?" A conference with the above title was held in Stockholm at the end of May.

The mass media (including the central papers) provided regular reports on this conference. However, the placid

and cautious attitude of the majority of European countries toward the events in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is such that one can reflect on this matter today as well.

For two days the Swedish Rikstag was the site of speeches presented in English by conference participants from the FRG, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, as well as from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and from Moscow. USSR People's Deputy Mavrik Vulfson presented his views in a spirited and impassioned manner (at times breaking into German) ("Baltic independence strengthens Gorbachev's position"). Dainis Ivans conscientiously and consistently presented the ideas of the majority faction within the Latvian Parliament.

The speech by Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Council ("First give us back our freedom; then we shall think about compromises") sounded the traditionally firm position.

Representatives of the "Center"—Muscovites Ye. Baranovskiy (Diplomatic Academy) and A. Myullerson (USSR Academy of Sciences)—naturally view the possibility of independence for the Baltic republics from an opposite position.

But we are more or less informed about this opposition of views. It would be more interesting in my opinion to examine the reaction of representatives of the countries of Northern and Western Europe. In spite of differences in their points of view, I would venture to synthesize impressions from their speeches and to trace the common elements of their positions.

For example, what is the reason for such restraint in response to the events in the Soviet Baltic? The primary response to this question is words about unconditional ardent sympathy with the democratic movements of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and about moral support for the aspirations of peoples. But beyond this it becomes clear that the governments of the West are prepared to support first and foremost strong authority which is in full control of the situation in a republic and which guarantees its stability. In addition, new governments should acquire this strength of authority on their own. Only in this case will their position be strong.

In general one observed approximately the following scenario, as proposed by Western experts, for resolving the matter of recognizing independent states which are former components of the Soviet Federation. First of all, a firm, stable policy and gaining of full political power. Second, settlement of the matter of establishment of their economic system and putting the republic's economy on its feet. Third, guaranteed observance of the rights of all ethnic minorities and human rights, regardless of a person's national or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, racial origin, and sex. Only after this would it be possible to commence discussions on acquisition of a certain status vis-a-vis the United Nations and other international structures.

The reason for caution on the part of the Western countries is quite obvious: redrawing political boundaries in Europe would threaten to stall the entire Helsinki process. The unification of Germany is already an extremely dangerous factor for the development of this process. In this regard we might cite a thought presented by Christophe Bertrand (FRG): the main issue for the West is not the Baltic and not even the fate of Gorbachev, but what kind of Soviet Union we shall have in the future, for this is closely linked with the future of Europe itself. It would be a good thing for the Baltic republics to keep in mind at all times not only the West but the USSR as well: this is in their interest, in the interest of the USSR, and in the interest of the West.

Hanging like an invisible shadow over the future of Europe in many of the discussions was the shadow of the Soviet Armed Forces. Hans Binnedijk (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London) presented a brilliant paper on the role of the Baltic region in the strategic power of the USSR. His conclusion: geographic loss of the Baltic territory fully under Soviet control would not have a decisive effect on the military power of the USSR. (In coming issues we shall endeavor to provide for the readers of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH a translation of this paper, a copy of which is in the possession of the editors.)

The meeting proved beneficial, both for European public opinion, which heard appeals for greater support of popular movements in the Baltic republics, and for the parliamentary representatives of these movements, who are not always willing to search patiently for compromise, as well as for a sober understanding of the fact that yes, "the West will help us," as the classics stated, but only if His Majesty the Western standard of living and Her Majesty protected freedom—there are no higher values than these for Western society—do not yield a single inch from their position. It seems to me that one can assess from these and only from these positions any steps toward accommodation of democratic processes in the Baltics, about support of and sympathy for which there is no doubt whatsoever.

Estonian Supreme Soviet 7th Session Reported

90UN2085A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 22, 24 May 90 p 1

[ETA reports: "Session of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[22 May 90 p 1]

[Text] The 7th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic began its deliberations 21 May at 11:00. By the opening of the session 85 deputies were present and 20 were absent.

Before discussing the agenda the deputies heard several statements.

A. Sirendi dwelt on the problem of installing a confidence telephone in Tallinn.

I. Hallaste stressed the need to place the question of voiding legislative acts dealing with territorial change on the agenda.

V. Yermolayev spoke of the events of 15 May and proposed that the Commission on Deputy Ethics look into the decision passed in response to those events. He also criticized the press in connection with its evaluations of the actions of some deputies.

L. Arro read a statement from a group of agrarian deputies to the effect that rural inhabitants do not wish to supply food for strikers.

S. Petinov proposed including an agenda item on the stance of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic with respect to decrees of the President of the USSR.

Ju. Uluots, on behalf of independent deputies, proposed including an item on the appointment of the Prosecutor of the Estonian Republic on the agenda. A. Sirendi's statement about a confidence telephone sparked an extensive debate. As a result he declared that the position of the Supreme Soviet deputies on the question was apparent and no vote was needed.

The session approved the following agenda proposed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium:

1. Approval of Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic.

2. On the Program of the Government of the Estonian Republic.

3. First reading of the draft Law of the Estonian Republic on Property.

The proposal to include the question of voiding legislative acts dealing with territorial change in the agenda was rejected.

It was decided that the question of appointing the Prosecutor of the Estonian Republic would be considered on Wednesday.

By a majority of votes the deputies rejected the proposal to discuss the position to be taken with regard to Decrees of the President of the USSR.

The deputies decided that at the current session there would be four plenary meetings, with one day assigned for work in the commissions.

V. Pohla raised the question of an appeal from the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies. His statement aroused a lively debate. The deputies noted that it would be expedient to wait to see who became the leader of the RSFSR and only then establish contacts with a leader who has received the trust of the Russian people.

After that the first item of the agenda was discussed. Four Decrees of the Supreme Soviet Presidium were submitted for the Supreme Soviet's approval. The report on the question was made by T. Anton, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Legal Commission. He also answered deputies' questions.

The Decree "On Partial Depoliticization of Legal Agencies of the Estonian Republic" was approved by majority vote.

Approval of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic "On Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code of the Estonian SSR and the Criminal Procedural Code of the Estonian SSR" was taken off the agenda and the Decree was sent for consideration by the Commission on State Defense.

Approval of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic "On Suspending the Action of Paragraph 1 of the USSR Council of Ministers' Ordinance #456 of 12 April 1988 on the Territory of Estonia" was postponed for the evening session.

Then the Decree on setting up the Kodukaitse organization was approved.

In view of the changed general situation in the republic, U. Nugis proposed changing the sequence of considering the items on the agenda and commencing with the first reading of the draft Law of the Estonian Republic on Property, shifting discussion of the Government Program to last item of the agenda.

A report was presented by P. Varul, Tartu University Docent, head of the working group which drew up the draft law. He answered numerous questions from deputies. However, the deputies did not complete the first reading and decided to hear two co-reports at the morning session of 22 May following the Prime Minister's report on the Government Program.

[24 May 90 p 1]

[Text] The session of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic continued 23 May at 10:00. By the commencement of work there were 73 deputies present and 32 absent. This gave the Supreme Soviet Speaker U. Nugis occasion to state that it would be necessary to discuss deputy participation in the Supreme Soviet's work at the next session.

The deputies decided to conclude the first reading of the Law on Property and devote the remaining time to discussion of the Government Program. Ju. Uluots, leader of the Independent Democrats, informed that he was withdrawing his proposal to appoint the Prosecutor of the Estonian Republic at this session. He also proposed not putting the Government Program to a vote and taking note of it instead.

T. Kallas asked why even more deputies from the "Equal Opportunities" groups and the Communist faction were absent at this meeting than at the previous one. Deputy

Speaker V. Andreyev indicated the reasons: business travel, studies, meetings with constituents, illness, participation in the work of local Soviets.

E. Leisson informed the Supreme Soviet that the Estonian People's Front deputies group had set up a working party to prepare a draft law on citizenship.

The deputies were advised that an information period would be set aside at the next session during which the government would respond to their inquiries. The Supreme Soviet then took up the items on the agenda.

The first reading of the Law on Property was continued. Justice Minister Ju. Rajdla presented a co-report. He also answered deputies' questions. A second co-report was presented by A. Veetousme, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet's Economics Commission. He was asked a number of questions on the draft bill. In accordance with the terms of procedure, the first reading did not include time for speaking from the floor. The Supreme Soviet decided to conclude the first reading of the Law on Property (67 for, none against, 4 abstentions. There were 80 deputies in the hall for the vote).

The deputies then proceeded to discuss the Government Program. First they heard the views of the standing commissions. The reports were made by A. Veetousme, chairman of the Economics Commission; A. Junti, for the Legal Commission; H. Peterson, chairman of the Rural Affairs Commission; S. Sovetnikov, chairman of the International Relations Commission; L. Hainsalu-Soot, chairman of the Family and Social Problems Commission; R. Tamme, chairman of the Defense Commission; R. Veidermann, chairman of the Press Commission; A. Ristik, chairman of the Administrative Reform Commission; A. Tarand, chairman of the Environmental Commission.

The floor was then opened to the deputies. The speakers were: Ju. Telgmaa, I. Hallaste, I. Rajt, T. Made, A. Sirendi, M. Titma, Ju. Uluots, A. Junti, Ju. Liim, E. Tupp.

Discussion of the Government Program continued after a recess. A. Junti proposed to set up a commission on the formulation of normative acts defining citizenship of the Estonian Republic. The Supreme Soviet supported this proposal (68 for, 3 against, 4 abstentions. There were 76 deputies in the hall). M. Lauristin was elected chairman of the commission.

Then the deputies continued the debate on the Government Program. The speakers were: A. Paju, A. Tamm, V. Lebedev, V. Andreyev, S. Sovetnikov, K. Sergiy, E. Savisaar.

It was decided that the Prime Minister would make a closing statement after the government considered the comments and proposals. The Supreme Soviet took note of the Government Program. The Government of the Estonian Republic was asked to consider the proposals and comments and submit an appropriate report at the

Supreme Soviet meeting on June 4. The proposal was passed by 64 votes, none against, with 7 abstentions.

The agenda was exhausted. The deputies also exchanged views on current problems.

The 8th session of the Supreme Soviet will start 28 May at 11:00.

Opposition to Estonian 'Equal Rights' Group Detailed

*90UN2233A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 9 Jun 90 p 2*

[Article by P. Panfilov, chairman of the "Equal Rights" deputy group: "The Deputy Mandate"]

[Text] Today, at a time when the political life of the republic is stormy, it seems timely to me to talk about the activity in the Supreme Soviet of our "Equal Rights" deputy group.

It has 20 deputies. Another six deputies joined the groups "Communist Faction" and the territorial "Virumaa." As a rule all three groups coordinate their actions and come out in the Supreme Soviet as a single entity.

Clearly, under the conditions of currently existing regulations of the work of the Supreme Soviet, 26 out of 105 deputies cannot have a decisive influence on the adoption of legislative acts, for which a qualified two-thirds majority of the deputy corps is required. In many ways this also determines our action.

We do not aspire to rule in the republic. Our position is simple—Estonia should be governed by Estonians, but this has to be done in such a way that the entire population lives well, regardless of nationality, language, religious belief, and political orientation. A person, with his needs and concerns, should be at the center of activity both in the Supreme Soviet and in the government. Any other approach, in our view, will sooner or later lead to a dead end. Truly democratic states have long understood this.

The path to a civilized resolution of all of Estonia's problems is through trust in each other and striving for a search for compromises, but in no way through a broadening of confrontation. It seems that many understand this, and they talk and write about this, but there are no practical efforts.

Trusting in the attempts of E. Savisaar to establish the kind of government that would most completely take into account the real situation in the political, economic, and social structures of society, in a brief conversation with him our group of deputies came out with a proposal for a candidacy to the post of minister of interethnic affairs, who would be known to the non-Estonian part of the population and gain its trust. We also proposed examining the possibility of establishing a post of minister for the coordination of operations of enterprises of Union subordination. However, these talks also did not

lead to anything. The chairman of the government nominated A. Kuznetsov, chairman of the People's Front, who is practically unknown to us, to the post of minister of interethnic affairs, and the Council of the National Economy, which was established on 26 May in Kokhtla-Yarve at a congress of deputies of all levels, took on itself the coordination of operations of Union enterprises. That is, our mutual relations with the prime minister did not proceed well from the very beginning.

Taking into account the opinion of our own voters, who believe that strengthening stability in the republic and giving the non-Estonian population confidence in their own future would be served by adoption of the Law on Citizenship with a zero variant and the Law on the Referendum as a rule-of-law and democratic regulator for resolving Estonia's most complex problems, from the first session the deputy group tried to include these questions on the agenda, but the automatic majority continuously rejected these proposals. Now that the conference of the Estonian congress is over, and after considering this question, it became obvious why this happened. Citizenship will not be given to everyone who lives here, and in addition there will be those who reject it themselves who do not want to lose USSR citizenship, and this will thereby reduce (possibly substantially) the number of real participants in the referendum. Now, undoubtedly, these two draft laws will be introduced in the Supreme Soviet, but they have already lost their consolidating thrust and they will hardly serve to strengthen the belief of many people in their own peaceful future.

The Supreme Soviet of the republic is adopting one political document after another. But our group's proposal to consider at the session the practical question of giving aid to the population of northeast Estonia, which is in an ecological disaster zone, could not be put on the agenda for a long time. And so many angry and sad words were said and written on this subject! Having exhausted this subject to obtain political dividends, it was tossed aside. But the people? What have they got to do with it? But policy must be "made," one's popularity has to be maintained, and cushy jobs have to be captured and kept. Therefore, forward, faster, gallop—forward.

The past Supreme Soviet, which was undemocratic and not freely elected, allowed the people of the republic to discuss draft laws before final adoption. The new democratic and free parliament rejects this. Now the deputy knows everything himself, and he can decide everything independently, and for this reason he is given a nice salary. So many historical laws were passed by the new parliament, but not one of them was submitted to the people for consideration, and the proposals of the "Equal Rights" deputy group were rejected straight off.

Well, what about the issue of pluralism of opinions? It is not high on the list. We protested the action of U. Nugis, speaker of the Supreme Soviet, several times, when in our view he prevented the deputies from expressing their own opinion on one or another question. At times in

parliament we sense an outright disdainful attitude toward the collective opinion of our group, which is different from the opinion held among deputies of the People's Front and the Estonian congress. We sensed this in discussions of practically all documents concerning Estonian statehood, the situation in Lithuania, and the first RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies.

An interesting situation has developed in the Supreme Soviet, where our opinions are of more interest to the mass media of foreign states than to the deputies and journalists of our republic. But here the question of glasnost comes up—the basis of all democratic transformations.

It was struck a blow after the very first meetings—radio broadcasting of discussions of vital importance to all the people of Estonia was stopped. And in exchange, articles were sent to the press. We also registered a protest on some of these. Here are just two examples that we brought to the attention of the Supreme Soviet. Arvo Sirandi, Supreme Soviet deputy, writes in the 27 March issue of HARJU ELU: "Along with these people (that is, those who live permanently on their own territory—P.P.), there is some kind of an enormous group of migratory people for whom what has been established by others is not sacred, who kill, destroy, and tear down everything in their way..." In the 29 March issue of the newspaper PJARNU POSTIMES, Ants Lajgna writes insultingly about the deputies of our group: "... They recently elected Intermovement members to the government. Those who desire the division of Estonia, and those whom I believe to be criminals, are working their way into legislation in order to stifle the wishes of the people of Estonia..." Broadcasts on Estonian radio in the Russian language can be added to this. Simultaneously, practically all information on the situation in the republic that appears in the central press that does not reflect the views of the People's Front or the Estonian Committee is subject to obstruction.

Despite all of this the activity of the "Equal Rights" deputy group finds support among a substantial part of the republic's population. Voters say this openly in meetings with us, in letters to us, and at rallies and demonstrations. We do not assert that we are supported by all 600,000 non-Estonians living in the republic. This is simply impossible. There are as many opinions as there are people, and, today, not one problem can be resolved by a unanimous "I approve." However, we are opposed by the very same people whose speeches and articles continuously appear in the mass media. They opposed us in elections to the Supreme Soviet, they stigmatize us for activity there, for work in the electoral organs of the Communist Party and in other public organizations, and at the invitation of TV they demonstratively burn their Soviet passports and declare hunger strikes as a sign of protest against our alleged violent desire to protect their interests. This is a normal occurrence. There always have been and there always will be people like this at all times and among all peoples. But

today I want to say to them and to those of a like mind not to waste your health through hunger and not to squander money on new passports. We will never defend the interests of those who do not need it, but we will do everything in our power to defend the interests of those who voted for us and who trust us. And if we do not justify their trust, then they themselves will decide our fate.

And lastly. One can like or not like and respect or hate the leader of the "Equal Rights" group and its other deputies. I also have my own opinion of a number of specific persons. But no one is permitted to have a disrespectful attitude toward the people. All of the republic newspapers carried a photograph of deputies of the Supreme Soviet greeting people who gathered at Toompea on the occasion of the beginning of the work of the new parliament of the republic. There I am standing next to Savisaar, listening to the parting words of the representatives of the people.

But then on 15 May, A. Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the multinational republic, refused to meet people who had declared beforehand why and when they will come to Toompea. U. Nugis, speaker of the Supreme Soviet, declared to a proposal to meet with the people and accept a document they brought that this was not a people and that he will not go into a crowd. In those tense minutes of a worsening situation, when a group of deputies tried to come out on the balcony of Toompea castle, neither the speaker, the prime minister, the state minister, or the commandant resolved the problem of a suddenly disappearing key to the balcony. As you know, we had to crawl through a window. But this key was found when, two hours later, A. Ruutel, E. Savisaar, M. Lauristin, and others wanted to go out on this same balcony...

Time will put everything in its place. It will determine the role of every movement and individual personalities in the history of Estonia, including our deputy group. Some believe that our activity is harmful, and some that it is not useful. But this is not so. We are the reality that exists today in the life of the republic, and it is impossible to ignore it. It is unwise. Our deputy group is not waging a struggle against the Estonian people, which at times is attributed to us. We recognize their right to self-determination and to their own statehood. But we insist that these reforms be implemented in a democratic and constitutional way. So that this process will take into account the interests of every person who lives on the territory of Estonia.

Kezbers on Independent Latvian Communist Party Future

90UN23264 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
23 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Ivars Kezbers, chairman of the board of the Independent Latvian Communist Party, conducted

by Sergey Orekhov; date and place not specified; first paragraph is newspaper's introduction: "Our Direction Is Social Democratic"]

[Text] The name of Ivars Kezbers is well enough known in Latvia and outside. A professional diplomat and chief ideologist even in the quite recent past on the official list of an organization now in the republic called a branch of the CPSU, he has persistently, despite the fierce attacks of his "comrades," pursued a policy of restoration of Latvia's sovereignty. Following the split in the Latvian Communist Party at the 25th Congress and the detachment of the "independent" communists, I. Kezbers was elected chairman of the board of the Independent Latvian Communist Party. The present and future of this organization is the subject of today's interview with him.

[Orekhov] How would you describe the situation in the Independent Latvian Communist Party at present?

[Kezbers] We have only been in existence for two months, and for this reason it is still too early to talk about any deep-lying processes. The first stage of formation of the party has now been completed. Our party organizations, from primaries through the Central Committee, exist throughout republic territory. A board (somewhat akin to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo) has been formed. Extensive discussion has begun on what kind the party should be—on the main directions of our activity and on the program, which we have to strengthen and develop with regard for the interests of the particular social base on which we can count from now on.

[Orekhov] What kind of social base is this?

[Kezbers] Yes, this is a fundamental question. Naturally, we consider ourselves a party of the left and see as the basis of our activity defense of the interests of the strata of the population that live by their labor; those whose possibilities will be hit by the market economy. For this we have to formulate a clear-cut socioeconomic program. Our second direction is the working people who will be in need of retraining and correct labor guidance.

The intelligentsia, Latvian, in the main, it is true, is somewhat surprisingly substantially represented in our party. And this is at first sight illogical. But if one addresses the history of our republic, the end of the last century, say, when national self-awareness was only just being revived, the town and the intelligentsia helped the country in exactly the same way. Certain traditions may be discerned here, which is, of course, good.

What is negative is the fact that the urban workers directly are as yet only slightly represented in our party—approximately six percent. Although prior to the split in the Latvian Communist Party they constituted approximately 11 percent. And the second minus in our mononational character is that a mononational party of the left is not accommodated on any political palette. Nor do we like the fact that among our supporters only

15 percent—I will permit myself this term—are non-Latvians: We must reflect our republic's social and national composition.

[Orekhov] May the creation of the Independent Latvian Communist Party be seen as a return from the communist utopia to social democratic roots remembered by specific people on Latvian soil? A return from impasse?

[Kezbers] A political party that wants a future cannot be built on the past. We may, of course, return to our roots, we may return to a name and traditions, but we must think about the future. And we need to proceed here from the fact that Marxist ideology is collapsing in East Europe and in the world movement of the left in general. This is hard to acknowledge and recognize: I myself joined the Communist Party, joined it out of conviction. But, that's life.

The main reference point is how best to protect the socially unprotected. It seems to me that the West's social democrats have done a very great deal for this. So our direction is social democratic. But we will not copy anyone for, like returning to history, this is futile. We will have our own experience, our own path—a left, social democratic orientation.

[Orekhov] Inasmuch as the party retains the appellation "communist" as yet, what in this connection are the lessons of the administrative-command past in the formation of the apparatus and the formulation of the principles of its activity?

[Kezbers] This will not be the old party. It seems to me that a most flawed principle, still present in the work of the CPSU, is the aspiration of its apparatus to be some ministry for personnel and ideology. We will not lay claim to be such. With us membership dues (depending on wages) will range from one to three rubles and may not be paid, what is more, under serious circumstances. In the CPSU membership dues are a kind of tax. The apparatus of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee constitutes over 120 employees, with us, seven (a further two or three to be added, possibly). We are a parliamentary-type party of all levels, from the district through Union level. We are for operating in the Union parliament, at the Congress of People's Deputies, and in the Supreme Soviet. I believe that even now we are represented pretty well by party groups, although there is no clear faction as yet.

[Orekhov] What is your attitude toward the process of the formation of a Baltic market and Ryzhkov's program for the creation of a controlled market?

[Kezbers] I am profoundly convinced that a market separate from the republics (or states?) is impossible. Both today and for many years to come this will mean close economic, cultural, social, and political relations with the East. However events develop—with a blockade or without one, with a breakthrough, with setbacks—we

will for all that be oriented toward the East. This is fundamental, and whoever does not recognize this is not a politician.

As far as the controlled market is concerned.... There either is a market or there isn't. We are continually involving ourselves in some half-measures. I greatly respect Mikhail Gorbachev for his foreign policy and security policy, it is constructive and specific, and there is a decisionmaking mechanism. What kind of economy we have I do not know. I know of all kinds of half-measures, unfinished laws, and old methods of leadership.

[Orekhov] Additional political assurances are most likely needed. The multiparty system could contribute to the formulation of such. What do you think, does it exist in the Republic of Latvia and is the creation of it in prospect in general? Different viewpoints are being expressed on this score, one of which, specifically, takes account of the contemporary experience of democratic countries, where parties are gradually going into self-liquidation.

[Kezbers] The Republic of Latvia has been declared to exist. But I would prefer it to exist in actuality, even if under the former name, reliably protected economically and socially. The present multitude of parties and political organizations (there are over 30 in the republic) is an infantile disorder. It would seem to me that this process will peak, and a few political forces—in the form of parties, fronts, or movements representing forces of the left, center, and right—will remain. Yes, I also believe that practice shows that in Italy or Denmark, where there are very many parties, the necessary effect is not always achieved, and the existence of five or six is entirely justified.

[Orekhov] What are the first results of parliamentary struggle?

[Kezbers] Much has accumulated in people's hearts in the past decades. There is the desire, but not much ability, to express one's attitude and to listen to others. Many people think that the law is what is written down. But it becomes such only when it can be defended and realized. This on a Union scale, but it is the same in a republic also. We need to learn to make a law which will operate for 20-30 years, creating the appropriate support mechanism. But simply a declaration can be made in one night.

[Orekhov] A very pertinent issue is the army. Your attitude toward it?

[Kezbers] I believe that this is a state within a state. We have learned a figure which supposedly corresponds to our army's budget. It would seem to me that it is understated. This is indicated by both our press and figures of the Stockholm Institute for the Study of War and Peace and the London Strategic Institute, where a corresponding analysis is made by proceeding not only

from the budget but also the possibilities of the country's national income. It seems to me that these figures also are somewhat understated.

The army should be professional, for its social problems today ensue from an absence of social safeguards. It seems to me that the army should cut military spending and sharply increase social spending. And it would be just if the young officer could at the start of his service firmly count on acquiring an apartment after a certain length of time. The professionalization of the army would improve its morale also.

[Orekhov] Please tell us in conclusion how your relations are taking shape with the leadership of the Latvian Communist Party and the CPSU and how property matters are being resolved.

[Kezbers] I would like both the Latvian Communist Party and the CPSU to recognize that we are partners. This is not the case as yet. There are certain signals and contacts, even with the CPSU Central Committee leadership, and I am very grateful to certain members of the Politburo for this. But I am always being told: We receive you as a deputy of the USSR, only you should not say that you are chairman of a party. But I will not become anything else. With the leadership of the Latvian Communist Party it is different: They are aggrieved and believe that we are splitters.

We have our own clear-cut program and precise reference points, which correspond strictly to the constitution and the law, and for this reason there are no grounds for assertions concerning violations on our part and that we are acting contrary to fundamental laws. I believe that the Latvian Communist Party is nursing a grievance because of the loss at the elections. But what can we do.... Unfortunately, the CPSU Central Committee considers all property its own. I believe that they should share it with us. No one is demanding some ideal half, but we should have mass media and means of subsistence. We need to reach mutual understanding here, and I would like Moscow and the local territorial organization to take a more sober view of things.

[Orekhov] You do not, as I understand it, anticipate an invitation to the CPSU Congress?

[Kezbers] I do. I would like to go, were such an invitation to arrive, and I make no secret of this for I believe that if social democrats of the West or representatives of other parties of the left are coming, in what way are we worse or more embarrassing? And if we are not invited, this is short-sighted policy. We will be at the 29th Congress.

[Orekhov] If it takes place....

[Kezbers] If it takes place.

Latvian Peasants Union Formed

90UN2447A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 29, 21 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent E. Govorushko under the rubric "Such is Multiparty Life": "Bread and Politics"]

Riga—The Latvian parliamentarians are so taken with political problems that they seem to have no time for economic ones, for our daily bread, so to speak. A new faction being formed in the Latvian parliament, which includes members of the Latvian Peasants Union, intends to bring them down from the political summits to mortal earth.

According to one of the new party's organizers, P. Kruglyauzhza, the motivation for this is that the People's Front faction is not at all dealing with rural problems as village residents would like. The Peasants Union is not a professional association, but a political organization, whose goal is to defend the peasantry's interests in parliament and society. It will be a conservative party with a centrist orientation, advocating the priority of individual farms but recognizing the right to create any type of collective farms. Most of the new party's members so far are connected in one way or another with agricultural work, but its founders are beginning to attract representatives of various professions and nationalities interested in the problems of the village and of agricultural production.

Brazauskas on Moratorium, State of Party

90UN2373A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
27 Jun 90 p 3

[Part of interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, by editors of LIETUVOS AIDAS: "Lithuanian Press"]

[Text] A week ago, on 20 June, the newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS carried replies by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, to questions submitted by the editors. We of course cannot present the entire interview with the First Secretary, and we therefore offer the readers of this press digest some excerpts from the interview.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] We would like to address these questions to you as an opposition party leader rather than as a member of government. Could you state specifically the major errors of the new government?

[Brazauskas] First of all I want to say again what I have repeatedly stated: the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is not now and never will be in opposition to Lithuanian independence. Both prior to 11 March and at the present time the party supports seeking optimal ways to restore and consolidate independence as well as genuine implementation of the striving toward nationhood.

Nor would I want to agree with the statement that the Lithuanian Communist Party is in opposition to the government. The present cabinet of ministers of the Lithuanian Republic is a coalition cabinet. Many persons in the cabinet as well as in other governmental bodies are members of the Lithuanian Communist Party who, on an equal basis with their colleagues, bore an enormous burden on their shoulders during these difficult days of resistance to the blockade.

What mistakes has the government made, or is it making mistakes? He who does nothing makes no mistakes, but let the people themselves judge on this score.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] What do you think about suspending the Enactment of 11 March, and do you think that the republic parliament has the authority to do so?

[Brazauskas] Such a statement of the issue seems somewhat tactless to me, since I see in it the suggestion of a notion being persistently pushed by certain parties, to the effect that A. Brazauskas and the independent Lithuanian Communist Party are proposing to repeal the Enactment of 11 March pertaining to restoration of Lithuania's nationhood. Nobody can erase this important event from the history of Lithuania, even if they wanted to.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] Have you not noticed that reactionary forces within the Lithuanian Communist Party have now gone on the offensive—particularly in the outlying areas? Will such vigorous activities on their part not wreck the party?

[Brazauskas] I would not agree with the assertion that there are "reactionary forces" in the Lithuanian Communist Party. It is my profound conviction that no such members have remained in our party following the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, that they simply have chosen other political structures. I am also in general disagreement with claims that there are many persons in the Lithuanian Communist Party who have discredited themselves. Those times are past when being in the party constituted a kind of political indulgence.

Of course this does not mean that all Lithuanian Communist Party members are equally progressive and equally ideal. Obviously this will never happen. Differing views on a specific policy and tactics can surely be observed in all parties and societal movements. Naturally we too have party members who have different views on some problems, who have more conservative views if you will. But can they not publicly state their opinions?

As for the outlying areas to which you made reference, the most realistic, even pragmatic opinions on the current situation are heard precisely out there, in the Lithuanian village. And one should not start making accusations of being reactionary due to this. Recall the history of the Lithuanian village, and this cautious attitude toward the processes taking place in this republic will become fully understandable.

I think one can also perceive in it displeasure on the part of certain political elements with the fact that in a substantial percentage of rayons the independent Lithuanian Communist Party was victorious in the elections of local self-government deputies. If this is the case, why is it that in one instance we are pleased with the results of elections, considering them to have been an expression of the will of the people, while in another case we feel differently? Does such a view not constitute a clear confirmation of the assertion that there is only one correct opinion in this republic? The choice of the people must be respected.

* * *

There is a new reflection in the changeable political mirror of Lithuania: an initiative group has been formed—the 11th of March Party, which sets forth its position in a declaration to the citizens of Lithuania. The declaration states: "11th of March does not constitute merely empty words but rather a threshold beyond which lies a new era. 11th of March is the name taken by an assembly of people who intend through their deeds and determination to strengthen and consolidate our independence." One of the initiators of this party's establishment—Virgilijus Cepaitis—consented to answer questions asked by correspondent Aldona Svirbutavichyute. The newspaper carried this interview in its 22 June issue, under the title "11th of March Party Formed."

Prunskiene 26 June Supreme Council Report

90UN2375A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
29 Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Speech by Prime Minister of the Lithuanian Republic Kazimera Prunskiene at the 26 June Plenary Session of the Supreme Council: "Report by Prime Minister of the Lithuanian Republic Kazimera Prunskiene"]

[Text] The fact that we are engaged in discussion virtually signifies affirmation of an independent Lithuania, an independent state. Declaring independence on 11 March, we laid the initial foundation for the legal restoration of independence, but it is hardly likely that any one of us can claim that we in fact have independence. While not retreating from our strategic goal, we must now consider what tactics can help us confirm our independence. To confirm [utverdit] means first and foremost reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union and obtaining recognition by the world, recognition by the Western nations. This, incidentally, is also confirmed by world opinion. These things are closely inter-linked. The Western nations, as well as the leaders of Poland, which I recently visited, quite candidly link the possibility of our recognition with the necessity of an understanding with the Soviet Union. As distressing as this may be, it is a fact. Lithuania as a state can see its future only in the world community of nations, and in this sense it must be responsive to them. Must we negotiate, declaring a moratorium, or can we do this in some other way? Does there exist another way—without a treaty or formal agreement [dogovor] with the Soviet

Union—to resolve the issues of borders, armed forces, and military service obligation, in other words the forming of guarantees in regard to our young men and, finally, the economic blockade? Those who oppose entering into negotiations must reply to this question. But the government, having discussed the matter, sees no way other than negotiations. The government unfortunately does not possess a magic wand with which it can resolve these issues. Do the candidates for a future new government perhaps have such a wand? If so, let them show it to us. We shall test it out to see if it is effective.

What does our proposal mean? A moratorium does not mean that the Enactment of 11 March becomes null and void. The moratorium is not restricted in timeframe. I fully support the esteemed Chairman of the Supreme Council Vitautas Landsbergis, who stated that this applies only to time from the moment of initiation of negotiations—it can be limited to months or days. Or perhaps prior to beginning talks an agreement on this period of time should be reached, with the time to be set only following such an agreement?

A moratorium does not affect our independence. We are talking about a document, which possesses primarily political weight. Even discussion of possible negotiations signifies the effect accomplished by this document vis-a-vis the world community. Incidentally, many states have known about restoration of the Lithuanian State and acknowledge this right, not effective 11 March but rather from 16 February, but this does not signify that they are hastening to establish diplomatic relations with us.

Wherein lie the risk and danger? In the present situation, if such a document were adopted, there is automatically no risk. Because we are presently talking not about the object of negotiations or the conditions of negotiations, but are merely taking a step on our part toward the beginning of negotiations. This would not be the only step and would not be the last step prior to commencement of negotiations. Finally, we could also decide not to engage in talks. Why should our vigilance, our wisdom and integrity disappear if we decide that negotiations are not acceptable when these conditions begin to clarify? Everything is in our own hands, both today and subsequently, if we adopted this act. What is the source of this fear that following adoption of such an act our own role might disappear? During these months we have confirmed the action of independence. It has also been confirmed by the fact that the blockade essentially has failed to weaken Lithuania's self-determination. And the fact that this question is being discussed does not mean that we have been brought to our knees or that we have begun to waver regarding our independence. On the contrary, the test of time is a confirmation of our independence, for ourselves and for the outside world. The Western nations, which are increasingly modeling a new Europe, see us as a player in the new Europe, see us as one of the European states. In saying this, I am basing my statement on numerous conversations, including with Greece's foreign minister, who has just returned

from a conference in Luxembourg of foreign ministers of the European Community nations. One subject discussed at this conference was a future conference in Dublin at which, with the participation of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, the question of Lithuania in the overall European context will be one of the most important items on the agenda. This means that international guarantees are forming, although there are no documents or declarations. Unfortunately the principal diplomatic effort is proceeding without the adoption of documents.

Of particular interest to us are the external conditions connected with our partner in future negotiations, to which we are asserting independence—the Soviet Union. The Esteemed Chairman has set forth the reasons why compromise and negotiations are also desirable for the Soviet Union. I just want to mention in addition something that happened a few hours ago and surprised me considerably. Exactly two hours after Chairman of the Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis and his colleagues left the President's office, M. S. Gorbachev phoned. The conversation was specific. Apparently the Lithuanian issue was discussed once again following the meeting and certain adjustments were made in the Soviet Union's position, adjustments which are possibly as far as they are willing to go.

Here are the main points which the President of the Soviet Union asked to be communicated to Parliament. A moratorium in the interpretation which I presented is acceptable. I am not going to go into great detail on this interpretation today, and I shall not go into an explanation to the effect that this does not pertain to the operation of the Enactment of Independence but that the point in question pertains only to utilizing opportunities; in other words this is a different interpretation of actions. I do not know whether President Gorbachev had precise information at his disposal on the interpretation of this moratorium, for this is in conflict with that interpretation which Chairman of the Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis had just received from him. Other provisions are adequate, that is, acceptance of a moratorium does not signify a return to the status as of 10 March. But could I perhaps have not heard him correctly? I would be surprised if this were the case, since the other points as well attest to the same thing. The subject at hand was the forming of intergovernmental relations during the period of negotiations and the point that proposals could be submitted. Of course another point of discussion will be the forming of a new union of sovereign states. The President of the USSR mentioned that eight republics have submitted proposals for an agreement of union. But what about the blockade? I asked. The President replied that the blockade would immediately be withdrawn upon acceptance of a moratorium. Therefore present your proposals; we must move on, he commented. The President of the Soviet Union also mentioned a point connected with several of our draft enactments pertaining to the illegality of the act of joining the USSR in 1940. Of course if we present a

demand that the 1940 enactment by which Lithuania joined the USSR be rescinded or declared illegal, in any case such a decision would have to be made not by the President but by the Parliament. M. Gorbachev made it clear that this was hardly an optimal agreement. I believe that this indicates that we must check once again in order to determine whether we correctly understood one another and whether this is in fact an adjusted position.

Thus two somewhat different Moscow positions and interpretations appeared within a single day. M. Gorbachev made it known that he expects this action from us and that these matters should proceed as he has prescribed. I seriously doubt whether there will be more favorable conditions for this at a later date. First of all, absolutely indescribable and difficult-to-predict things are taking place within Russia proper and in the Soviet Union. Secondly, it is hardly likely that we ourselves will be any stronger. I emphasize that such a step must be taken while we are still on our feet.

As for the previous resolution, it is in no way milder, since that moratorium interpretation which we presented applies to a single document. Incidentally, A. Lukyanov had previously submitted a three-part proposal, including legal documents proceeding from this, which affect the interests of the Soviet Union and, in its original version, even the laws of the Soviet Union. Consequently the government's proposal was risky in the sense that it embodied a minimum of that which the other party was expecting. And this minimum, as you see, received preliminary recognition.

The government performed a thankless task, for it stated that which does not sound attractive to Lithuania and which was debated for a long period of time and was given various interpretations. People have even ceased distinguishing the document proper from independence as such. I feel that, after listening to the exhaustively-presented various alternatives by the esteemed chairman pertaining to discussion of the concept proper, one should scarcely have any apprehensions. As I see it there is no greater risk than I took previously, particularly when you know that the moratorium will be in effect only for the period of negotiations.

I again stress that there are international guarantees, but Lithuania can become a component part of a community of European states only taking overall aggregate interests into account. It is hardly likely that there will be states which will in some way attempt to bring the Soviet Union to its knees before Lithuania, in view of Europe's present attitude toward the USSR and its leader, President M. Gorbachev. And if a conflict arose, not one European state would undertake to help resolve it.

The intonations of today's conversation with Moscow seemed both to the Chairman and to me to be appreciably different from a couple of months ago. Apparently fairly favorable conditions are forming on all sides.

Now let us discuss the various alternatives. The meaning of each depends on the degree to which the result proper

is accentuated. Possible negotiations would constitute not only one more statement of our position; it has been stated a great many times. It does not arouse doubts either in us or in anyone else. For this reason it is very important to focus precisely on the results aspect. Take the second draft proposal. The proposal to restore historical justice and to call upon the Soviet Union, as is suggested in some draft proposals, to rescind or acknowledge as illegal the documents pertaining to Lithuania's joining the Soviet Union in 1940, creates an additional obstacle for us. For this reason a question arises: does this obstacle benefit us? Will we actually see the restoration of this justice? Will this not constitute confirmation of the fact that we are indeed a component of the Soviet Union? And what then? A pragmatic approach, you say, but we could postpone this point for a certain time. For example, to the commencement of negotiations.

Further on in the second draft proposal we talk about suspension of authorities. But we emphasize precisely that a moratorium does not abrogate powers. It signifies that those possibilities or rights which proceed from a document in force will not be exercised. Why is it that in this alternative draft proposal we worsen the very essence of moratorium? This certainly should not be done. Is it necessary to state in documents that the Supreme Council has the right to impede a moratorium? It might seem that we have doubts about this right, for nobody is forbidding us to adopt another document on the following day or to rescind an adopted document.

The third alternative draft proposal is in my view an intermediate document. If consultations with the Chairman had not taken place today, perhaps it would be appropriate once again to test the other side's reaction via an inquiry. But is this necessary now? The fourth alternative draft proposal once again talks about 1940.

And, finally, how does a moratorium on action differ from a moratorium on an enactment? It follows from the explanation given by the esteemed P. Kuris that there is no difference, that they are one and the same thing, of course if moratorium means what was stated. By changing the term "moratoriya na akt" [moratorium on an act or enactment], however, we bring its wording closer to a more specific anticipated result.

The sixth alternative draft proposal proceeds in a completely different direction, proposing to coordinate actions with our neighbors. It too has its import, but these are other things. They could constitute very substantial alternatives for asserting our independence in other areas.

And now a few words about the so-called government proposal. Of course provisions pertaining to international discussion of this issue and to guarantees could be incorporated in the preamble, which would not constitute a retreat and would not refute what has already been stated. We could add a provision to the effect that the document shall enter into force upon commencement of negotiations. We could stress the period during which

the document will remain in effect, but of course not the duration of negotiations. In view of the broad range of issues requiring discussion, it is hardly likely that we shall be able to reach an agreement within a month or two. I was involved in drafting the Law on Economic Autonomy. It was not a pleasant experience, but it does enable me to draw certain conclusions.

Thus I support the Chairman's opinion that the documents must be discussed, and first and foremost in the sense of to what degree they are leading our actions toward negotiations. Otherwise discussion would not make sense. I feel that we should definitely not adopt any documents today, since we ourselves need very much to determine why it is that on the same day we have heard two different positions of the leadership of the Soviet Union. I would like to draw attention to the fact that the last position is clearly more favorable for us. It was stated two hours after the Chairman's meeting with the President. If this is a result of the meeting, naturally we should thank the Chairman and his colleagues.

Lithuanian Public on Standoff with Moscow

90UN2246A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by D. Romanov, special correspondent: "Their Own Halfway Points: They Must Be Passed by Both Vilnius and Moscow"]

[Text] Vilnius—Long lines waiting for ice cream and for lemonade. Still longer are the lines for newspapers. Naturally: the thirst for news and information is, perhaps, the most powerful one. For "big-league politics," which the majority of people used to regard if not with indifference, then, at best, used to push aside or dismiss, nowadays has become a constituent part of every household, of every family.

A small table has been set up at the center of the populous Gedimino Prospect. Here, as shown by the hand-lettered poster, they are collecting signatures from Lithuania's foreign-language-speaking population under an appeal to the President of the USSR. It states that the process of restoring Lithuania's sovereignty and statehood is being conducted democratically and without discrimination. In general terms, the message is something like: "Leave us alone, and we'll sort things out by ourselves...."

Someone signs silently, while another person, just as silently, turns away and proceeds along the street. But many persons pause a bit longer. And here, not as at a political meeting, where passions are whipped up to an extreme, nor as at an assembly-type meeting, where the minority frequently fears to go against the majority, but in an unfettered and anonymous type of situation, such a diversity of opinions is manifested as can emerge only at a crucial time in one's own destiny. The opinions range from an unconditional "For" to a furious "Against."

"The collection of signatures is being conducted by an initiative group," states V. Bolotin, the person in charge of the small table. "We don't belong to any political faction. But we think that Moscow should not interfere in Lithuania's business. The demonstration of military equipment, the seizure of a publishing house by the military—all this only exacerbates the situation and worsens inter-ethnic relations. I know what I'm talking about: I was born and raised here, I'm a candidate of chemical sciences, and I work at the Physics Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. My father fought during the war. For almost 40 years he was a CPSU member, but now he has switched to the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. And for him there's no doubt about it—Lithuania should be independent. But Moscow's attempts to show force will evoke an answering reaction not merely in Lithuania, but in the Soviet Union itself. And many people understand this: here at my table more than 1500 persons have affixed their signatures to the appeal."

But here is a completely different conversation—one held with I. Slovina—at this very same table:

"I've lived here for 32 years, and my husband—even longer. We have children and grandchildren.... Suddenly we became like strangers or aliens, people treated with bitterness and malice; relations become worse with each passing day. What are we to do? Abandon everything and become refugees in our old age?"

There are no halftones, no shadings. Nor is there frequently (and unfortunately) any desire to listen to each other. Here on the Gedimino Prospect, that is quite understandable and explicable: each persons speaks about what is bothering him the most, events are treated not "in general," but as applied to one's own circumstances, one's own experience, and one's own understanding. But it seemed to me that this little scene—commonplace in present-day Vilnius—is a mould or copy of the overall situation in Lithuania.

Each person has his own truth. Some demand that Moscow "pound on the table with its fist," and even beat up on Lithuania, while others are prepared to sacrifice everything for the sake of immediate independence and the imminent or coming prosperity. Whatever words may be spoken in this connection, whatever goals may be proclaimed, at times the impression is created that the further along we proceed, the more reciprocal insults pile up, bitter animosity grows apace, and the path to a calm, constructive dialogue becomes more difficult and complicated. Is it not time for both sides to "put on the brakes"? Because, in my opinion, the actions taken by Lithuania's leaders, as well as by their opponents, whether they want to or not, are objectively providing an impetus to a dangerous tendency. The opposition between Vilnius and "the Center," the opposition between forces within the republic itself, is gradually creating in thousands of Lithuania's citizens an inherent feeling that they are not so much participants in events as their hostages.

Open the local newspapers. Some of them accuse the Center of all the deadly sins. With rare exceptions, the press organs are not inclined either to restraint, or to serious analysis, or to seeking a compromise. It's as if many newspapermen get a certain satisfaction out of the opportunity to trample upon everything that they were compelled to extol for so many years. Well, no matter what one may think, this is certainly understandable: too many insults piled up. The only trouble is that, having hurled themselves to the other extreme without looking around, many publications revile not only the regime, which they simultaneously accuse of being alien, and not only its representatives (the "occupiers"), but also persons whose opinions do not coincide in the most minute points with the proclaimed line. And it is here that they make the transition from opposition to ideas to "witch-hunting."

Nor do those publications which take an opposing stance stand on any particular ceremony with their opponents. Here too passions are being whipped up to extremes; emotions frequently predominate over events. Moreover, the "Centrist" journalists are being pounced upon and attacked by both the above-mentioned extremes. Thus, by "nourishing" each other, the mass media, in reflecting the views of the various political forces, are erecting barricades between "their own people" and the "aliens"; they are forming willy-nilly the "image of the enemy." Add to this the political meetings and counter-meetings, strikes, the dubious "divvying-up" of party property, the charms of party property, the truly innumerable appeals, statements, declarations, and calls to foreign countries—and you will understand, if only to a limited degree, the situation into which thousands of people remote from politics have fallen. These are people who have no experience in fighting for their rights and who are not at all accustomed to any sort of social defensiveness.

Here below is how the causes of the present-day, extremely mollified state of minds was defined by G. Kobetskayte, chairman of the Committee on Nationality Affairs under the Lithuanian Council of Ministers:

"Nowadays people are in a situation whereby it is necessary to take an independent decision. But, of course, we have not become accustomed to this."

A. Merkel, a member of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee (on the CPSU Platform) thinks differently:

"The lack of confidence on the part of many inhabitants of Lithuania in their own future is the result of an artificial and premeditatedly caused tension within the republic."

I do not intend to categorically judge who is more right here. As people say, it is clearer on the spot, and I am just here on a trip as a journalist. But I do see one thing: "big-league politics" provides much more happiness for those in whose name it is being carried out.

I am not going to reveal the last name of the person whose fate will be discussed below; this is at his insistence, and subsequently you will understand why. Let me just say the following: the editors know his real last name, first name, and address. Furthermore, our conversation itself took place in the presence of A. Valuyskiy, procurator of the Interethnic Affairs Division of the USSR Procuracy. And so here is what this man told us:

"I was born and raised in Lithuania," said Nikolay. "I know the language, and I have friends and acquaintances among people of various nationalities. I could never imagine that I would be compelled to fight for my life in the literal sense of that word. I was seriously wounded in Afghanistan and underwent more than 10 operations. I turned to many different persons: to Doctor Ilizarov, to Doctor Kashpirovskiy.... Nothing helped. An operation to be performed in a certain hospital in the FRG could save me. An agreement was reached to treat me there. But after 11 March a bureaucrat at the highest government level in Lithuania told me the following: 'You are a member of the occupation forces. We did not send you to Afghanistan. We have no money for you. Let Moscow help....'

"And so I went to Moscow," Nikolay continued. "At the Ministry of Health they did not want to talk to me at all: what money? Lithuania is seceding, so ask them there. You are not ours now. And at the Red Cross they offered me a 10-ruble note, evidently so that I would not make any complaint against them. I never engaged in politics; I did not go to fight in Afghanistan on my own. And so why am I being insulted and called a 'member of the occupation force'? Why am I now an alien both in Lithuania and in Moscow? Why must I die?"

Of course, Nikolay's story is an exceptional case. But only to a certain degree. Because, let's be frank, many persons have turned out to be in the role of "nobodies" or "extras," and examples could be cited, alas, for a long time. A certain person unexpectedly lost his job, while another one—just as suddenly—lost his place on the waiting list for housing. Some persons experience constant pressure at their place of work. Others find anonymous letters with threats. Who is to defend or protect them? Moscow? Vilnius?...

Yes, we understand that on a sharp curve, at the turning-point of history, costs cannot be avoided. But is it possible that the following ruthless thesis will become part of our life again: When you chop down a forest, the chips will fly? Is it possible that we will again throw our fellow-citizens into the millstones of political ambitions? We have already passed through that. And we know that, no matter which side emerges on top, there will be no real winners....

And we know the following: in order to achieve a compromise, each side must pass through its own halfway point. It is now evident that Vilnius and Moscow are striving to find a compromise which will help to extricate them from this impasse. But it is no less evident that there are internal paths which are hindering this. They are interwoven from ambitions and distrust,

from extreme conservatism and just as extreme radicalism. In recent days all this has been felt with particular clarity in Lithuania. After the government headed by K. Prunskiene proposed to declare a temporary moratorium on restoring Lithuania's independence, the opponents' voices have been resounding in a mighty chorus in this republic's Supreme Soviet, at political meetings, and in the local press. "The moratorium is our crematorium!" they chant. At a press conference a few days ago K. Prunskiene reasonably remarked as follows: "Alas, the opponents of a moratorium have not proposed anything which would help to bring closer the beginning of negotiations with the Kremlin."

It is obvious that Lithuania's parliament will be confronted with heated debates on this score. And for now it is extremely difficult to say whether they will bring us closer to the negotiating table. But we must hurry....

Belorussian Repeat Election Winners Listed

*90UN2022A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA
in Russian 17 May 90 p 1*

[*"List of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR Elected in Repeat Voting of May 14, 1990"*]

[Text] Zdanevich, Leontiy Ulyanovich, chief of architects group of SAKM-5 of the Belgosproyekt institute, CPSU member, Minsk. From Masherovskiy electoral district No. 39.

Tesovets, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, deputy head of internal affairs section of the executive committee of the Frunze rayon Soviet of People's Deputies of Minsk, CPSU member. From Pushkin electoral district No. 40.

Khomyashov, Ernst Nikiforovich, director of the Minsk scientific training center SNPO "Algoritm," CPSU member, Minsk. From Timoshenkovskiy electoral district No. 45.

Fedorenko, Viktor Nikolaevich, military, CPSU member, Brest. From Brest-Pogranichniy electoral district No. 99.

Composition of New Belorussian Parliament Analyzed

*90UN2022B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA
in Russian 18 May 90 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Who Are the Deputies Today?"]

[Text] Discussion was completed at the evening session of May 16 of the order for considering questions included in the agenda.

A report was then heard by the Mandate Commission, presented by its chairman, Deputy V.S. Leonov, who reported as follows:

—The elections just held reflected the complex, profound processes under way in our society. They contributed to revealing the opinions of the Belorussian

people on a wide range of questions. In electing the new group of deputies, the workers of Belorussia hope that we can firmly defend their rights and implement their directives and suggestions.

The Central Commission on Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR has presented to the Mandate Commission all the necessary documents. In accordance with article 98 of the BSSR Constitution and the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR, elections were held in 310 single-mandate territorial electoral districts and from four public organizations.

Overall, the nomination of candidates, their registration by local election commissions and the elections were conducted observing the Belorussian SSR Constitution and the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR. However, during the election campaign there were committed both organizational errors and certain violations of the provisions of the election law. The Central Commission on Elections has received 1472 letters and telegrams containing claims, statements and complaints. About 5,000 persons contacted the Commission in person and by telephone. All the complaints and statements were investigated by the Central and local commissions. The mistakes and violations revealed did not affect the election results.

At the same time, members of the Mandate Commission believe that there are imperfections and inadequacies in the election laws. As a result, certain provisions of the laws were interpreted differently, resulting in criticism by voters and complaints during the application of certain of their standards.

In all, there were elected 328 people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR. The Central Commission has registered all of them.

295 persons, or 90 percent have not been previously elected to the Supreme Soviet of Belorussia. 290 deputies are members and candidate members of the CPSU. This is 88.1 percent of all the deputies. There are four Komsomol members, 11 women, 9 young persons under 30. There are 242 (73.6 percent) Belorussians among the deputies, 19.5 percent Russians, 3.6 percent Ukrainians, and 3 percent Poles. Other nationalities are represented by only one person.

Workers from industry, construction, transport and communications comprise 57 persons in the Supreme Soviet, including 12 workers and 33 farmers. It is true that 27 deputies are chairmen of collective farms and directors of state farms; there are two collective farm workers. There are 96 workers of Party and soviet organs, and three of trade union and Komsomol organs.

93.9 percent of the deputies have higher education; 6.1 percent middle and special middle education. There are 26 doctors and candidates of science. The deputies include 11 lawyers, 13 members of the military; 3 members of the clergy were elected for the first time. Four deputies are Heroes of the Soviet Union and 6 are

Heroes of Socialist Labor. 182 deputies (55.3 percent) have received awards and medals; 8 deputies are laureates of state prizes.

A majority vote decided not to open a debate on the Mandate Commission's report. Commission member deputy S. A. Antonchik voiced his disagreement with the conclusion that the shortcomings and violations uncovered did not affect the election results. Other deputies also questioned certain provisions of the report.

The following draft directive was introduced for the session's consideration: "Having reviewed the report by the Mandate Commission, the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees: that the authority be recognized of the 277 people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR elected in 1990 from territorial electoral districts, and the 50 people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR elected from the Belorussian Republic Organization of Veterans of War and Labor, the Belorussian Society of Invalids, the Belorussian Society of the Blind and the Belorussian Society of the Deaf."

After this, the deputies took up consideration of item five of the agenda: "The procedure for electing the Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet." The discussion was extremely sharp from the very beginning, and sometimes overly emotional. The presiding officer received many questions, including: Who is the author of the document distributed on the eve of the discussion in which it was proposed that candidacies for Chairman of the Supreme Soviet be discussed before they are added to the list for voting? Most of the deputies saw this as a violation of democratic norms and of their rights.

Deputy V.I. Gonchar demanded an explanation from the present Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Deputy N.I. Dementey, who noted that the document was submitted on behalf of the Soviet of Representatives of Groups of People's Deputies.

By a vote of 268 for, 11 against and 9 abstentions the deputies expressed their opinion that future discussions of the procedure for electing the Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet should be based on the appropriate provisions of the temporary rules, under which any number of candidacies can be entered on the list for voting.

The session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet continued its work on May 17.

Deputies' Appeal to Ukrainian Parliament on Chernobyl

90UN2022C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
18 May 90 p 1

[Article by People's Deputies from Zhitomir oblast V. Yatsenko, V. Bondarev, V. Rudyk, M. Duplyak, V. Budko, 24 signatures in all: "Appeal to the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR"]

[Text] We, people's deputies of the Ukraine, are deeply disturbed by the tragic situation in which the population

of regions suffering from the Chernobyl catastrophe finds itself.

As of now there has not been created a clear, well-defined and comprehensible concept of safe residence in radioactively contaminated areas, including those with a contamination density of up to 15 curies per square kilometer. The most frightening is that no one is giving the people a guarantee that they, their children and grandchildren will be able-bodied. This has created and feeds a growing psychological stress; the residents are abandoning everything and leaving. Life in the cities and villages is disintegrating. All this can lead to social and political explosions.

The fact that the government has resolved individual questions but not the entire problem comprehensively only aggravates the situation.

We urgently propose that a threshold-free concept be adopted of residence in the region contaminated by radionuclides (it is impossible to live where the results of one's labor cannot be utilized and where any limitations exist).

Based upon this, we propose consideration of a program of urgent measures including the following:

1. To develop and adopt by not later than June of this year the status of a resident of the region affected by the Chernobyl disaster. The state must compensate people for loss, and above all provide housing within a year.

2. To define the status of the region contaminated by radionuclides.

3. To mandate that the republic's government reexamine decree No. 315 of December 14, 1989, taking into consideration:

—for citizens living and working in the contaminated area, introduce conditions of material incentives for their work, and benefits for leave, retirement and entry into higher and middle special educational institutions;

—the actual supply to the population not of "relatively" pure, but actually pure foodstuffs in accordance with physiological standards;

—adoption of decisive measures for public health and to improve the medical services for the public, especially children;

—creation of special economic conditions for work collectives of enterprises, organizations and institutions.

We demand that this Appeal be included as a separate question on the agenda of the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. We ask all the people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR to support us in this.

Rukh Official On Political Objectives

90UN2039A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 7 June 90 p 3

[Interview with O.H. Vlokh, professor at the Franko State University at Lvov and people's deputy to the Ukrainian SSR, by O. Telenchi, in Lvov: "Let Us Get Back to Earthly Matters..."]

[Text] "Let us get back to earthly matters..." This thesis should become the definitive one in the National Council of Rukh's activity—this is the view of its leader, a Professor of the Franko State University at Lvov, a People's Deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, O. H. Vlokh.

[Telenchi] Orest Hryhorovych, during the election campaign in Lvov, Rukh was an influential force. Lvov residents informed themselves at your headquarters; they got to know which candidates supported Rukh. It is known, this attests to Rukh's authority here. And it seems to me, that to some people Rukh appears to be a singular symbol of opposition to the Party organs and all Communists. Such "movers" and their supporters have made questionable slogans, like: "Councils—without any Communists," "Ukraine—for Ukrainians" and so on. How can a person who is not privy to the political scene orient himself as to who's who and what's what?

[Vlokh] The elections have considerably altered the array of political forces in the oblast. All the candidates from the Democratic Bloc, who were candidates to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, got elected. And the birth and consolidation of any new political power—whether it is a community group or a party—cannot but involve an uproar, hot tempers, and the so-called meeting heroes, who voluntarily or involuntarily provoke indignation and political destabilization. We understand that individual "heroes" enter Rukh only in order to discredit it. At one meeting, which generally proceeded in an organized, democratic manner, an orator managed to get hold of a microphone and began to call people to take up arms. We immediately isolated him, led him into headquarter's office, and called the militia. We see him as a provocateur. The main organizational center shortly afterwards expelled him from Rukh.

[Telenchi] In its time the Lion's Association put people seeking political office under an uncommon sort of scrutiny in order to avoid ending up with the wrong people in office. Rukh is a mass organization, which unites communists and non-Party people, believers and atheists. What guarantee does one have that there are not other "heroes" hidden in its ranks, who are secretly slowing down the unfolding of events? I heard an interesting compliment from one, high-school, history (!) teacher about you—"red Vlokh." This teacher tried to get elected to the local council and agitated to have a council without any communists.

[Vlokh] I regard this expression as an infelicitous compliment, because Ukraine took a beating from the

"Reds" and the "Whites." In Rukh there are quite a few Communists, but they have nothing in common with the command-administrative system, which compromised the concept of a "communist." This is why the problem of freeing ourselves from using labels has directly confronted us. Rukh has become not only popular, but also...modish. This was especially apparent during the election campaign. And it's funny and painful to observe, how some political leaders, who still yesterday thought being in the ranks of the CPSU and Rukh was incompatible, tried to demonstrate their tolerance in every possible way, even to us and the electorate. Earlier the Party leaders demanded our expulsion from the Party, and now some are putting the issue thus—"A Rukh—without any Party members." Isn't this similar to a coin with two sides or a slap on the face to both cheeks?

In its time, Rukh was organized in a somewhat spontaneous manner: notes were made and information was recorded—and that is all. The qualification of candidates as such was not an issue foreseen by us; however, now each candidate is discussed on an individual basis in the main organizational centers. One is happy to say that an initiative from below has implemented this procedure.

Now, when we have become a "formal" group; that is, a registered organization with a corresponding juridical status, when our elected people have filled up the Ukrainian parliament and local institutions of authority, we now bear the responsibility to a considerable extent for the republic's political and social stability. We are prepared for a constructive dialogue and cooperation with all the healthy forces, which are capable to work with a sweating brow for the creation of a sovereign, democratic, lawful Ukrainian nation. The conditions of an ecologic catastrophe and an economic and cultural crisis do not at the present time allow the luxury of picketing, meetings and strikes, though we, I want to emphasize once again, do not discount these forms of political struggle.

Tolerance requires tolerance, and we will never cooperate and conduct a dialogue with those political leaders who bear the responsibility for ruining the republic, which is apparent in all spheres...

[Telenchi] Orest Hryhorovych, won't one more area of tension and confrontation arise, when the Communists will leave the ranks of the CPSU in order to join this or that party, a party which will perhaps emerge from Rukh's political base? Are you in agreement, that leaving the CPSU is a far from painless procedure?

[Vlokh] A party cannot be born quickly; this is an extremely serious affair. The situation should clear up to such a point that the choice of choosing a party would become natural, that such a choice would not be accompanied with a new "witch hunt" and confrontation. The democratization of society—this is a long term process. Let us take a look at history. Each revolutionary process

began with the proclamation of certain slogans, which served as catalysts of social development. However, the slogans were proclaimed by a few people, and other people assumed authority...

We must return to earthly matters and above all promote the work ethic in all spheres of life. The democratic forces' most important task lies in overthrowing the questionable, central dictatorship. All the republics are suffering because of the fact that they do not see the end results of their economy's efforts, they do not precisely know who controls their economy and how they control it.

The bountiful lands, the natural resources of the republic and the nation as a whole, in essence, have become the property of no one, or more exactly, the property of the so-called "sixteenth republic," which has caused the present day conditions to develop. I cannot but recall the example of Finland, which did not proclaim sublime slogans and which attained a very high level of prosperity for its people, not having our natural riches and climactic conditions. In the last analysis, the prosperity of a society is determined by its level of organization and capability to renew itself, a capability attainable through working, and to work well, one needs good conditions. Therefore, one of the ideas of Rukh is to renew the work ethic.

[Telenchi] In the Great Council of Rukh you chair the commission for foreign relations. Please discuss these relations in more detail.

[Vlokh] Changes in this field are very apparent. Not so long ago ties with the Ukrainian diaspora were few and were often regarded as if they were ties with an enemy, and because of such ties, you could lose your job. The airplane which came here in connection with the blessed mission of "The Children of Chernobyl"—this is the starting point of cooperation which will extend in time to all spheres of life.

Not so long ago, a shipment came to Rukh from a Ukrainian woman's organization from Great Britain. A session of the renewed Academic Association of T. G. Shevchenko took place in which people from the Ukrainian diaspora from USA, Canada, France, Australia, Poland and other nations participated. In the summer, in Kiev and Lvov an all-world convention of Ukrainian doctors will take place. We will invite foreign economists here, because the academic field of economics, for reasons readily apparent, cannot educate the people to think from a new, economic point of view. Thus contacts, which began along the lines of community organizations, are already attaining an official, state level. We are concerned by the fact that the republic's government is not paying any attention to the complicated Polish-Ukrainian relations. On the everyday level, these relations are not normal. The still relevant territorial claims, claims which heated up during the unification of Germany, and the absurd view about the fact that the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church is the starting

point of Polonization, though in fact it served as a means for preserving the national culture—all these issues can cause a destabilization of the [Western Ukrainian] region. Now, when we have our representatives in the Ukrainian parliament, we can conduct a discussion about the normalization of relations between the two nationalities on a higher, official level.

Rukh Hunger Strike in Vinnitsa

90UN2458A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
29 Jun 90 3

[Article by UKRINFORM correspondent Ye. Zakhar'yash: "They Resorted to a Hunger Strike"]

[Text] The politically motivated hunger strike of the dean of the Vinnitsa Pedagogical Institute, chairman of the Podolsk NRU V.S. Mulyava, lasted over two weeks. He was joined by over twenty persons, who set up a tent city in front of the Vinnitsa city executive committee building. As indicated by the registration book of hunger strikers located at the tents, over 400 persons conducted one- and two-day hunger strikes in support of V.S. Mulyava's demands.

The hunger strikers demand, in particular, that all facts be disclosed regarding payment for the activities of the Party committees' permanent staff (secretaries, their deputies, assistants, technical workers) out of the city budget, paid for by enterprises, institutions, organizations, and firms; that fine and other forms of punishment imposed by law enforcement agencies be abolished; that instances be investigated of "bureaucracy games," of irregularities in elections to the Soviets; that the Party obkom's House of Political Education be converted into a House of Workers' Social and Political Problems; that the Vinnitsa region be declared one of ecological danger in connection with the Chernobyl disaster and the nearness of other nuclear power plants; etc.

Representatives of Party, Soviet and law enforcement agencies held several meetings with the hunger strike participants. Their proposals—to resolve contentious issues not by hunger strikes, but by other methods—were not listened to. One of V.S. Mulyava's demands was met: his statement was published in the newspaper *VINNITSKA PRAVDA*.

There was a meeting with the hunger strikers by the chairman of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, first secretary of the Vinnitsa Party obkom A.P. Nekhaevskiy, chairman of the city Soviet, first secretary of the Party gorkom I.I. Soroka, chairman of the city executive committee V.I. Yuryev, director of the UVD (Administration for Internal Affairs) V.S. Tyazhlov, oblast procurator I.D. Temchenko, and other officials. It took place in the presence of several thousand residents of Vinnitsa. Answers were given to the questions of the hunger strikers and those present at a citizens' meeting. An agreement was reached on talks between the directors of

the oblast and city and the participants in the hunger strike, and on broadcasting these talks at the city's central square.

At the designated time, the sides' representatives gathered in the city executive committee offices. Thousands of Vinnitsa residents came to the square. But the talks did not take place. The activists of Rukh refused a dialogue, stating that the other side did not meet one of the preconditions: publication by that day in the oblast Party newspaper of the resolution of a meeting held June 10 under the slogan "Human Rights Are the People's Rights."

An attempt by intermediaries, members of the Vinnitsa Independent Democratic Deputies' Club, to get the talks started by noting that the resolution will be published, was unsuccessful.

The resolution appeared on June 27 in the *VINNITSKA PRAVDA*. V.S. Mulyava ended his hunger strike; others are continuing theirs.

The city Soviet session opening here is discussing the situation created in the city by this action and the hunger strikers' demands.

Ternopol Oblast Soviet Chairman Elected

90UN2458B Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
28 Jun 90 3

[Unattributed article: "The Oblast Soviet Session"]

[Text] Ternopol, June 27 (UKRINFORM)—The second session of the Ternopol oblast Soviet of People's Deputies of the new convocation began work here today. Organizational questions were considered. In connection with his election as secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy was relieved of his duties as chairman of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

L.M. Malanchuk, previously serving as the director of the Ukrainian branch of the All-Union Institute of Cattle Breeding, was elected on an alternative basis as chairman of the Ternopol oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

Several other questions are on the session's agenda.

Kirghiz Decree on Osh State of Emergency

90US1147A Frunze *SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1

[“Decree of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Introducing a State of Emergency on the Territory of the City of Osh and the 60th Anniversary of Kirgizstan, Kyzyl-Kyshatakskiy, Kyzyl-Bayrakskiy, Narimanskiy, Tyuleykenskiy, and Sharkskiy Rural Soviets of Kara-Suyskiy Rayon, Osh Oblast”]

[Text] In view of the current emergency situation developing as a result of the ultimatum demands by groups of

persons of the Kirghiz and Uzbek nationalities with regard to the allocation of land lots for the construction of individual housing which have brought about mass disturbances and casualties, the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. To declare a state of emergency on the territory of the City of Osh and the 60th Anniversary of Kirgizstan, Kyzyl-Kyshtakskiy, Kyzyl-Bayrakskiy, Narimanskiy, Tyuleykenskiy, and Sharkskiy Rural Soviets of Kara-Suyskiy Rayon, Osh Oblast effective 2200 hours on 4 June 1990.
2. To appoint the Kirghiz SSR minister of internal affairs, Major General V.V. Goncharov, commandant of the territories indicated.

*A.M. Masaliyev, chairman,
Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet*

Kirghiz Plenum on Osh, Congress Agenda

*90US1147B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 6 Jun 90 p 1*

[Information report on the plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee]

[Text] A plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee was held on 5 June 1990.

The plenum proceedings were participated in by the first secretaries of the city and rayon party committees, leaders of ministries and departments who are not members of the Central Committee, secretaries of the Kirghiz Central Committee of the LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League], secretaries of party committees and primary party organizations, employees of the press, radio, and television, and ranking functionaries of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee apparatus, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee, A.M. Masaliyev, informed those gathered about the situation existing in the city of Osh and the rayons adjacent to it. He expressed his conviction that the efforts undertaken by the republic and oblast leadership would bring about the normalization of the situation and the establishment of public order.

Issues of the regular 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party were considered at the plenum.

The text of the Central Committee report to the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party was handed out to the plenum participants ahead of time.

The first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee, A.M. Masaliyev, made a statement on the Central Committee report.

The following made remarks and suggestions concerning the draft Central Committee report to the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party: V.S. Beloteilov, second

secretary of the Issyk-Kul Obkom [oblast party committee]; Sh.B. Aldashev, Kirghiz SSR minister of consumer services to the populace; M. Bazarkulov, Kirghiz SSR minister of education; N. Isanov, chairman of the Issyk-Kul Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee]; S.B. Daniyarov, academician of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences; K.B. Khuriyev, chief of the Naryngidroenergostroy Construction Administration; I. Zhusubaliyev, first secretary of the Kyzyl-Kiya Gorkom [city party committee]; B.I. Silayev, first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Raykom [rayon party committee]; T. Tabyldiyev, first secretary of the Kirghizia LKSM Central Committee; S. Begaliyev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Planning Committee; T. Ishemkulov, editor of the newspaper SOVETTIK KYRGYZSTAN; K. Kokoyev, first secretary of Panfilovskiy Raykom; and B. Ryspayev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade.

The plenum approved in the main the draft Central Committee report to the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party, instructed the Central Committee Bureau to work on it additionally taking the discussion into account, and instructed Central Committee First Secretary A.M. Masaliyev to deliver the report at the congress.

Partial changes were made in the agenda of the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party approved by the previous Central Committee plenum. The item "On the Draft Regulations on the Control and Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Kirghizia" was deleted. The following wording of item 6 on the agenda was confirmed: "Elections of the leading organs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia:

"a) Kirghiz CP Central Committee;

"b) Auditing Commission of the Kirghiz Communist Party."

The issue "On Endorsements of Candidates for the CPSU Leading Organs" was placed on the agenda of the congress.

The plenum confirmed a commission for preparing the main documents of the 19th Congress and working out proposals for the composition of the elected organs of the Communist Party of Kirghizia and delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, and endorsements of candidates to the CPSU leading organs.

The first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee, A.M. Masaliyev, made the closing remarks.

With this the plenum adjourned.

June 4 Information Report From Uzbek CP Congress

*90US1089A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Jun 90 p 1*

[Information Announcement on the 22d Uzbek CP Congress]

[Text] On 4 June 1990, the 22d Uzbek CP Congress commenced its work in Tashkent.

The Congress was opened by the First Secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee and Uzbek President I.A. Karimov.

The delegates elected the leading bodies of the Congress including the Presidium, the Secretariat, the Editing and Credentials Commissions. A commission was also elected to work out proposals on the membership of the elective bodies of the Uzbek CP.

The following Congress agenda was approved.

1. On the course and basic directions of perestroyka, the tasks of ensuring the sovereignty and economic independence of Uzbekistan, the place and role of the Uzbek CP in the new political system of the nation and the republic. The Political Report of the Uzbek CP Central Committee.
2. The report of the Uzbek CP Auditing Commission.
3. On the Draft of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and the 28th Party Congress "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism."
4. On the Draft of the CPSU Bylaws.
5. On the Regulation "Concerning the Control-Auditing Commission of the Uzbek CP."

6. Elections:

- The Uzbek CP Central Committee;
- The Uzbek CP Control-Auditing Commission.

7. On the candidacies from the Uzbek CP to membership of the CPSU central bodies.

The First Secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee and Uzbek President I.A. Karimov gave the Political Report of the Central Committee to the 22d Uzbek CP Congress.

The report of the Auditing Commission was heard and this was given by its chairman, M.A. Zaidov.

Participating in the debates were: Comrades D.S. Yadgarov, first secretary of the Bukhara Party Obkom, S.D. Niyetullayev, first secretary of the Karakalpak Party Obkom, A.Ya. Yakubov, chairman of the board of the Uzbek Writers' Union, and G.S. Paryayeva, secretary of the Party Committee at the Samarkand Kinap Plant.

The Congress elected a commission to work out the draft resolutions of the 22d Congress on the political report of the Uzbek CP Central Committee on the Drafts of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress and the CPSU Bylaws as well as a draft decree on the report of the Uzbek CP Auditing Commission.

In the continuation of the debates, the following spoke: Comrades A.I. Fazylbekov, first secretary of the Tashkent Party Gorkom, R. Ruziyev, brigade leader of electrical assembly workers of the SPMK-1 [specialized mobile mechanized column] of the Karshirmontazh [Karshi Irrigation Installation] Trust under the Specialized Construction Association Karshistroy [Karshi Construction], Sh.N. Makhmudova, secretary of the Tashkent Party Obkom, B.T. Nurmatov, brigade leader at the Fergana Leather Plant, U. Khashimov, Editor-in-Chief of the journal SHARK YULDUZI, N.V. Stryapsheva, team member on the Kolkhoz imeni Segizbayev in Mirzachulskiy Rayon of Dzhizak Oblast, B.R. Kariyeva, chairman of the board of the Uzbek Union of Theatrical Workers, A.A. Aydarkulov, first secretary of the Syrdarya Party Obkom, P. Kadyrov, chairman of the Commission of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet on the Questions of Interethnic Relations, Language and International Education.

The Congress heard and approved the report of the credentials commission given by its chairman, T.A. Alimov.

Adopted was an Appeal of the 22d Congress of the Uzbek CP to the Communists, to all the Peoples of the Republic on the Questions of Interethnic Relations.

Participating in the work of the Congress was the Deputy Head of the Department for Party Construction and Personnel Work of the CPSU Central Committee V.N. Lobko and the Sector Head of the same department, N.I. Semenov.

The Congress is continuing its work.

Karimov Report to Uzbek CP Congress

*90US1089B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Jun 90 pp 2-6*

[Political Report of the Central Committee to the 22d Uzbek CP Congress given by the First Secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee and Uzbek President I.A. Karimov: "On the Course and Basic Directions of Perestroyka, on the Tasks of Ensuring the Sovereignty and Economic Independence of Uzbekistan, on the Place and Role of the Uzbek CP in the New Political System of the Nation and the Republic"]

[Text] Comrades! The 22d Uzbek CP Congress is commencing its work in a complex, tense and, I would say, critical situation. Presented for discussion by it are questions the solution to which will determine not only the present and future of the republic and its party organization but also largely the entire nation and the

entire party. The republic workers expect from the congress answers to extremely acute questions which are of concern to all.

The processes which are occurring in the sociopolitical sphere are causing great disquiet and concern. Engendered by perestroika, democracy and glasnost have been little protected from anarchy and demagoguery. There are growing attacks on the fundamentals of our state, political and social system. Discipline and order are breaking down, crime is rising, and the guarantees for personal safety, the rights and dignity of the citizens are being violated.

The state of affairs is also deteriorating in the production and social spheres. Social production, labor productivity and national income are all dropping. Wages are rising but this is not backed up by goods and services and inflation is deepening. Speculation, corruption and the shadow economy are becoming widespread. All of this tells negatively on the standard of living of the people, particularly the poorly-off strata of the public.

There is also a devaluation in cultural and spiritual life and along with the politicization and increased activeness of the masses one can also observe an attempt to destroy the ideological and moral underpinnings of society and disregard the common human standards and national values.

Social and interethnic conflicts have assumed a crisis acuteness. The situation in the Baltic and Transcaucasus shows this with harsh obviousness, as here events have actually dangerously approached the state of civil war. This can be seen from those overtly antiparty, anti-Soviet and fascist slogans which were proclaimed by a portion of the demonstrators on May Day on Red Square in Moscow.

The communists and the workers of the republic, as throughout the nation, view with concern these destructive processes and trends. With great disquiet they are asking the questions: By what and to what is our society being driven? Are these negative phenomena the inevitable result and accomplice of perestroika? Or is this the consequence of errors in the political leadership of society and the absence of a clear plan for the measures being carried out or indeed the inability to anticipate and foresee the consequences? Just to what dangerous limits can these processes be allowed to go?

The question at present is extremely acute. Will the party be able to maintain its unity, will it be able to rebuff the various currents which are endeavoring to split it into factions and platforms? Just how quickly will it be able to rethink and take on its new role, harness the rapid and contradictory processes of social development and direct them into a creative channel? Or will the upper hand be gained by the spontaneous, destructive trends and forces which are leading our society to chaos and destruction?

The Congress should provide clear and precise answers to all these questions.

We must formulate our positions on the drafts of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and the new CPSU Bylaws.

It is essential to define the ways and the practical actions aimed at ensuring the true political sovereignty and economic independence of Uzbekistan, for strengthening the independence of the Uzbek CP, as well as work out decisions on the questions of the organizational and ideological unity of the CPSU.

All of this defines the basic role and significance of the 22d CP Congress as a turning point in the life of the republic party organization. It must work out decisions which would arm the communist party with clear political guidelines and a precise program of actions. Only under this condition is it possible to count on successful advancement.

I. On the Basic Lessons of the Past

In following the Leninist traditions of political realism, it is essential to assess objectively the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation, no matter how complex and difficult it might be.

There have been and are no alternatives to revolutionary perestroika and to a fundamental renewal of our society on humane, democratic principles. Otherwise the nation would inevitably have run off the road of world progress. The fundamental changes must provide a new impetus for the development of society and multiply the creative potential of socialism.

But here clear principles and views are essential. We cannot agree with the assertion that the socialist idea from the very outset was wrong and that October 1917 was a mistake. We cannot obviate our history in which there are many both heroic and dramatic stages, and the struggle and effort of the older generations, our fathers and grandfathers. They raised a backward, semifeudal nation to a modern level of social and scientific-technical progress. This is an objective fact which no one and nothing can refute.

But as well, no one and nothing can refute the fact that major violations and deformations were permitted in many stages of socialist construction.

The roots of these errors and crimes go back into the past. The main one is that contrary to the swing envisaged by V.I. Lenin of all views to socialism, "an artificial model was forced on our society.... And society was forced to fit in this model. For this reason, there was so much that was unjust and warped." (M.S. Gorbachev, "Speech to the Communists of Frunzenskiy Rayon of the Capital," PRAVDA, 15 May 1990.)

From the outset the wrong guidelines, goals and ways of achieving them were completely warped and distorted during the years of the cult of personality and the years of stagnation. At present, constantly new flagrant facts are becoming known of unjust mass repressions, the

pitiless breaking of the basic foundations of life in the periods of collectivization and industrialization, the destruction of spiritual values and traditions of the peoples, corruption and degeneration of the cadres, socioeconomic degradation, as well as ignoring the urgent needs and vital requests of the people.

These negative phenomena appeared in all regions, in all republics, and all peoples suffered from them. And to try to reckon who did so more and who did so less would mean to speculate on the grief and pain of the people. This is an unworthy political game.

We categorically condemn all deformations, errors and crimes of the past and we decisively set ourselves apart from them. We uniformly favor a just, objective and critical analysis of our past and present. We are in favor of eliminating all the "blank spots," whether this be the Bashmach movement, collectivization, repression or the decay of the period of stagnation. But without fail, this must be done considering the concrete historical conditions of each event and proceeding from the awareness that this is our history and for each step of this we paid with the sweat and blood of the older generations. And to besmirch it with a solid coat of black paint would be an unforgivable error to the memory of our fathers and grandfathers and to the moral health of our sons and grandsons.

The main thing is to disclose those problems and deformations which impede the current life of the republic. We must work out a constructive program of actions to rectify the situation. We must provide a solution to all the very urgent problems of national-state, socioeconomic and spiritual development.

II. Socioeconomic Situation in the Republic

There has been great and hard-to-repair damage caused by the deviation from the Leninist principle of nationality policy and the equal and mutually advantageous collaboration of peoples. This was stated directly at the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

But it is not the peoples who are to blame for this, as at present individual chauvinistic and nationalistic forces are endeavoring to show. Of course, these are not the workers of Russia on whose shoulders have rested primarily the basic burden of all the hardships.

In his letter "To All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East," V.I. Lenin wrote: "From now on, your beliefs and customs, your nationality and cultural institutions are declared free and inviolable. Organize your national life freely and without impediment. You have the right to this. Know that your rights, like the rights of all the Russian peoples, are protected by all the might of the revolution and its bodies and by the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies."

It is impossible to erase from history and from the noble memory of the peoples Lenin's decree on developing the

Golodnaya [Hunger] Steppe, Lenin's Science Train which marked a beginning to higher education in the Central Asian Region, the aid from the industrial centers to develop the industry of the republic or the selfless turning over of scores of enterprises and aid in training personnel. Unforgettable is the joint struggle and mutual aid of the people during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the rebuilding of the earthquake-devastated Tashkent, as well as the construction of major national construction projects and water control facilities.

We will not resort to oversimplified comparisons such as with what our republic commenced its difficult task of resurrection from semifeudal backwardness to socialist creativity. The facts and figures on this question have been given repeatedly. In the course of socialist construction, Uzbekistan has become a region of large-scale industry, the volume of industrial production has risen many-fold, and great progress has been made in the development of culture, public education, science and art. All of this is irrefutable.

But also irrefutable and obvious is the fact that the republic in terms of all the basic economic and social indicators lags significantly behind the average Union level and holds one of the last places in our nation. We have already repeatedly given these figures, but at present they must again be given some thought.

In terms of the production of gross social product per capita, Uzbekistan holds 12th place in the nation, and in terms of the production of per capita national income is one-half the average Union level.

In terms of labor productivity in industry, the republic is 40 percent behind the nation and in agriculture by double. The per capita production of consumer goods in the republic is just 40 percent of the average Union level. In terms of the level of income and the consumption of the main types of food products, we are in the very last in the ranking of the Union republics.

The average inhabitant of Uzbekistan consumes almost 2-fold less meat and meat products, milk and dairy products and eggs than as the nation as a whole. The share of the population with an average per capita aggregate income under 75 rubles a month is almost 45 percent, while for the USSR it is a little more than 12 percent. Around a million persons cannot find employment for their forces in social production.

The sectors of the social infrastructure such as public health, public education and the children's preschool institutions are in a very severe situation. Suffice it to say that 60 percent of the schools and hospitals are in make-shift quarters.

The list of very acute economic and social problems could be continued. But the main thing is expressed in the fact that elementary conditions are lacking not only for the integrated and harmonious development of man, for the moral development of his personality, but frequently even elementary support of life.

How did such a situation come about?

How could the republic which possesses such significant resource, production and scientific-technical potential, good natural-climatic conditions and, most importantly, such an industrious people, end up in one of the last places in the nation for the main economic and social parameters and reach a state which is rightly characterized as a crisis one?

These questions are being asked now by every concerned person who is alarmed at the fate, who is alarmed for the future of the republic and who is alarmed for its younger generation.

The answer must be sought in the fact that at the beginning of the 1930s, with the victory of the administrative-command methods of economic leadership and the forgetting of the Leninist principles of nationality policy, faulty approaches to the development of Uzbekistan and its productive forces became evermore established. How were these expressed? Primarily in the fact that our republic was viewed basically as a source of raw materials, a raw material appendage for the industrial ministries and departments. The regional socioeconomic features were clearly underestimated or merely ignored, and no consideration was given to a possible alternative for more comprehensive, accelerated growth in the economy and the social sphere and for changing the role and place of Uzbekistan in the national division of labor.

Let us ask the question of what place our republic holds in the national division of labor and for what parameters has it emerged in leading positions. We have always said with pride that at present some 1,500 large production associations and enterprises are operating in our republic, and every 4 days produces as much electric power as was generated in an entire year prior to the revolution. We hold 4th place in the nation for the output of gas. The agrarian sector produces two-thirds of the nation's raw cotton, over one-third of the Astrakhan fur, over 60 percent of the silk cocoons as well as large amounts of kenaf, fruits, grapes, vegetables and melon crops. In terms of the number of students per 1,000 inhabitants, Uzbekistan is ahead of many developed countries.

These conclusions have been repeatedly given from the high rostrums, in dissertations, in reports and summaries. But if one gives some thought to what is behind these phrases? It must be stated that our economy has acquired a one-sided, hypertrophied raw material nature and has not been focused on integrated development and on the needs of the population. The share of finished product in industry is just 50 percent, over 80 percent of the agricultural product is shipped out of the republic without any processing. The profound disproportions in the structure of social production can be seen from the fact that in the product shipped out of the republic, two-thirds is in the form of raw products, materials and

semifabrics. In the imports into the republics, 60 percent is due to machinery, equipment and products of the light and food industry.

A paradoxical situation has developed. The republic produces very valuable raw materials such as cotton, nitron, and caprolactam and at the same time, because of the low degree of their processing and the incompleteness of the manufacturing chain, is forced to ship in textiles, acetate fiber and finished products products from the same raw materials.

Calculations show that relatively small outlays would be sufficient to increase the number of manufacturing stages making it possible to produce finished articles and then the questions would not be so acute of material and commodity supply or the seeking out of financial resources.

In recent decades priority in economic development has actually been given to the raw material sectors producing and exporting raw products and semifabrics and marked by relatively low labor intensiveness of the products. As a result, the proportional amount of light industry in the total production volume has dropped over the last 50 years from 54 percent to 37 percent, and in the food industry from 30 to 14 percent. On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in the share of the fuel industry, chemicals and petrochemicals, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, that is, basically the raw material sectors. At the same time, the share of machine building over these years has increased just by 7 points and is currently just 16 percent.

The accelerated development of the mentioned sectors would not solve and could not solve the question of putting the able-bodied population into production, as per 1 million rubles of fixed productive capital there are just 9 persons in the fuel industry and electric power, 16 persons in the chemical industry, 18 in petrochemistry, 34 in ferrous metallurgy, 24 in nonferrous, while in light industry the figure is 168 persons, in woodworking 143, machine building 112 and the food industry 90. In individual types of production of these sectors, the range of labor intensiveness reaches 300-400 persons. But these particular features were not taken into account.

Can one really speak of the comprehensive development of machine building, if all its operations are related to cotton production and producing equipment for cotton growing? The republic produces virtually no complex household equipment, road building machinery, plastic articles, equipment for the food industry, trade and service sphere and so forth.

Why has this happened? Our people are talented, they are capable of developing modern production, electronics, instrument building and other scientific- and labor-intensive sectors of industry.

At present, with pain we must also reassess the "successes" in the development of chemistry. Here preference has been given to large-scale production which has

substantially worsened the ecological situation in the republic. It is particularly indignant that these enterprises, as a rule, have been located in the flourishing oases nourished by the labor of scores of generations of our ancestors. It is a question of the Novokokandskiy Chemical Plant, the Chirchik, Fergana, Samarkand and Navoi chemical enterprises and many others. This is particularly the case as the products produced by them are also in essence products of primary processing such as nitron, acetate and caprolactam which are destined to be sent outside of Uzbekistan.

It has long been asserted that the republic for selfish purposes has inflated the gross production of raw cotton. It is time to put an end to this myth. The cotton monopoly was imposed from above, by strong-arm pressure and contrary to the fundamental interests of Uzbekistan agriculture.

Even beginning in the 1930s, Uzbekistan was confronted with the task of ensuring the nation's cotton independence at any price. We carried out this task but it cost us a great deal.

Such specialization by Uzbekistan in cotton production has inevitably led to a decline in the opportunities for producing meat and milk in the republics. However, we have not received any equivalent compensation.

At the same time, there was the encroachment on many vitally important interests of the republic. The cotton monocropping, the violating of scientifically sound crop rotation, the depletion of the land and the growing scarcity of water resources became a lethal impediment in agriculture. Restrictions on food production and the exacerbating of the problem of supplying food to the population became a consequence of this. The disaster of the Aral became a true ecological disaster for Karakalpakia, for all of Uzbekistan, for all of Central Asia and the south of Kazakhstan and immediate and extraordinary measures will be required for saving it.

Thus, distortions and faulty approaches in the placement of the productive forces, serious shortcomings and disproportions committed in the national economic structure and in developing the leading economic sectors had far-reaching consequences and brought about the rise of a number of major national economic problems as well as increased social and economic tension in the republic.

This state of affairs is reflected in all other problems such as employment for the population, the formation of national income and this has predetermined the budget deficit and the poor material prosperity of each family.

Or what is we take the questions of the development of school and preschool education or the moral education of the youth? It has long been known that only the most progressive types of production, a rational infrastructure and primarily a social one, create conditions for the harmonious development of the younger generation and for acquainting it from childhood with modern production and scientific-technical progress.

With all responsibility at the Congress, we should state today that it was created without considering the historical reasonable logic of development in the region under the pressure of the command-administrative system and should be done away with. The development prospects of our region should be viewed primarily through the prism of the interests of the republic population, each and every man living in this ancient and beautiful land.

Such an approach should be at the basis of that strategy which will be carried out and is already being carried out to review the placement of the productive forces, structural and investment policy, as well as the use of the created production, social and spiritual potential.

Clearly, the problems which have accumulated for us are characteristic of all the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan which have many common features in their economy, culture and history. However, here as well we do not have the proper reciprocal ties. We are profoundly convinced that each republic will move forward if it establishes relations in a closer, mutually advantageous collaboration and with a correct division of labor.

We are aware that only the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the turning of society toward democracy, glasnost and openness made it possible to lift the curtain of silence from the true reasons of the crisis being experienced by our republic.

III. The Moral-Political Situation and the Measures to Normalize It

The communists and all the workers of the republic looked with great hope at April 1985. We saw possibly more sharply than in other regions and felt that crisis, critical state in which the economy and social sphere and the standard of living of the Uzbek population had fallen and realized that we could no longer advance in this manner but fundamental changes were required in all directions and in all spheres of life.

Perestroyka arrived in an extremely complex, contradictory and largely painful period in the life of the republic. It had been literally overwhelmed in the drive for the cotton gross. At the limit and on the brink of explosion were not only the economy and the social sphere, not only the countryside which had been reduced to poverty, but the entire population, all strata, including the children and the youth who to the detriment of their studies and health had worked hard in the cotton fields.

The Uzbekistan CP was the initiator of a critical analysis of the state of affairs and decisive measures to rectify it. All the healthy forces rose to struggle for social justice, and to eradicate the padding, speculation, embezzlement, bribery, protectionism and degeneration of the cadres.

The CPSU Central Committee and the national government concerned by the situation in Uzbekistan outlined concrete and balanced measures to strengthen state and party discipline, to instill order in all levels of national

economic management, to restore social justice and provide the essential aid to the republic population.

However, now it must be admitted that this basically and essentially correct line to eliminate the serious deformations in the political life of Uzbekistan, in personnel work, in eradicating serious and flagrant violations of legality and protecting others against tyranny—all of this began to be distorted from the very first days of its implementation under the specific conditions of the republic.

It turned out that the misfortune of Uzbekistan was blamed on the republic itself. The example of this would be the so-called "Uzbek cotton case." The republic and its workers had barely been able to recover from the cotton gross, from the distortions and violations of the party and state standards and laws and the principles of social justice when a wave of legalities and humiliations related to the same cotton swept down on them. The hard struggle commenced by the party was used by certain forces, including in the Union bodies of the nation, for selfish purposes.

The brazen, unjustified insulting of the people which got underway in the mass information media, the moral terror against individual honest workers, and those mass repressions which were unleashed not only against the organizers of the padding but also against thousands of ordinary workers rested as a heavy additional burden on the shoulders of the people.

This arbitrariness above all was aided by the circumstance that the republic was headed by spineless persons devoid of political will and unable to defend the honor and dignity of the Uzbek CP and the republic people. Many of them primarily out of saving their own skins carefully did not notice those misdeeds and violations which were committed by the law enforcement bodies, including the Gdlyan and Ivanov group.

The healthy forces of Uzbekistan have done a great deal recently to protect our people against this injustice but there is still much to be done.

We at present cannot help but point out that there have not been substantial changes in the republic's socioeconomic life. On the contrary, it has become a sort of testing range for poorly conceived experiments. As in the other regions of the nation, this has become apparent in the antialcohol campaign, in state acceptance, in the economic reform, in the adopting of unsound laws on the state enterprise and cooperatives. It must be said now that in carrying out all of these measures the republic leadership to please the center has endeavored to be the first, without giving any thought to what this would cost the people.

The so-called "General Plan for Managing the Republic Economic Complex" can serve as a clear example of the voluntarism and the ignoring of the particular features of Uzbekistan and the interests of its inhabitants. It is not even a question of ridiculous, completely unsound

restructurings in the established structure and existing ties, but rather the most faulty approach and methods. The planned changes involving the vital interests of virtually all the inhabitants were worked out secretly away from the public. Any attempts to introduce clarity or argue for alternative proposals were not merely ignored but were literally stifled with the aid of insulting labels and political accusations. For instance, conservatism and localism were opposing the new. As a result, the republic economy suffered harm running into the hundreds of millions of rubles. But who has measured the moral damage when the needs and interests of the people were simply overlooked and the situation had to be quickly rectified.

The question arises: For whom was this advantageous, who stood behind these pseudo-perestroika decisions and thereby attempted to make a career? And where were those leaders who due to their official position should have been guarding the interests of the republic and prevented these costly experiments?

The absence of a clear position, of a unity of will, spinelessness in the activities of the previous Central Committee Buro cost the republic and its party organization a great deal. Here, with the connivance of the first leaders, a sort of "shadow cabinet" was formed and this by using methods of strong-arm pressure and behind-the-scenes intrigues imposed its adventuristic decisions which had nothing in common with the true interests of the republic.

Hard-to-rectify political and moral harm were also caused by the artificially instigated hostility between the local cadres and those sent in from other regions. Some of them not only did not go into the needs and problems of the republics, but rather perceived their appointment to leading positions in the party, soviet, law enforcement and other bodies as a mandate for permissiveness. Without knowing and without desiring to know the very rich history and culture of the people and the unique features of the region, they set to breaking up and refashioning the life of the republic in their own image.

Particularly painful was the disregard for the great traditions, culture, rites and spiritual values of the people.

In trying to gain favor, some of the local leaders also rushed to declare their emancipation in forgetting their roots. Real persecution of folk customs, traditions and culture developed, and the sphere of using the mother tongue was artificially limited. Even the calendar which had existed recently and was distant from national traditions was not to the liking of someone and an attempt was made to modernize it. Even the national dress was condemned. Things reached a point that people were afraid of celebrating a wedding or burying their relatives in accord with the folk traditions.

The awkward attempts to conceal this behind slogans of internationalism had nothing in common with real internationalism. One has merely to recall how the Law on the Uzbek Language as the official one on the territory of

the republic was initially worked out. Everything was done to foster a law of bilingualism under this title. This merely deepened the hostility to it by the people, even those who had lived all their life in the village, used the mother tongue and did not experience any linguistic discomfort.

All of this, I repeat, was done for the sake of a personal career, to seek favor. But those leaders who instigated and implanted all of this forgot the main thing, the people. And the people will never agree to the loss of their national uniqueness.

The socioeconomic hardship, the demographic situation and the increased unemployment, the ecological crisis, and the moral and spiritual insulting of the people created the explosive situation which was utilized by extremist forces in order to destabilize the situation, to force the people into mass disorders and illegal actions and cause social and interethnic hostility and clashes.

Precisely against this background, last year's dramatic events in Fergana Oblast became possible as well as the recent disorders in Bukinskiy and Parkentskiy Rayons of Tashkent Oblast and in the city of Andizhan. All these events were given strict party assessments both on the level of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms as well as on the level of the Central Committee. Clearly, they will not be repeated. But we must draw lessons from them.

And just what are these? First of all, that the local party and soviet bodies and the social organizations have been divorced from the people, from their pains and needs, they have lost control over the situation and the ability to forecast and control events. In the critical moment, many leaders who determined the fate of the people in their offices were afraid to come out. They had nothing to say to the people, they did not understand the people, and the people did not understand them. Moreover, many had not mastered the language of the people.

In addition, as became clear subsequently, many officials, in particular in Tashlakskiy Rayon where the Fergana events developed with the greatest drama, were sullied by violations and corruption. Plots of land and loans for individual construction had been allocated preferentially to precisely them and their relatives, although 400 regular workers who were in greater need of this had been turned down. Of the 319 motor vehicles allocated for sale, 236 were allocated illegally to persons not residing in the rayon, including from other republics. The procedure for allocating housing had been flagrantly violated, the questions of gas supply, water supply and jobs had not been settled for years—in a word, the elementary questions of life support, without which a person cannot live. What question could there be here of the authority of the party and soviet bodies and their influence on the masses.

The law enforcement bodies also showed their helplessness. Not only were they unable to stop the mass disorders, but often connived in them. Later, when the

situation was stabilized and an investigation was started, they preferred to deal with the surface, leaving aside the main organizers of the tragedy and its roots.

We cannot help but point out that individual corrupt and unhealthy elements wanted to take advantage of this unhealthy situation, this dissatisfaction of the people with their plight and they partially succeeded, and for them personal interest and ambition are higher than the interests of the people. Certainly it is a fact that the participants in the disorders were under the influence of those who organized various unsanctioned meetings, assemblies and parades, those who tendentiously appeared in the press and disseminated rumors and leaflets, those who inspired letters with ultimatums.

The main result was that in the flames of the Fergana fires many of our notions were consumed concerning the magical force of decrees, and the smoke of various formal measures was dispelled, like the review of party organization militancy, and in which the previous Fergana Party Obkom had particularly excelled.

Let us be frank: if under these conditions the republic leadership had continued to limit itself to speculative notifications and empty promises, it would be difficult, or more accurately it would not be difficult to imagine to what scale the catastrophe could have risen. The new leadership is confronted with the difficult task of quickly seeking out possibilities and adopting effective active measures to eliminate the tension, to relieve the situation and prevent an explosion.

Such measures were undertaken. This included the overcoming of the cotton monocropping and the stabilizing of cotton procurements. This also involved additional payments for the harvest of cotton and other products and last year these were around 500 million rubles and during the current one will approximately double. This also was the question of revising the prices for cotton and other types of agricultural products and this has begun to be partially carried out. This also meant providing aid to the less well-off population, free meals for school children in the younger classes, for ailing pregnant women, as well as increase pensions and benefits for veterans. These were additional payments for students. The increase in the plots for private subsidiary farms and individual construction, the increased loans and sale of building materials for these purposes had a beneficial effect on the republic population and primarily on rural inhabitants. This also included the recently adopted ukases of the president concerning increased aid to mothers with large families, disabled and participants in the Great Patriotic War. These were also measures for the guaranteed supply of fodder for the private farms.

But man does not live by bread alone. Concern for him, respect for the people can be seen in the adopting of the Law Giving the Uzbek Language the Status of the Official One on Republic Territory as well as in the restoring of previously banned rites and traditions, the restoring of the holiday of Navruz which is a favorite

among the people and the declaration of it to be a nonworking day, in changing the procedures of military service for inductees from Uzbekistan in the construction units and much else.

All of this is not the mere toying with the people, as some have endeavored to prove, but rather our fundamental line which we will steadily carry out. We have stated this in the preelection platform of the Communist Party, and on the basis of this we have gained the trust of the republic workers and won a majority of the votes for the government bodies. It is our duty to keep our word given to the people and to justify their trust with practical deeds.

Recently voices have been heard on the need to revise and abrogate the decisions of the 16th Central Committee Plenum (1984). This has been heard at a number of oblast party conferences as well as in letters to the party bodies.

In actuality, at present we cannot uniformly accept those analyses and conclusions which were made at this and the subsequent plenums and at the 21st Uzbek CP Congress.

First of all, we cannot agree that the push for the cotton gross and the introduction of cotton monocropping had a localist, selfish character or that the republics "stood to gain" because of this. In carrying out our international duty to ensure the cotton independence of the nation, we consciously and to the detriment of the republic's interests and to the requirements of scientific farming, compulsorily limited the production of fruits and vegetables and feed crops and hence livestock output.

As a result, we ended up in one of the last places in the nation in terms of food production and generally in terms of the standard of living. And instead of equivalent compensation for the cotton, we were accused of parasitism. This was a great profanation which we completely reject.

Nor can we accept the rebukes concerning adherence to an obsolete, patriarchal way of life with a voluntaristic assessment of the folk traditions and religious beliefs or the attempts to eliminate the past of the people from their memory.

All of this we decisively reject and consider it our prime duty to restore the honor, dignity and good name of those who unjustifiably were subjected to repression, as well as compensate for the moral and material harm caused to them. But these injustices were caused not by the 16th Plenum itself, but rather by the distortions and deformations of the policy set by it, and by the voluntarism in carrying it out. By those who to the harm of the republic created their own career.

We cannot escape the fact that a portion of the party, soviet and economic leaders was contaminated by corruption and that protectionism and cover-ups became widespread and the principles of social justice were flagrantly violated.

In assessing the painful phenomenon of the past, some would like to more quickly eliminate the negative features of the past, to declare them as unessential or, at least, completely overcome. But the Uzbek CP Central Committee and other republic bodies have received numerous alerts, extortion and bribery in allocating plots of land, in granting loans for individual housing construction or supplying building materials. We are still confronted with bribes for admission to VUZes and extortion for treatment in hospitals. Speculation in scarce commodities and equipment has become a true scourge for society and there still is not proper order in the allocating of housing. Flagrant violations have also been disclosed in financing the activities of cooperatives and in carrying out foreign exchange operations. We cannot close our eyes to the increased influence of the "shadow economy," and in a number of places to its merging with individual law enforcement bodies. Who suffers most from all of this? Of course, it is the people, the working class and the peasantry, the simple folk who do.

It must not be forgotten that in line with the transition to a market economy, the probability of official abuses will increase greatly. It is essential for us to strengthen and build up a mechanism of social protection for the citizens against various crimes, including official ones.

The provisions of strengthening discipline and responsibility of the leaders, for raising the role of the primary party organizations and for developing criticism and self-criticism have not lost their timeliness but, on the contrary, have assumed new significance.

Strict exactingness for oneself and for others is not a campaign but our fundamental line which we will unswervingly carry out in the future. And even more implacably than before, for the measure of responsibility for party authority and the title of a communist at present has immeasurably risen.

Always, with any abrupt changes in history, it is essential to have balance, objectivity and responsibility. We cannot write off all that was done in the 1960s through the 1980s to the abuses of individual persons and on this basis eliminate all at once everything as completely negative.

From this position we must also approach an assessment of the activities of Sharaf Rashidov. He lived and worked and for almost a quarter of a century led the republic in a period which we now uniformly call one of stagnation. But if there is a higher justice and a higher truth—and this, we are convinced, is the opinion of the people—then this cannot deny those enormous, very important changes for the life of the republic and which are linked precisely to this man. Yes, during this period

there was a flourishing of sham and a fetish for reports, deception and ostentation, protectionism and intrigues.

But was Rashidov himself the prime cause of all these phenomena and was what we now uniformly condemn inherent solely to him? Could not something similar exist also in the other republics and regions of the nation? Nor must we forget the responsibility of such individuals as Brezhnev and his circle. We condemn everything negative that is linked to the name of Rashidov. For us, this is unacceptable. We must purge ourselves of the past routine and without this we cannot make progress. But at the same time, we cannot blame everything that happened during that period on one, now deceased individual. It is all the more impossible and inadmissible to speculate on the name of the person with whom many of his current accusers worked, in holding far from secondary positions.

The danger of such unprincipled strategems, not to mention such concepts as ordinary decency, a feeling of tact and personal responsibility for the past, consists in the fact that at present some out of ambitious considerations are seeking new bugbears, and by an unprincipled hullabaloo over these are trying to protect themselves and even ride the new wave and make another career.

Here the main thing is overlooked. This consists in the fact that at any time, the people have been, are and will be a great worker the hands of whom have created and will create everything valuable on earth. But the respect and trust of the people can be won only by those who honestly, consistently and courageously tell the people the truth, and who assume all the responsibility for their past, present and future. And do not try to shift all the burden and blame to their predecessors.

Comrades! At present, with every reason it can be said that the abyss which separated the party bodies and masses of workers has finally begun to narrow and that a bridge has been thrown across it.

Everything that has been done in the last year is merely the first steps making it possible to a certain degree to relieve the growing tension in the republic.

Against the background of the slipping downwards of the national economic indicators in the nation, this has made it possible to maintain the level of the main indicators and even make some headway. Not without strain and in essence without mobilizing the city dwellers, last year we brought in a not bad cotton crop. There has also been a definite increase in industrial production and in other economic sectors.

The increase in consumer goods has outstripped the increase in the means of production by double. The quotas of the five-year plan have been fulfilled for the production of gas, oil, for the production of cement, linoleum, animal fats and canned fruits and vegetables. The procurement of potatoes, vegetables, meat, milk and so forth have risen.

Over the 4 years, above the plan we have completed 2.3 million m² of housing, general education schools with 71,000 places, hospitals with almost 3,000 beds and polyclinics for 8,000 visits a shift.

At the same time, no really tangible shifts have as yet occurred in the republics socioeconomic development. We have not fully overcome the inertia of the old management methods. In terms of the quotas of the five-year plan, over the 4 years gross national product was 10.5 billion rubles short and national income was 6 billion rubles short. The plans were not met for the mining and production of coal, rolled metals, chemical fibers, textiles, knitwear, footwear, furniture and so forth.

The planned rise in labor productivity has not been achieved in industry, agriculture and construction.

A particularly difficult situation has come into being in capital construction. Incomplete work has risen to 5.7 billion rubles and this is more than the annual capital investment program. Last year alone, 73 major projects and production-end capacity were not completed and this was equivalent to the loss of 200 million rubles of national income.

We should particularly point out that the failure to complete a large number of projects producing consumer goods, the absence of any tangible shifts in their output at the enterprises of the A group, and shortfalls in the deliveries of a broad assortment of goods to the trade network have led to increased inflationary processes, to a rise in emission and to a deterioration of monetary circulation.

The long awaited shifts in light industry have not been felt. Over the 4 years, in terms of the quotas of the five-year plan, we failed to produce 195 million m² of cotton textiles and 29 million pieces of knitwear. The republic's population has failed to receive consumer goods valued at almost a half billion rubles. The leaders of the ministry and its enterprises have not achieved tangible results in improving product quality or introducing modern equipment and technology. With the acute shortage of goods in the republic, the completion of 13 production projects has been thwarted, and these include 5 knitted garment mills, the affiliate of a footwear factory in Denau and others. As a result, the republic economy has suffered losses on the order of 700 million rubles and the possibility of finding employment for around 3,500 persons has not been realized.

We all are well aware of how acute is the problem of building materials supply. We possess unlimited resources of local building materials, however the Ministry of Local Industry has done little to develop their production. Moreover, the dates are not being met for the completion of brick plants and this has led to a significant underproduction of brick and the republic experiences an acute shortage of this product.

During the 4 years, the republic contracting organizations failed to carry out planned work valued at 320 million rubles. This means that the completion of almost 200 major production facilities, over a million m² of housing and preschool institutions with 9,000 places was not carried out. The reason is that our leading contracting organizations such as the Minstroy [Ministry of Construction], Glavtashkentstroy [Main Tashkent Construction Administration] and Uzagrostroy [Uzbek Agricultural Construction Administration] during all these years have essentially been marking time.

The state of affairs in completing capacity in the fuel and energy complex cannot help but cause alarm as the shortage here is evermore strongly felt in the economy and the social sphere. Due to the irresponsible attitude shown by the leaders of Uzbekenergo [Uzbek Power Administration] and Uzbekgidroenergostroy [Uzbek Hydropower Construction Administration], the completion of the first stage of the Talmardzhan GRES has been deferred for an entire 2 years.

Enormous blame for the failure to meet the national economic plans rests on the executive committees of the local soviets. The Andizhan, Tashkent, Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya Oblispolkom, the Karakalpak Council of Ministers and the Tashkent Gorispolkom have failed to meet the quotas of the five-year plan for industrial development.

With the acute shortage of housing, the Andizhan, Samarkand, Dzhizak and Syrdarya Oblispolkom and the Tashkent Gorispolkom have not provided the planned completion of housing while here the individual builders in these oblasts have significantly surpassed the previously set volumes of housing construction. The situation is even worse with the development of the municipal economy in such oblasts as Samarkand, Bukhara, Surkhandarya, Fergana, while the Karakalpak Council of Ministers and the Khorezm Oblispolkom with the aid of the republic government have completely failed in the planned completion of major water lines which are awaited by the population of this region.

With the large number of temporary and makeshift schools under the local soviets over the last 4 years, some 65 million rubles have not been used, or 14,000 places in schools were not completed.

A major lag in completing children's preschool institutions, particularly in the countryside, has come into being in Andizhan, Samarkand, Syrdarya, Dzhizak and Tashkent Oblasts as well as in the autonomous republic.

A clear example of "concern" for the health of others is the attitude of the Samarkand Oblispolkom to the construction of hospitals and polyclinics. In having the lowest facility rate in the republic, the oblast leaders failed to use 10 million rubles allocated for these purposes. With these funds it would have been possible to build hospitals with 900 beds. In the same oblast with the high infant mortality, since 1979 they have been unable to complete the construction of a general children's hospital.

The situation is no better in the Karakalpak ASSR, in the city of Tashkent as well as in Tashkent, Syrdarya and other oblasts.

It would be possible to deepen and continue the list of these missed opportunities, but that is not the essence of the question. The main thing is that the people have long been fed up with empty plans and obligations not backed up by specific deeds, and are impatiently awaiting for us to finally achieve a unity of word and deed.

We must carefully analyze the course of carrying out all our plans, ascertain the reasons for failures which are subjective and derive from poor discipline and increase responsibility of the leader communists for the assigned job.

In order to securely stabilize the situation and completely regain trust, the communist party has a great deal to do. And above all to bring about fundamental changes in the life of the republic and achieve concrete shifts in raising the prosperity of the people and in the life of each individual family and person.

Future of Ethnic Relations Debated

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[Article by A. Gasparyan: "Is a Scenario Without Conflicts Possible?"]

[Text] "Our correspondent A. Gasparyan asked the Soviet political scientist and candidate of doctoral sciences Viktoriya Chalikova to engage in a dialogue by correspondence with American Sovietologists."

The LOS ANGELES TIMES newspaper published an article bringing together various versions of the Soviet Union's development over the next 5-10 years. How much longer will a country exist consisting of 15 republics, with over 100 nationalities, the "last empire in the world"? How will its structure change? The LOS ANGELES TIMES asked several experts on the Soviet Union about this.

Alex Alexiyev, senior specialist for Soviet affairs at the Rand Corporation:

What we are witnessing is the sunset of the last European empire. Every time the sunset of an empire occurs, expenses begin to substantially exceed the advantages conferred by owning such an empire. This has occurred throughout history. The Russians have suffered more than most empires, if one bears in mind the economic costs and the destruction of their culture. Many of them understand that they would live better without other nationalities. By the end of this century, the Soviet Union as we know it will no longer exist. After perestroika it will resemble a confederation of several parts of the Soviet Union, consisting, for example, of the Slavic republics: Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine. In fact, it is fully possible that the Soviet Union as such will simply cease to exist, and be replaced by an independent Russia, which will return to its historical national borders.

The big question is whether such disintegration will occur peacefully or violently, whether the Soviet Union will explode or this explosion will be neutralized. And this, of course, will have consequences for all of us. It is in our interests to understand that this process has already begun and that it is irreversible. Certain structures in the Soviet Union today, such as the military leadership and the diehard members of the Party for example, are prepared to do anything to prevent the collapse of the empire. This creates the real possibility of violence.

The Bush Administration's actions are based on the assumption that everything M.S. Gorbachev does is good, because he is in favor of "perestroika." We should not give the Kremlin grounds to assume that he can save the Soviet empire by force and blackmail.

Marshall D. Shulman, professor of international politics at the Harriman Institute for Long-Range Studies of the Soviet Union at Columbia University:

There are three questions which will probably determine the Soviet Union's future. From the economic standpoint, the question is whether the regime will be able to transform the economy, arresting the trend towards a drop in living standards and increasing the supply of consumer goods and food.

From the political standpoint, the question is whether it will show sufficient flexibility in negotiations with national minorities to convince them to enter a confederal state in which they will enjoy sufficient autonomy to satisfy their national aspirations.

And finally, the question of what will happen to the Communist Party: will it survive, split apart or lose its strength, and will it be gradually replaced as an organizing force by some other public and political forces? Probably, a clear answer will not be available to any of these three questions for some time.

The most probable candidates for separation are the three Baltic republics. Others include Georgia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, and maybe even the Ukraine. If events go that far, the formation will be possible of an inner core of old Russia, consisting of the Russian republic, maybe Belorussia and the Ukraine, if it does not secede, and those republics which remain. This is the goal of certain Russian nationalists, to reestablish the old Russia without any external appendages.

Another possibility is that the process of republics' secession will not go that far. The Baltic republics will probably secede. Some type of confederal relations may be worked out allowing the remaining republics a greater degree of autonomy. A draft is currently being developed of a Union Treaty that will attempt to define the relations of the central government with more autonomous national republics.

If the result is that there remains a central core, consisting of the Russian republics, in which the Russians predominate, it will obviously be relatively more homogeneous, which will lend it a certain stability. It will have very considerable natural resources, although it will lack certain resources of non-member republics, which will pose a certain problem for the Russian republic.

Archie Brown, professor of political science at Oxford University:

Clearly, the Kremlin still hopes that a new type of federation will make it possible to keep all the republics together. But it is obviously quite probable that certain of them will in fact secede. It is extremely difficult to predict how stable the situation will be. Much will depend on the implementation and success of economic reforms. In the final analysis, the Russian republic is very rich in natural resources, and if the Soviet Union can take a large step forward towards creating a more

efficient economic system, it might actually be prosperous. It is difficult to imagine that the situation will improve substantially in the next five years. Gorbachev's problem is that the time to achieve genuine economic improvements exceeds the period during which he will probably remain the Soviet leader.

Adam Ulam, director of the Russian Studies Center at Harvard University:

The chances that the Soviet Union will shrink in the next 10 years are 50:50, but the process leading to it could mean a civil war. The Baltic states would gain independence, but this would only lead to a domino effect, where other republics—Georgia, and maybe the Ukraine—would demand independence as well.

A less probable alternative is the development of a genuine confederal system, which would reconcile the Baltics and the other republics, granting them extensive autonomy and local power but keeping under central control foreign and military policy. These republics would have agreed to such a structure had they been offered it two years ago.

So if the Kremlin works out a sensible enough plan there is still a hope, albeit a small one, that it can keep the republics together. But if the Baltic republics secede, the probability increases that other republics will try to do likewise. In all probability, this will engender a strong reaction in the Russian center of the empire. And this could lead to the appearance of some type of military or other dictatorship, which will not contribute to stability.

But Is There An Empire?

Most social forecasts are like weather forecasts: tomorrow will be either rain or good weather. Either the Soviet Union will collapse, or it will remain as a renewed state.

A process of the republics becoming more sovereign is actively under way in the country. But let us recall, for example, the recent history of Portugal, for whom the secession of Angola with its subsequent forced and harsh expulsion of Portuguese from Angola resulted in these angry and humiliated expellees (angry not so much at Angola as at their own government, which could not defend them) staging a coup, which turned into a fascist dictatorship, and Portugal paid for it. Moreover, Angola having made the "socialist choice," gained nothing but turned into a poor country torn by internal strife.

Many Western analysts very cautiously express the idea that for us this process can be dramatic and violent, it can be accompanied by serious traumas. For me, as a person working with refugees and living among them, it is obvious that the main victims of this process are the citizens of various nationalities, basically Russian speakers, who have lost even those rights they had under a totalitarian regime. Their situation is catastrophic, and at this point I can see no light at the end of the tunnel. There are a half million of them today in the country,

basically Baku refugees and Meskhetian Turks. If refugees pour out of Central Asia, there could be several million of them.

What achievements do our republics have in the field of national economy and culture? I would gladly name at least one. But we can see neither major cultural monuments restored during this period, nor an economic improvement, nor a rise in people's spirits or improvement in their lifestyle.

Now For the Term "Empire"...

Judging from the Sovietologists' statements, most of them in pronouncing the term "empire" have in mind a multinational state built on a national-territorial principle, not a state of one nation over others. They do not see the empire as a country where Russians live at the expense of their colonies. On the contrary, they believe the Russians are just as impoverished a nation, if not more so. And here is the diagnosis: such conglomerates are doomed, they have no vitality. In fact, outside of Switzerland there are no such examples anywhere. But Switzerland is a small, rich, neutral country. All other multinational and prosperous countries are organized on the state principle. In the USA, for example, the national culture is maintained, but there is no ethnic monopoly over territory. There is a certain ethnic accent, in some places there are more Hispanics, in some Russians, in some Ukrainians, but there is no direct national-territorial separation.

Our country did indeed undertake a unique experiment: on the one hand, it was declared that the country consists of national states; on the other hand, there was no state system at all. This duality preprogrammed various versions of collapse, as it were.

Several years ago, the word "empire" conjured up the image of Czarist Russia. Today "imperial" problems and "imperial" conflicts arise not so much in Russia as in the national republics.

Not so long ago, in early June, there was a "Helsinki conference" in Moscow on human rights. Everyone who wished from the national regions was given the opportunity to speak out. There were many sharp, emotional speeches. The information, of course, was not always reliable, but it came from representatives of peoples who live inside one or another union republic. For several hours we, the conference participants, heard that the Georgian "empire" is repressing the Abkhazians and Ossetians, in Uzbekistan the Tajiks and Kirghiz are being repressed, etc. And the speakers quite clearly stated that if the republics leave the Union they will join the RSFSR, because it is a large country, less ambitious, peaceful, and it will be easier for them to exist there.

So today the term "empire" has taken on a regional nature and a protest against imperial policy also has a highly regional character.

On the Nature of the Conflicts

Many problems connected with interethnic relations have a clear social dimension. And this is not by chance. The Union unquestionably should have a new quality. And the further peaceful development of events obviously depends on the resolution of economic problems. But doesn't this lead to a vicious circle? For the solution of economic problems today largely depends on the stability of the social and political situation, which is destabilized mainly by national conflicts. And the facts indicate that national, social and social-political conflicts are by far not always synonymous. What appears from afar as a purely ethnic conflict is in fact a social-national war. A war in the direct sense of the word.

Few people know about the tragedy in Andizhan. There have been vague and sparse reports of it and, to my amazement, even people's deputies did not know the details. What happened there? It's an Uzbek city where Armenian and Jewish communities have been living for centuries, which have produced craftsmen and specialists; in other words, a solid population with a good income, always enjoying general respect. And suddenly, apparently unexpectedly (but by a well-prepared scenario tested in Sumgait), a crowd of 14-16 year old teenagers, led by "unknown" persons, attacks these Armenian and Jewish neighborhoods, begins burning, threatening, robbing, raping. Neither the police nor the internal forces help the victims; firemen don't even put out the fires. And it is clear here that the national aspect is only the shell, the arrangement. The main aspect is social: unemployed youth, high on cheap drugs, from less well-off families; in general, unhappy Uzbek youth... We know how low the standard of living is there, how many there are there who are victims of ecological disasters. It is a perfectly obvious war of "villages" against "the court," but with an ethnic coloring.

All eyewitnesses to the events in Baku say that those conducting the pogrom were mainly interested in occupying apartments. And those who had no housing occupied them. I think it's a mistake to see here the influence of only ethnic factors. The conflict is more of a social nature. Aggression built up with some, and despair with others. Moreover, the time has come when one can create a party, become its leader, maybe later on become the state president. The situation is complicated by the fact that a movement has begun for the return of soldiers from the regions of ethnic conflict. Belorussia recently quite officially announced that it does not want Belorussians to serve in the Caucasus and Central Asia, because it is dangerous for their life. But if such a decision is taken by Russia and the Ukraine, then there will be no troops left in the regions of conflict. And this means that the Russian-speaking population of all these regions will be fully defenseless. It is true, I know, that the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR is drafting a program for social and legal protection of the Russian-speaking population living outside of Russia. The draft is harsh but reasonable, providing for an indemnity for each person expelled.

What forecasts can be made? If all the republics declare sovereignty, establish independent economic ties and create their own armies, then it is not hard to predict that the first phase will be a sharp change in the relations among the native and Russian-speaking population: conflicts, large-scale migration. And the first to feel themselves left out will be representatives of the middle class: the native intelligentsia with a stable material position, attached to world cultural values. These people will have it very hard in conditions where national patriotism reigns, to which everything will be sacrificed. For example, I have already had occasion to meet with ethnically pure Azerbaijanis, educated people, who simply cannot imagine how they will live if Azerbaijani nationalists win. We all remember how the intelligentsia fled Iran during the revolution... The percentage of people is not that large who are prepared to accept hardships and sacrifices for the idea of a mononational state, with its own exclusive religion and language. So there will be dissatisfaction, the new governments will start to be criticized, and the next phase will evidently be the search for new integration.

Who Feeds Who...

The policy of a central power is to convince different peoples of the necessity for integration. This is expressed in agreements that there is no need to hurry, that it is better to await reforms which will bring all nations new rights and possibilities... But unfortunately, it is very difficult to convince, to persuade people, especially in our country where society is accustomed to not believing the state, and where nothing has yet gotten better. It is more sensible today to focus efforts on working out a sort of **safety procedure**; i.e., conditions protecting human rights. It is perfectly clear today that the first quasi-ethnic conflict—Sumgait, robbery and banditism—should never have gone unpunished. After all, there was essentially nothing national or liberating in this medieval outburst. Yet the central authorities were unbelievably patient in responding to it. As a result, such scenarios have been repeated. But on the other hand: Tbilisi, where there were no grounds for taking such harsh measures. But they were taken, resulting in a tragedy and a sort of "Tbilisi syndrome." These two events together deformed and distorted the subsequent course of events...

I am convinced that the process of sovereignty will at least destroy myths. The myth has gained strength among our peoples that each of them feeds all the others, that everyone in the country lives at their expense. It turns out that everyone is feeding each other, but everyone is hungry. And only by having tried going it alone will people be able to understand who feeds and who doesn't. We will evidently have to go through this, to realize the extent of one's own possibilities.

Of course, from the republics' standpoint there can be various positions here. For example, I once heard an interview with a representative of the movement in Georgia, in which he said that yes, without question,

after leaving the USSR Georgia will be unable to buy, say, fuel for hard currency, because it has no hard currency, and it cannot create it in a short period of time. But Georgia's impoverished situation is explained precisely by the fact that for many years it has lived under a regime which did not allow it to become a rich country. So this regime must supply Georgia with everything it needs until it grows strong and can exist on its own... But what is meant by "this regime"? After all, Russia is also gaining its independence. So who will supply Georgia? And who will owe what, and above all, to whom will it be owed? In fact, it can only be understood who can do what during the separation, drawing together and subsequent integration.

As soon as we start talking of nationality problems, we immediately begin talking about "imperial thinking," "great power chauvinism." Western Sovietologists try not to talk about this. And I can understand it, since the most important thing is the means of existing. Yes, there was a shock for part of the Russian-speaking population of the Baltics. Many did in fact start from the position that the Russians are the leading nation. But they quickly started accepting the new realities. And it is characteristic that the main claims are made not on the Baltics, but on the central authorities, that they somehow guarantee the equality of the non-native population, equal rights, that rights not be restricted, that working and living conditions do not get worse. People are beginning to get used to the idea that they are living in a different state... But the assertion of one's own superiority is a subtle thing; it can also be the result of a recognition by some groups of the population of their own political and cultural backwardness, their inability to adapt to a different environment. All these attitudes will break down and change during the course of events.

By the way, Sovietologists' literature in the past always predicted that if the Soviet regime began liberalizing then it will come from above and, consequently, nationalist mines will begin exploding. They always predicted that the ethnic pot will boil, that there will be conflicts. We must understand the inevitability, the spontaneity of this process. From the standpoint of practical politics this is very important.

I think this conflictual development will continue for a long time. And in this situation we need to think of how to avoid terrible clashes. There are two unquestioned necessities: absolute glasnost in the area of suffering and sacrifices connected with conflicts; and secondly, revealing as much as possible the social, economic and political motivations in all these clashes and conflicts, which occur as ethnic clashes, and their separation from their own national cultural core.

I understand, of course, that any structure struggling for power, especially those who lose this struggle, is not averse to using ethnic conflict for its goals. But we must not forget that it becomes a victim of this conflict itself. For example, why is it that frequently where ethnic clashes occur people begin to burn and destroy three

buildings: the raykom, the procurator's or court, and the militia? Isn't it because some of these "structures" are now at a loss, that they can do little, that real power is shifting from them?

The Priority of Rights

Can we only meet and talk? Can we only conclude a new union treaty recognizing the fact that there are several states and that the treaty assigns general interests, such as common defense, and necessary economic links? Of course, it's hard to do this in midstream, both because of the interconnected and unclear nature of economic ties, and because of the terribly scattered nature of the population. It is not mononational by republics, and most republics have their own ethnic formations. But there is everywhere a national-state consciousness.

In this respect, the native peoples of the Baltics are the most independent. In Lithuania, for example, there are people, albeit only a few, who have lived in the Lithuanian state. But such a memory is absent in many regions.

Many of us used to think that support for national groups was almost a matter of conscience. But it turned out that today it is the individual who needs support the most: not the member of some party or front, but the person who sometimes does not himself know what nationality he is, because his mother is Russian and his father Kirghiz or Korean, who thinks and speaks in Russian and who can at any minute be beaten, deprived of his rights and insulted not only by the authorities, as was the case for decades, but also by some new party, some new front.

The more vigorously develops the process of disintegration, of sovereignty, of the appearance of new links, the more complicated will be the existence of the individual if he does not belong to the national elite forming the new government in the republic.

From the basis of humanitarian logic, if the rights of society have a higher priority than the rights of the state, then over them, above everything, are the rights of the individual, human rights.

Moscow Soviet Deputy on Refugee Problem

90UN2437A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 10 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Yuzefovich Melnikov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet Commission on Refugee Problems, by V. Poegli, MOLODEZH ESTONII correspondent: "The Ostrich Tactic: Is Moscow Ready for an Influx of Refugees?"]

[Text] About a month ago, the All-Union Center for Studying Public Opinion conducted a survey of Muscovites at the request of the Moscow Soviet Presidium's Commission on Refugee Problems in order to find out their attitude towards Baku refugees. Here is an excerpt from the brief report on the results of the sociological survey: "The survey brought to light the attitude towards

the fate of refugees on the part of various population groups. On the whole, it can be noted that the older and less educated respondents expressed hostility towards the refugees more often than others. Conversely, the younger and more educated Muscovites demonstrated greater hospitality. Native Muscovites, people living in Moscow for a long time, and also those who arrived quite recently demonstrate a more tolerable attitude towards the refugees compared to people who have resided in the capital for 5-15 years. This category of people is the most concerned, obviously, with possible competition on the part of the refugees arriving in Moscow for the benefits of life in the capital. On the whole, an unfavorable, inhospitable attitude towards refugees is taking shape in Moscow. More than 55 percent of those surveyed stated a negative attitude towards the fact that refugees are settling in the city. The appearance of new residents in Moscow (from among the refugees) apparently does not suit them (16 percent were neutral concerning this, and 21 percent approved of it). Sixty percent agreed with the temporary accommodation of Russian refugees in Moscow; 30 percent agreed with the accommodation of Armenian refugees. The half lesser tendency to demonstrate the famous Moscow hospitality or to demonstrate the traditional 'brotherly feelings' and so forth towards the Armenians puts us on guard as a symptom of a loss of universal criteria of humanism and kindness and their replacement with totally different criteria of division into 'one's own people' and 'not one's own people.' This is the first condition of a nationality, ethnic, racial, and similar discord. It is also a prerequisite of civil war, mass repressions, dispossession of kulaks, and so forth. Forty-two percent of those surveyed responded positively to the question about whether forced resettlement of Armenian refugees from Moscow was permissible. The answers to the same question with respect to Russian refugees convince us that this is not simply an outburst of hostility toward Armenians and not simply a chauvinistic reaction. One-fourth (!) of those surveyed considered it possible to resettle the refugees in this case, too. (We 'do not have enough of our own people,' they explained, and they, consequently, are 'not our own people.')

An analysis conducted shows that we have to resolve not only relatively simple tasks of explaining to Muscovites the true state of affairs with refugees, removing tension, and so forth, but also the much more significant problems of forming a healthier moral climate in urban society, which can be the only guarantee of a lasting and worthy social order in the city.

The results of the poll are also corroborated to some extent by the letters received after publication of the article "A Mark of Mercy" (18 May of this year). The majority of the letters proposed a single method of resolving the refugee problem—"chase them out of Moscow with a garbage broom," and also clarifies the nationality of the article's author. The Moscow Soviet Presidium's Commission on Refugee Problems is forced

to work in such a complicated situation. Our correspondent met with its chairman, A.Yu. Melnikov.

[Poegli] Aleksandr Yuzefovich, I think that one of the reasons for such an attitude towards refugees is the feeling that there are "very many of them" in Moscow. Just how many of them are there in fact?

[Melnikov] Officially, there are now 5,500 refugees residing temporarily in Moscow and 5,000 in the oblast. These figures are from the Main Administration of Internal Affairs. They are based on information about visitor visas received by refugees. In addition, at least several thousand people are living in the capital illegally.

[Poegli] That means that people are still gradually leaving; after all, just a month ago we were talking about 60,000?

[Melnikov] This figure reflected the number of refugees registered in Moscow, but they have settled not only in Moscow Oblast but also outside its boundaries. In the time that has passed, about 5,000 of the total number of refugees have received work and housing through the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems [Goskomtrud], 1,200 have returned to Baku, and the rest are still awaiting the decision on their fate.

[Poegli] I know that members of your commission were recently in Baku. What is your opinion about the prospects of the refugees returning there? After all, a resolution by the Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan was recently published which guaranteed the safety of Russians returning to Baku. A group of Baku leaders also visited Moscow; they were also trying to persuade Russian refugees to return to Baku.

[Melnikov] Yes, I know about this. But does not involve all refugees, only Russians. The return of Armenians is ruled out completely; they are not guaranteed safety even for a brief stay in Baku. Since such a division by nationality exists in principle, who will guarantee that at any moment all this will not turn against the Russians or any other nationality. Moreover, Russian refugees are quite skeptical about returning. They remember that the Armenians at one time were also urged to return, and they remember what happened after that. In addition, the relative calm in Baku is ensured for the time being by military force; no one knows what will happen after the troops are withdrawn.

[Poegli] Much has been said both in the USSR Supreme Soviet and at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies about the need to pass a Law on Refugee Status. But according to the assessments of the deputies themselves, it can be passed no earlier than this fall. As far as I know, discussion of the Interim Statute on Refugees on the Territory of Moscow, which your commission is preparing, is on the agenda of the first session of the Moscow Soviet....

[Melnikov] In general, in a normal state everything should be different. First, the law has to be passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, then by the RSFSR, and then by the Moscow Soviet. But in connection with the extremely unsatisfactory course of preparation of the Law on Refugee Status in the Supreme Soviet, the Moscow Soviet plans to pass a statute on their temporary status. There is a need for this. At present, refugees are actually deprived of their constitutional rights, for example, such as the right to housing and the right to employment.

The level of work of the Goskomtrud, which is charged with settlement of the refugees, is fairly low. Despite the fact that the system of dispersing the refugees throughout the country according to their specialties is faulty (the optimum thing would be to create compact settlements), with the staff that they have they could have done much more. During the entire time, beginning in February, the Goskomtrud has found jobs for only 2,000 of the 17,000 families. All the more so because the assignments given to the refugees often do not correspond to reality, and in the localities the Baku refugees encounter something totally different than what was promised.

[Poegli] Please tell us about the content of the statute on which your commission is working. At what stage is the work?

[Melnikov] The commission has already completed preliminary discussion of the statute. It includes a definition of the concept of "refugee," registration procedures, and the rights of refugees. It also calls for forming a migration service within the framework of the Moscow City Ispolkom, which will register and issue documents to the refugees and provide them information and legal assistance. It is necessary to determine the registration procedure for refugee committees. The statute will also specify limits on the number of refugees on the territory of Moscow. Status will be granted to that number of people whose rights can be realistically ensured. Specific limits for each category of refugees will be determined by the Moscow Soviet. After all, Moscow's capabilities, especially its housing capabilities, are very limited. There exists a real danger of an influx of refugees from other republics. Thus, 135,000 Russians in Adzharian and 196,000 in Dushanbe are literally sitting on their suitcases. On 4 June, the conclusion of the good will mission of the "Sodruzhestvo" [Cooperation] Fund, which visited Lithuania, was reported at the Moscow Soviet Presidium. It was stated that the economic blockade now being conducted may lead to a massive influx of Russian refugees from Lithuania, too. You see, they will simply end up being unemployed there.

For the time being, we are not ready for this, nor is the Supreme Soviet or the government agencies. In principle, it would be logical to create some kind of temporary settlements and draw up specific measures; but according to our information, no one is thinking seriously about this. They continue to bury their heads in the sand.

Although today we can talk about the statute only in the subjunctive mood, everything will be resolved by the Moscow Soviet session. But our overall concept is clear now: Refugees should not compete with Muscovites for anything, not in right to housing, not in access to stores. Any assistance that will be given to them will not take a single kopeck away from Muscovites.

[Poegli] I think one of the reasons that a Law on Refugees has still not been passed at the union level is the impossibility of supporting it economically. Approximately how much will passage of your statute cost Moscow?

[Melnikov] Moscow now bears certain expenditures for refugees. For example, this includes the cost for their stay in hotels. But in the near future, the USSR Ministry of Finance should reimburse us for these costs. In general, we proceed from the fact that the cost will be quite cheap, since the main expenditures will be compensated from the union budget. In addition, Moscow will also receive a certain advantage; you see, after passage of the statute, refugees will be able to work temporarily. And we have a huge manpower shortage for a mass of specialties. For example, Baku subway construction workers see "Help Wanted" signs at every corner, but they cannot take the job because they do not have work permits.

[Poegli] Addressing a meeting of a USSR Supreme Soviet subcommittee on human rights, People's Deputy M.D. Maley stated that there is unanimity on the refugee issue in the Russian Congress of Deputies. In your opinion, is there such unanimity in the Moscow Soviet? Won't the fates of the refugees also become a card in the political struggle?

[Melnikov] Of course, there is not and cannot be complete unanimity. But in our commission, for example, there are two deputy groups represented: "Democratic Russia" and the "Independents." There is not a single person only from "Moscow."

And despite the difference in political views, we find a common language.

[Poegli] By passing the Interim Statute on Refugees, won't the Moscow Soviet go against the public opinion expressed in the survey of Muscovites?

[Melnikov] Basically, no, since it does not call for granting the refugees permanent residency in Moscow, which 55 percent of the Muscovites oppose. I want to reemphasize that refugees do not aspire to settle in Moscow. They are in favor of creating compact settlements in the central and southern part of Russia. Maybe we are going against public opinion on the question of temporary settlement, since we do not make any distinctions about nationality here, but this would not only be contrary to all our democratic ideals. Those who demand resettlement of Armenian refugees from Russia to Armenia are not familiar with certain realities. First of all, the Baku Armenians were separated from their

homeland for a long time; some of them do not know not only the customs but even the language. Secondly, there are many mixed families among them who have nowhere else to live other than in Russia. And thirdly, there are already 300,000 refugees in Armenia. In addition, 550,000 lost their homes during the earthquake. On top of all this, the "economic blockade" had a very severe effect on Armenia's economy, so Armenia simply does not have the additional capabilities to accept new refugees.

Now about 300 Armenian families temporarily residing in Moscow are awaiting at the American Embassy authorization to enter the United States. To some degree this could ease the situation, but the Visa and Registration Department is not issuing them, citing purely formal reasons; for example, they must fill out the documents at the place of registration, that is, in Baku.

It is always very difficult to go against public opinion, and sometimes simply impossible, if there were not exceptions to the rule. Thus, in mid-May, when they quite feeding in most of the boarding hotels and refugee camps, cut off water and electricity, and daily threatened them with eviction, the servicing personnel and administration of the "Yunost" boarding hotel (city of Troitsk) and "Goluboy fakel" (Domodedovskiy Rayon) were doing everything they could to make life easier for the refugees. And when the editorial staff received letters demanding that all who were "not our people" be driven from "our" Moscow, one woman called me. She asked speak to the refugee committee: "I want to offer my dacha to some refugee family to live in temporarily."

Independents Evaluate Moscow Soviet

90UN2450A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 14 Jul 90 p 2

[Article under the rubric "On the Results of the Moscow Soviet Session": "This is How the 'Independents' Think"]

[Text] "As we understand, at the final meeting of the first session of the Moscow Soviet a group of independent deputies issued a statement. Could you please tell us what the statement concerned?"

N. Somov, Moscow, constituent.

It is true, one of the last persons to speak at the session was deputy I.E. Krugovykh. On behalf of a group of independent deputies, he made a statement regarding certain results of the session. Noting that a comprehensive, studied evaluation remained to be made, he said that the group considered it necessary to make the following preliminary statement:

1. The session did not resolve several questions of key importance for Muscovites, the most important of which is the city's food supply. Not only Muscovites, but also the deputies have no idea how foodstuffs, which moreover may be in short supply, will ultimately be distributed. In this regard, the deputies' group requests that the

presidium and executive committee of the Moscow Soviet clearly and succinctly explain this to Muscovites via the mass media.

2. The question remains unanswered of the permanent rules and status of the Moscow Soviet deputy, the correctness of deputies' combining their obligations with work in the Moscow Soviet bureaucracy. The group of independent deputies believes there should be absolute equality of deputies, that they should be personally responsible only to their constituents.

The independent deputies' group in the Moscow Soviet is responsible only for jointly adopted decisions.

3. The unjustifiably enlarged (to 200-250 persons) Moscow Soviet bureaucracy is cause for great concern. The deputies were not able to discuss its structure, function and staffing. The Moscow Soviet bureaucracy formed, and the executive committee staff approved at the session, can neutralize the deputies' work, and turn the Moscow Soviet into a site for general discussions of topics far from Muscovites' interests. This was repeatedly demonstrated at the first session.

The deputies' group retains the right to participate in shaping the bureaucracy, and to monitor its activity together with other deputies.

4. The question of the Moscow Soviet's mass media resources, included at the suggestion of the independent deputies, was not considered at the session: the creation of daily and weekly newspapers, and of a new Moscow TV channel. The "independents" reserve the right to include their representatives in the editorial staff of these publications and in the management of the Moscow TV, and to keep them under deputies' supervision. The independent deputies support the right of each deputy to have access to any form of the media, to free expression of opinions and to freedom of speech.

Taking into account the existing situation, the independent deputies' group has proposed that in September, before the second session of the Moscow Soviet, two working meetings of deputies be held, devoted to Moscow's food supply and to the city's preparation for winter. It also proposed that they adopt specific action plans for presentation to the session.

In preparation for the City Day, traditionally held on the first Sunday of September, the independent deputies proposed that a commission be created for its preparation, headed by the chairman of the Moscow Soviet G.Kh. Popov, and that the day be noted with a new, genuinely Muscovite emblem: of Georgiy the Conqueror.

This is the opinion of one of the Moscow Soviet's deputy groups.

Future of Latvian People's Front

90UN2319A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 14 Jun 90 pp 2-3

[Report on interview with Romualds Razuks, chairman of the board of the Latvian People's Front Duma, and Vladimir Steshenko, member of the Latvian People's Front Duma, by Yevgeniy Orlov, date and place not specified: "The Latvian People's Front: Victory in the Elections"]

[Text] There is much that is unclear in the present political situation. One of the things that is unclear is included in the headline of this article. Indeed, having won a victory in the election and taken over two-thirds of the positions in the Supreme Soviet, deputies from the NFL [Latvian People's Front], the majority of whom have had the status of "informals" for a long time, became "formals." Power is being concentrated in their hands and they are forming all kinds of government cabinets, having fairly easily (with a simple majority of votes) overcome opposition within the parliament.

The NFL program documents are beginning to become a reality...

NFL deputies are speaking on behalf of those who voted for them, the majority—on behalf of members of the Latvian People's Front...

But what is this People's Front? What is this Duma? What is this sociopolitical organization today and what will be its role in the future?

My interlocutors: Romualds Razuks, chairman of the board of the NFL Duma, and Vladimir Steshenko, member of the NFL Duma.

[Razuks] There was a significant decline in the activity of the People's Front after their victory in the elections. This is understandable: They had solved a tactical problem, after which a certain clarity of immediate goals disappeared. It seemed to many of us that the victory we had achieved in the elections and the two-thirds in the parliament were enough, and everything else would take care of itself. The new parliament would solve the problems posed by the NFL...

Now we have managed to put an end to the period of decline in the activity of the NFL, the local members are stepping up their work in the rayon and city organizations, and conferences are being held. So the NFL continues to be the largest and most influential sociopolitical organization in Latvia and its role as a kind of political center for the republic is as important today as it ever was.

Why? Yes, we won, yes, we now make up the government, but changes in all spheres of the life of the republics—above all in economic sphere, the administrative mechanism, and so forth—are negligible. The government has no stronger assistant in making these changes take place than the People's Front, its groups in

the local areas, the people who could actively assist in the implementation of government plans and counteract attempts at political destabilization of the situation in the republic (sabotage, strikes, and so forth).

[Orlov] And so a victory in the elections does not in and of itself guarantee improvements, for the "winners" today have ended up inside the old mechanism and the old structures, which are the main impediment to the development of the republic.

Could it not turn out in such a way that now, in the highest echelons of power, the deputies from the NFL themselves, for various reasons, do not want to make waves?

[Razuks] Today it is difficult to say "yes" or "no"—not enough time has passed to make this judgment. But one must remember that up until recently our deputies were expressing their resolve to fight against the underlying causes of our failure, and this, incidentally, is why people voted for them.

But the NFL policy with respect to the Supreme Soviet and the republic government can be characterized as a policy of constructive, critical support.

[Steshenko] This was said well by Viktor Avotinsh: "We must not be 'toadies' for the government."

[Razuks] Exactly. You understand that, after all, the People's Front is the mouthpiece for the will of the people. We have always proceeded from this, and this is why we won in the elections. If the government adopts unpopular, incorrect, and unacceptable decisions we must be firm, and in spite of the fact that our own People's Front people are in the parliament we ourselves must publicly and openly declare our disagreement and, if necessary, contribute to the development of certain alternative decisions or programs in order not simply to oppose but to oppose constructively.

[Orlov] I would formulate that as the role of the "constructively supportive opposition."

[Razuks] Yes. You know the kind of situation that has developed in the Latvian parliament. In my view, the minority faction, unfortunately, is not playing the role of the constructive opposition. So if we want to proceed toward a democratic society, and this is precisely what we are proceeding toward, we, the Latvian People's Front, will still have to play this role of the constructive opposition for the time being. We simply cannot get along without opposition...

[Orlov] Why does this seem important to me... In 1917 the Bolsheviks seized the power on behalf of the people and then, having gained the complete confidence of the people, brought this power down on the heads of the people...

[Razuks] Naturally, nothing of the kind should ever happen again.

[Orlov] Therefore the question: Is the Duma of the People's Front not becoming a miniature copy of the Latvian Supreme Soviet—after all many of its members are now deputies of the Supreme Soviet?

[Razuks] This will not happen because now the rayon organizations of the NFL have nominated new people for the Duma to replace those who have become Supreme Soviet deputies, so the Duma will have some new faces. This process is continuing. We have had preelections to the Duma board... Those same Supreme Soviet deputies who are continuing to work in the NFL Duma and its board comprise the necessary link between the People's Front and its faction in parliament, without which our activity is unthinkable.

[Orlov] Society is becoming politicized and a multiparty system is being established. What position in the multiparty structure will be occupied by the NFL? In general, how long will the Latvian People's Front continue to exist and where is the boundary beyond which it will cease to exist?

[Razuks] Up until recently and even now the NFL has been a kind of umbrella under which many parties have formed. This process will also continue. Without abandoning its function of rendering aid to various parties, the People's Front should take a more active position in the republic's political spectrum. For the majority of NFL members are not included in parties. Because of them the NFL is also performing the function of the center, which it should continue to perform in the future. I do not wish to say that we should transform the NFL into the party of the center, no, but one cannot but note that this process is taking place (we conducted the elections in a way that is typical of political parties). So the NFL will probably become a party some day, for without a party of the center in a society which is aspiring to democracy it is possible to have instability, which is fraught with undesirable consequences. This kind of instability, for example, threatens Estonia today.

[Steshenko] To me it is extremely important that the NFL is a movement, that it is a sociopolitical organization and not a party. Even the most direct opponents interact in the NFL today: It includes both communists and their ideological opponents.

[Orlov] Latvians comprise 80-85 percent of the NFL. What are the prospects for its internationalization? Will it become a truly PEOPLE'S party and not a national one?

[Steshenko] That is indeed a painful question, and in order to answer it we must look back a little ways. The NFL has experienced what I call a romantic time when on the wave of a national revolution the Latvian masses came out of their apartments and onto the streets of the cities of the republic. We rode on this wave of national enthusiasm until 4 May of this year—we achieved one concrete goal. Now we have begun difficult, routine work to carry out the program tasks. Now the People's Front must (and it has the capability of doing this, having won

victory in the elections) prove to its opponents not in words but in deeds that the alarms they sounded were largely unwarranted. Today we are encountering a colossal amount of speculation on the national issue, and therefore one of the main issues for the NFL is work with the non-Latvian population.

Perestroyka in Latvia is like a unification of the national and social revolutions. The non-Latvian population is tending more in the direction of the ideals of a social revolution, but it is embarking on this path weakly and inactively since certain forces are frightening them by the scope of the national revolution.

It seems to me that our task is to unite the two currents and explain to the non-Latvian population of the republic who the people are who are frightening them with ideas about nationalism and how and why they are doing it.

In this respect Lopatin's speech at the constituent congress of committees of USSR citizens was very indicative. As they say, the masks were discarded... "Our opponents are not only the NFL, the LNNK [Latvian National Independence Movement], and other extremists, but also their allies—Democratic Russia, the people's fronts of Russia, Moscow, and Leningrad... These are the ones who have gained nothing who want to take revenge..." Lopatin was seconded by Nefedov who heads the OSTK [United Labor Collective Council]: "The Union is to blame: the strongest ideological workers were expelled from the CPSU Central Committee... They want to separate, to split along party lines..." And he hit the nail on the head. Thus nonnational problems are frequently passed off as national ones in an attempt to conceal the real causes of the disaster in which our society has ended up.

This question is frequently asked now: Who should defend the interests of the Russian-speaking population? And this is a good question because actually each group of the population has its own specific interests which demand both protection and solutions, but it is important that these interests do not produce antagonistic relations. How is this achieved? We would be like Leopold the Cat [cartoon character who is an unsuccessful peacemaker] if all we do is say to one another: "Friends, let us live in peace!" and do nothing to reconcile our interests. Therefore I see the solution in having non-Latvians enter the Latvian People's Front and work actively in its ranks, democratizing it from within, influencing its activity, and conducting their own policy for protecting their own rights and interests.

Today is a time when we can expect the solutions to many interethnic problems from the new Latvian government; it is a time for saturating the NFL national program with specific content and giving it the status of a government program. Both in the area of languages and in the area of national-cultural autonomy, and so forth. The previous Latvian government gave us many promises, but all we got were crumbs.

[Razuks] We, the People's Front, of course, will remember for a long time to come the mistakes made both at the first congress and later. Yes, there were mistakes. We did indeed underestimate the significance of the problems raised by the Russian-speaking population during the time of perestroika. These are problems of the economy, ecology, public health, maternity, childhood, charity—there are many of these problems and they are mainly of a social nature.

[Orlov] Yes, the Russians have frequently been accused of mercantilism and narrowness of interests (Latvian television and some of the Latvian press were successful at this), wanting only shelter and food for their bellies...

[Razuks] That is true... Now that social questions have been raised to a new level, we can see our common interest in solving them—and this is another platform for joining forces. An economic reform is beginning—this is not the will of the Latvian government, it is an objective necessity for the entire Soviet Union, and questions of a social nature will then be aggravated even more. Therefore either we shall find a point of contact and begin to work together to distribute the small amount of social benefits we shall have for the first time and absorb the first blow, or else even more misunderstanding can arise against this same background.

[Steshenko] Incidentally, even now they are trying to blame the People's Front for the difficult economic situation in which we have found ourselves in recent months. One friend said to me: "See where the NFL has taken us! To coupons for macaroni!"—as if the NFL had already been in power for years, had already managed to plant the fields and reap the harvest, as if the crisis had not gripped the entire Soviet Union, the entire system.

[Orlov] And the last question: How and by what means can the Latvian People's Front help a single individual if at his specific individual enterprise new bureaucrats, armed with the idea of national renewal, start to infringe in various civil rights?

[Razuks] In order for the NFL to be able to help each person whose rights are infringed upon by the system that has not died out yet, it is necessary to look for support in NFL support groups at enterprises, in the rayon, or in the city, and it is necessary to create such groups where they do not already exist.

I repeat: The Latvian People's Front is not its Duma, is not the Duma board, and is not the deputies from the NFL. The Latvian People's Front is the people who are trying to live on the land of the Latvian republic according to the laws of justice and observance of rights, according to the laws of a civilized country...

Georgian Parties, Informal Groups Listed

90US1034A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
25 May 90 p 7

[Letter to the editor of MOLODEZH GRUZII and editorial reply under the rubric "MOLODEZH GRUZII Inquiry"]

[Text] Several times we have had occasion to hear that more than 100 various parties exist in our republic. Diverse figures are cited at rallies and quoted in the mass media—from 100 to 150. It would be interesting to know just how many parties and informal associations there are in Georgia. I would also like to know what kind of organization they have and who heads them.

M. Lebanidze, city of Tbilisi.

The rise of national self-consciousness and the democratization of our lives have led to an increase in the socio-political activity of the masses. In all likelihood, the emergence of a great number of political parties—many of which are in opposition to the ruling Communist Party—and diverse social organizations may be explained by a desire to be set free from the one-party system diktat which has existed for so many years and brought about such deplorable results, and by attempts to change present conditions. This process is continuing. New societies and organizations are instituted and new parties are created almost every day. It would hardly be possible, therefore, to arrive at an exact figure. Nonetheless, we have tried to ascertain, as accurately as possible, the number of social organizations and parties presently operating in Georgia.

Today in addition to the Communist Party in the republic, there are more than 20 national-political parties and organizations. These are: The Georgian Party of National Independence (I. Tsereteli, chairman); National-Democratic Party of Georgia—IV Dasi [Fourth Democratic Elections in Georgia] (G. Chanturiya, chairman); Liberal-Democratic Party of Georgia (M. Naneishvili, chairman); Democratic Party of Georgia (T. Sharmanashvili, chairman); Christian-Democratic Youth Association and Christian-Democratic Union of Georgia (I. Kakabadze, president); Constitutional-Democratic Party of Georgia (G. Korganashvili, chairman); Tbilisi Political Club (headed by M. Mamardashvili); Georgian Helsinki Union ("Vozrozhdeniye" ["Rebirth"], Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman); Republican Federal Party of Georgia (I. Shengelaya, chairman); Republican Party of Georgia (V. Dzagiradze, chairman); Party for Restoration of Georgian Statehood (G. Tskhvedadze, chairman); National-Social Party of Georgia (G. Bumbashvili, chairman); Progressive-Democratic Party of Georgia (D. Zodelava, chairman); Social-Democratic Party of Georgia (G. Muchaidze, chairman); Greens Party of Georgia (Z. Zhvaniya, speaker); Monarchy (Conservative) Party of Georgia (T. Zhorzhiani, chairman); Georgian Independence League (I. Tsereteli, chairman); Georgian National-Liberation Organization (T. Gviniashvili, chairman); Ilya Chavchavadze Society (headed by D.

Kopaliani); Ketevan Tsamebuli Society (L. Shakiashvili, chairman); Society of St. Elijah the Righteous (Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman); All-Georgian Merab Kostava Society (V. Adamiya, chairman); Union of Georgiy the Triumphant (T. Managadze, chairman); Georgian Citizens League (V. Mtavrishvili, chairman).

Not one of these organizations is officially registered today since we do not as yet have a law on parties, a law determining their status. Nonetheless, parties do exist and they are playing a decisive role in the national-liberation movement and socio-political life of the republic.

With respect to social organizations, according to data of the republic Council of Ministers, 50 such organizations were registered as of 10 April. These are: All-Georgian Rustaveli Society; Georgian People's Front; Georgian Demographic Society; Georgian Foundation for Resettlement and Assisting the Population imeni M. Kostava; Association of the Disabled (Union of God's Offspring) of the All-Georgian Rustaveli Society; Georgian Greens Movement; philanthropic associations founded under the All-Georgian Rustaveli Society—"Dzhavakheti," "Association for Spiritual Rebirth and Harmonious Development," the social organization "Democratic Elections in Georgia"; the All-Georgian Voluntary Philanthropic Society "Savaneta"; the philanthropic society "Racha," Union in Support of Those Repressed for Participating in the "Mamulishvili" Ethnic Movement; the Republic Association in Support of Children and Juveniles with Unique Mental Development imeni D. Uznadze—"Megzuri"; the Georgian Cultural Philanthropic Society ("Pegas" Georgian cultural association); Ivane Machabeli Society; Georgian Youth Foundation "Mamuli"; Association of Georgian Students of Politics; Association of Georgian Mothers of Soldiers; the "Lemi" All-Georgian Society; the "Mandili" Council of Georgian Mothers; Georgian Union of Afghanistan Veterans; Foundation imeni David Agmashenebeli; Union of Georgian Economic Revival; Union of Georgian Graduate Students; Union of Georgian Lawyers; Association of Georgian Doctors; "Mamuli" Specialization Foundation of Georgian Doctors Abroad; Union of Georgian Metallurgists; Union of Georgian Builders; Association of Georgian Scientists and Specialists; Association of Young Georgian Workers in the Arts; Independent Association of Georgian Journalists; Association of Georgian Photo-Journalists and Documentary Film Producers; Foundation of Georgians Working Abroad under the Georgian UNESCO Council imeni Grigol Robakidze; the Society to Facilitate Development of Mutual Ties Between Georgia and the United States; Social Center for Mutual Ties Between Georgia and Foreign Countries; the Georgian chapter of the social organization "Friendship Force"; "Tbilisi-Bristol" Association under the Tbilisi City Council; Georgian National Olympic Committee; Georgian Shotokan Karate Association and Georgian Rugby Association; Georgian Competitive Bridge Federation; Georgian

Ushu Federation; Georgian Baseball Association; Georgian Billiards Association; Georgian Soccer Federation; "Agro" Scientific-Production Association; the Georgian Foreign Tourism Association "Sakartvelo"; the Black Sea consortium "Kolkha"; association of the Union of Georgian State-Cooperative Enterprises (Organizations)—"Iberia."

In addition to the social organizations of the republic enumerated above, another 20 organizations have been founded and are operating which for one reason or another are not registered with the Council of Ministers or are registered with local organs of authority. These are: Rustavi Society; Ivane Dzhavakishvili Society; "National Accord" Association; David Agmashenebeli Society; "Mkhedrioni" of Georgia; Union of Georgiy the Triumphant; Legion of Shevardeni; "Ereti" Society; Kakutsa Cholokashvili Society, "Tbiliseli" Society; "Rasdzinad" Ossetian Association; "Aidgylara" People's Forum of Abkhazia; "Ronai" Kurdish Association; "Orpheus" Greek Association; David Garedzheli Society; Association of Georgian Jews; "Kheyrat" Azeri Association; the Demographic Foundation; free trade unions.

Georgian Nationalist Discusses Party Views

90US1034B Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
25 May 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Irakli Batiashvili, member of the Main Committee of the Georgian National Independence Party, by M. Yeligulashvili, date and place not specified, published under the rubric "Who's Who": "Experience Arrives in the Struggle"]

[Text] In no way did we decide to schedule our conversation with Irakli Batiashvili, one of the leaders of the National Independence Party, to coincide with Georgian Independence Day just because the party's name has the word "independence" in it. It is simply that the National Independence Party is one of the most significant and popular parties on the Georgian political horizon. Along with the National Democratic Party and several other organizations, this party is leading the so-called irreconcilable opposition. This is why we see interest in the views and positions which reign in the party.

[Yeligulashvili] We usually structure our "Who's Who" column in such a way that leaders of republic political organizations talk about their parties. In this instance I would like to depart from tradition and begin with a personal question. You have belonged to the Helsinki Group, the Ilya Chavchavadze Society, the Society of Saint Elijah the Righteous, and now—the National Independence Party. How do you explain this—by a transformation of political views or by something else?

[Batiashvili] Let me tell you how I became an active participant in the national movement. I had close personal contacts with Irakli Tsereteli. In 1987 the Ilya Chavchavadze Society was formed. I was one of those who participated in the constituent assembly. Many

changes took place following this as you well know. The society was split into two organizations—Ilya Chavchavadze Society—IV Dasi [Fourth Democratic Elections in Georgia] and the Ilya Chavchavadze Society. Later an even deeper division took place which left us with the following organizations in existence as of today: National Democratic Party, Society of Saint Elijah the Righteous, National Independence Party, and the Helsinki Alliance.

For a long time I was a member of the governing body of the Society of St. Elijah the Righteous, whose leader was the Georgian national hero loved by all, Merab Kostava. Governing body members also included Irakli Tsereteli, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Guram Gogbaidze, Tedo Paatashvili... At the same time I entered the Main Committee of the National Independence Party. Right now I am exclusively a member of the party headed by Irakli Tsereteli.

Transformation of political views is too general an expression. First of all I have to say that all of the organizations I mentioned above belong to the radical opposition. They share a common goal—the independence of Georgia. Their views on methods of fighting to achieve it also coincide in large part. But there are a great number of specific differences seen in important, concrete issues. The processes of development of the national-liberation movement, purely political relations between these parties, and divergences in their platforms predetermined my choice.

[Yeligulashvili] Indeed, the unity of strategic goal and similarity in methods of conducting the struggle of the majority of political organizations is apparent. The difference lies in nuances. All the same there exist today and there continue to be created a very great number of parties and organizations. In this stage of events, does such splitting weaken the national-liberation movement?

[Batiashvili] To begin with, I must clarify that the nuances we are talking about here are quite significant.

And with respect to unity, not typical of today, the idea that there cannot be two opinions would hasten political liberation processes. But I, for example, am not an advocate of the existence in Georgia of some kind of undifferentiated national movement. Because if this were the case, such a movement would not be political. In any country, at any stage of history, when a political struggle took place on the level of parties, principalities, or something else, it was always characterized by political pluralism. I consider this to be absolutely normal. We must also take into account the fact that the kind of Georgia we get in the future will be the kind of national movement we have today. If the movement today is distinguished by party pluralism, this means it is on such principles of political pluralism that we desire to see a democratic, free Georgia. A situation in which the country is ruled by a single, undifferentiated power would put democracy in question.

But it would be demagogic on my part to assert that fragmentation—or confrontation—is a good thing. These complicate the overall cause for which everyone is fighting. But everyone conducts the struggle in his own way. And this is what I had in mind when I spoke of the seriousness of the nuances. For example, the differences between our party and the National Democratic Party or the Helsinki Alliance are less than between us and the People's Front. In the second instance they are not simply substantive, but matters of principle, although here too it is possible to reach agreement on certain points. The most important thing in such a situation is to avoid confrontation.

But here I would like to add the following: I am deeply convinced that the process of restoring Georgian independence is a natural one. It is accompanied by a number of objective or subjective obstacles, which will be overcome. We may draw a parallel with the processes which began in Georgia in the eighth and ninth centuries and concluded in the 11th century in the unification of Georgia. It is well known how complex these were, and what obstacles accompanied them. At that time, after all, there was not just a fragmentation of various forces struggling to achieve Georgian unification, but a clear-cut confrontation was defined among them as well. The final result was predetermined by objective natural laws.

[Yeligulashvili] A question arises from what you state here. Is the pluralism in a free society, in your view, the same as that in a society which has just started to wage the struggle to achieve freedom? Or do we have to make some distinctions between them? After all, in that example you gave from Georgian history of the Middle Ages it was precisely that fragmentation and confrontation which determined the protracted nature of the processes, which drew out to some degree attainment of the goal.

[Batiashvili] Without a doubt. The pluralism which is permissible and necessary under conditions of determined statehood may prove to be even destructive during the stage when the struggle is being waged. When the people are engaged in their struggle, disconnected activity can lead to catastrophe. We must strive to see to it that our movement becomes a unified force, in spite of all its diversity.

Proceeding from this, I am forced to limit myself in a certain sense. For the sake of a higher goal—which the attainment of unity in the national-liberation movement is—we may have to make concessions in some regard.

[Yeligulashvili] To what extent is this succeeding? What is your party doing specifically to achieve this?

[Batiashvili] If only the fact of being among the initiators of the National Forum. But now the national-liberation movement has basically been split up into two wings. On the one hand you have the Coordinating Center for Elections to the National Congress created at the initiative of the National Forum and a whole number of socio-political organizations. And on the other—the

Roundtable. It cannot be concealed that relations between these two associations are taking shape today in extremely tense fashion. There is no point in discussing the reasons for this—so much has already been said in this regard. It is a fact that these two forces exist. And not only I, but the majority of people in the Coordinating Center, are not in agreement with a good number of significant points in the concept of the Roundtable.

What is taking place today? Dissension in the national-liberation movement is having a negative effect on the consciousness of the population. Disillusionment has set in: "They cannot cope among themselves—how do they intend to save Georgia? We are generally fed up with their endless bickering!" The reproaches are justified. But it is also time to understand that this is a normal phenomenon in political processes. The most important thing is what path the movement will take from here on—towards overcoming the confrontation or deepening it.

Generally speaking, the departure of a number of organizations from the National Forum has resulted in significant damage to the national-liberation movement. For during the course of the struggle, the psychology and mood of the masses are not less significant than political concepts. After all, it is the people, and not one party or another, that comprise the decisive force in any struggle. If the people fail to rally and become united, we can predict fiasco as the result of the efforts of any party.

And it is the people and their attitudes which we are concerned about first and foremost. The situation at present is highly complex. On the one hand people are demanding an end to confrontation, and on the other we see discussion of the incompatibility of political positions. To give up a position for the sake of achieving unity is politically unjustified. To ignore people's psychological state for the sake of being "uncompromising" in one's positions is also wrong. This is a dilemma which cannot be easily resolved.

What course do we see possible in the given situation? To steadfastly maintain an orientation in which processes follow their natural course. To avoid any artificial associations, because these are doomed to split up all the same. It is better to break up once over certain disagreements than to split and reconcile eight times, naturally eliciting people's protest and causing a frivolous attitude towards oneself.

[Yeligulashvili] There is another significant factor here, in my view, which can explain the crack in the people's mentality. People's interest in politics and their striving to attain an overall goal have not yet been translated into a milieu of clearly defined political views enabling distinctions to be made between parties and party leanings to be determined. Many, many people still have a single, coincident understanding of "informals." And all they see is internal, "inter-informal" strife in the contradictions among parties. How successful, in your opinion, has progress been in the politicization of the masses?

[Batiashvili] We can consider the fact that today politics has become a subject of general interest as politicization. This is extremely important. But the extent to which people get involved in political processes is in fact more important still, and in this regard the level of politicization in Georgia is not very high—though it cannot be compared with what we had just two years ago. People have begun to differentiate among parties, but it is evident that this differentiation is currently being determined not by platforms, but by the personalities of leaders. On the one hand this is normal, because national-liberation movements in any historical situation have had their leaders and individualities which determined them. On the other hand, however, it is natural and desirable that information on one party or another not be limited to "leader recognition" but be supplemented with a knowledge of the political orientation of the organization. We have not yet attained this level of political maturity—it lies ahead. This is especially true of regions of the republic in which organizations of the national-liberation movement, their subsidiary branches and committees, etc., have still not fully "spread their wings."

All the same, the degree of political maturity and ability to orient ourselves on the political map of Georgia have today reached such a level that it is possible to discuss the conduct of elections to a national organ of government. We might say that the mutual enhancement principle is at work here. Agitation and propaganda during the course of elections in turn lead to an increased level of political enlightenment in the Georgian population.

[Yeligulashvili] We have been talking about leaders. Any movement—in its initial as well as final stage of statehood acquisition—requires professional politicians. But we do not have public institutions to produce them. Could you talk about this somewhat on the example of your party?

[Batiashvili] I would put it this way. In order for someone to become a great writer, he has to possess talent given from above. At the same time, he undergoes a professionalization during the course of his work—on the basis of experience, trial and error.

It is exactly the same in politics—talent, then enhancement of one's professional level through empirical experience plus a knowledge of the processes and events taking place in the world. Any epoch of world history—whether it be 18th century America, France during its times of revolution, India during its national-liberation movement, etc.—has given birth to its political leaders through natural processes, and they have then worked consciously on their professionalization.

It would be boastful to assert that our party today consists of full-fledged, professional politicians. After all, on the larger scale of processes we are still in the rudimentary stage. But it is a fact that the level of professionalism is growing before our very eyes—not just in our leaders, but in ordinary party members as well

who are working actively in one committee or another—on interethnic issues or the boycott of military service in the occupation army, or in the Coordinating Center. Already they are becoming true professionals in their spheres—the work underway in the committees is quite serious. And this work is forming professionals. Our newspapers NEZAVISIMOST [independence] and VREMYA [times] are graphic examples. They are not ideal, of course, but if one compares them with what they were half a year or a year ago, the difference is evident.

[Yeligulashvili] Generally speaking, would you be able to state that a serious working environment has taken shape inside the party?

[Batiashvili] First of all I should say that our party is exactly what is meant by the word party—a political organization with fairly well defined structure and quite a large membership (over 1,000 individuals—and this given an orientation based not on quantitative indices, but rather a concern with quality selection of personnel). At the same time that it has a large membership, our party is distinguished by quite a number of outstanding personalities who determine the party climate through their work, political tenor, and political dreams too, I would say.

The National Independence Party espouses perhaps the most radical positions in the national-liberation movement. But I am personally quite pleased at the fact that within the party, although we have our conflicts and contradictions of course, a very warm, friendly, humane atmosphere has been created. There is no political chill in our relations. We might say that it is not just a party, but a community, which absolutely does not preclude mutual responsibility and exactingness—after all, we are waging a serious political struggle.

[Yeligulashvili] Voluntarily or involuntarily we are always comparing the Georgian national-liberation movement with what is taking place in the Baltic republics. With regard to the criticality of processes and political irreconcilability, we are not merely not lagging behind the Baltic republics—we are perhaps surpassing them. The clear impression is created, however, that their movement of liberation has been more seriously prepared in the scientific, economic, and conceptual framework.

[Batiashvili] This must be acknowledged. We in general, and our party in particular, are oriented more on purely political aspects than anything else—although we do have parties which devote a fairly great amount of attention to economic issues and drawing up economic concepts. But I repeat that in Georgia, on the whole, this relationship is far less prominent than in the Baltic republics. I personally believe it is necessary right now to begin a professional, competent effort to develop the economic concepts of an independent Georgia.

[Yeligulashvili] Does your party have an economic commission?

[Batiashvili] Not yet. We have not as yet taken specific, significant steps in this direction.

[Yeligulashvili] And if we fantasize a bit and imagine that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow Georgia acquires independence, and as a result of the very first elections it is your party which obtains the leading positions... Won't you be unarmed as you face the need to undertake the real functions of state leadership?

[Batiashvili] Let us begin with the fact that our party will set as its goal the struggle for power only when realistic conditions for governing are created—i.e., after the occupation of Georgia is completely removed. In general, we are categorically opposed to opposition forces taking power into their hands before there are real possibilities for government. Our goal today is to struggle for the de-occupation and liberation of Georgia.

But if we are realistic about it, this will not happen “tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.” And so, the issue of our having to take over the reins of government right away, while we are not prepared, is not a real issue. We will not be too hasty in the formation of a government and the distribution of portfolios. A great deal remains to be accomplished prior to this.

But, I repeat, the time has already arrived for our party to establish a working organ within its framework which will have specialists to deal with these issues. I am convinced the independence of Georgia is near. The disintegration of the empire is not far away.

[The following information is set off in a box in the middle of the article]

Biographic Information

Irakli Batiashvili, member of the Main Committee of the Georgian National Independence Party, was born in 1961. He graduated from the philosophy department of Tbilisi State University in 1982. Presently he is working as a junior research assistant at the Philosophy Institute of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. He never joined the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] or the CPSU. Batiashvili is married and has one child.

More on Georgia's National Forum Convention

90US1091A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZH in Russian
1 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Eteri Kakabadze: “The Consolidation Concept Prevails”]

[Text] Over the course of three days, 23-25 May, the attention of the republic was riveted on the Tbilisi Sports Palace where the first National Convention was taking place, convened at the initiative of the Georgian National Forum.

I should make some commentary now on the situation leading up to the convention, events preceding it, so that

the political situation and conditions under which it was conducted might be understood. Let me remind the reader that the Georgian National Forum, in which almost all political forces existing in Georgia participated through representatives, was elected at an extraordinary conference of informal associations and parties from the implacable and liberal opposition. One way or another the National Forum could until recently be considered to some degree as a political representative organ speaking for the National Liberation Movement, with all the functional authority proceeding from it.

However, the exodus from the National Forum of such influential political organizations as the Georgian Helsinki Union, the Monarchist (Conservative) Party, the Merab Kostava Society, the Society of Saint Elijah the Righteous (although some representatives of this organization participated nonetheless in the work of the convention and even joined the Coordinating Center), and the Greens Party of Georgia split the National Liberation Movement in fact, placing in doubt the status of the Forum itself and that of the convention as a national convention. The organizations that left joined together in a "Roundtable," and charted their policy and political concept with regard to the main question introduced for discussion at the convention—elections to the National Congress.

And so, let us return to the National Convention which assembled more than 6,000 delegates under the arches of the Sports Palace—the representatives of 82 political organizations (the Georgian People's Front turned in its 50 sets of credentials and officially renounced participation in the convention), creative unions, major enterprises, and almost all nationalities residing in Georgia, from 63 rayons of the republic. The chief purpose of the convention was to draw up and ratify a provision on elections to the National Congress, and to elect a Coordinating Center for preparation and conduct of universal, direct, democratic elections.

Before the first National Convention began its work, the most holy and blessed Ilya II, Catholikos-Patriarch of All Georgia, addressed the participants. Wishing the convention a successful session, the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church stated it was symbolic that the convention was taking place during days of celebration by orthodox Christians of two great holidays—the end of Easter and the Ascension, and on the eve of 26 May, Georgian Statehood Restoration Day. He noted that the National Liberation Movement was moving into its next phase of development. It threatens no one and has no aim of encroaching on anyone's rights, no matter who they may be. We have lived in peace and will continue to do so in the name of the future Georgia. Today as never before we require unity and mutual understanding, love for our neighbor, and tolerance. Giving his blessing to those assembled, the Catholikos-Patriarch asked them to remember eternal values in their thoughts and deeds, to forget personal offenses, to unite in the name of a single goal. And as a symbol of these instructions he presented the convention with a gift—a newly published bible with

dedication inscription and a holy candle which burned over the course of the three-day session.

Irakli Tsereteli, leader of the Georgian National Independence Party, opened the convention in the name of the National Forum. He characterized the sociopolitical situation which has come about in the republic and noted the necessity of consolidating political forces around the concept of electing the National Congress of Georgia, which must become the exclusive organ expressing the will of the republic population. He termed the function of coordinating the National Liberation Movement and uniting it into a single opposition force of influence one of the main functions of the Congress. He stated we must do everything we can in order to achieve consolidation around the concept of restoring Georgian independence. The National Liberation Movement today has no need of raw emotion. It needs deliberate, constructive action and political wisdom.

Following Tsereteli's presentation there were primary addresses by Georgiy Chanturiya (National-Democratic Party) and Iliko Khaindrava (Tbilisi Political Club).

It seemed that business-oriented debate and discussion would develop following the addresses on issues raised, in particular regarding the validity of National Congress elections in the present political situation. But during its first day in session the convention was unable to overcome the mass-rally style in which speakers do not treat the substance of issues but rather talk about sore points. The split in the National Liberation Movement and attitude toward the coming elections to the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet comprise such a sore point in the present situation.

We must note for the sake of fairness that in comparison with the extraordinary conference of opposition forces, the convention was marked by a certain honesty and liberalism with regard to alternative opinions. And these did exist. As USSR People's Deputy and film producer Eldar Shengelaya stated in his address, the presence of three orientations in the distribution of political forces—radical opposition, liberal opposition, and separate Communist Party of Georgia which takes a national stand—is a reality which, if not taken into account, threatens to impart a one-sided nature to the National Liberation Movement.

A call for compromise for the sake of consolidation of the sound forces in society resounded in many presentations, a gratifying fact in today's politically fragmented situation. The positions of principle of a number of political parties and associations (Republican Party, Constitutional-Democratic Party, Tbilisi Political Club, the Ilya Chavchavadze Society in part, and others)—to acknowledge Soviet structures of authority as existing de facto and participate in elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet along with elections to the National Congress—met with the negative reaction of those assembled on the opening day of session, but on the second day were yielding positive results. The path

toward compromise decisions, however difficult it may have seemed, turned out nonetheless to be entirely realistic and attainable, a fact which provides true evidence of the new stage of maturity of the National Liberation Movement.

The second day of the convention stood out by virtue of its thoroughly businesslike and constructive nature.

Irakli Tsereteli read out the convention resolution on the National Congress, which was voted upon (without discussion, we note here) point by point and adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes. But even after ratification of this document, which forced its way through the dictate of Giya Chanturiya, the day's presiding official, Professor Chumburidze of the Tbilisi Medical Institute, Vakhtang Dzabiradze, leader of the Georgian Republican Party, and others did not fail to mention that not a single convention which holds itself in esteem would adopt such significant documents "by ear," without preliminary discussion no less, and that the resolution required a thorough legal processing.

The liberal opposition, personified by the Tbilisi Political Club and its adherents, acknowledged as requiring softening the resolution point on boycotting Soviet elections. Giya Zhorzhiani (Tbilisi Political Club) expressed the position of liberals on this issue:

"At such a significant time for the fate of our nation we must not stand in confrontation against one another and make accusations of collaborationism. We must utilize all political means to achieve the goal. Not a single existing party is about to renounce its positions, and it would be stupid to require this. We must find one common concept and unite ourselves around it. The National Congress was one such concept. But political wisdom will fail us if we apply a veto to participation in elections of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, which has influence and support among a definite segment of the population, not to mention its legal authority."

This same question would arise on the third day of the convention session in discussing the law on elections to the National Congress, and would find understanding from both the irreconcilable opposition and from all convention participants. But I will make one slight comment regarding the name of the document under discussion, specifically as to how appropriate it was to call it a law, taking into account the fact that the National Convention is not a legislative organ. As several speakers rightly noted, it would be more correct to call it a provision. We will settle for this.

The provision on elections was published in republic newspapers, and convention delegates were familiar with it to one degree or another. Nonetheless, the provision which was read aloud by Irakli Tsereteli differed somewhat from what was published. Some comment concerning its substance. Elections to the National Congress are conducted by direct, secret, universal vote on a democratic basis. Any citizen permanently residing in Georgia who is 18 years of age may participate in the

elections to the Congress, irrespective of political views, religious beliefs, nationality, sex, social status, etc., with the exception of individuals serving in the ranks of the Soviet Army and internal troops. Agreement was reached on two points of principle during the course of discussion of the draft provision on elections: Firstly, the prohibition was lifted on those desiring to participate in elections of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet; and secondly, CPSU members are permitted to participate in elections to the National Congress.

The convention voted for the conduct of elections to the National Congress to take place 30 September of this year.

The Coordinating Center was formed this same day, consisting of representatives of 50 political parties, organizations, associations, creative unions, and the Georgian Academy of Sciences—representatives of almost all nationalities residing in Georgia, persons who enjoy prestige among the people, and—by decision of the convention—vacant seats were left for the political organizations which comprise the "Roundtable" in the event they come to support the concept of elections to the National Congress in the existing political situation.

The Coordinating Center was directed to form the Central Electoral Commission on Elections to the Congress.

Without a doubt we should note among the significant events of the convention the address by Zurab Achba, deputy chairman of the Abkhazian People's Forum "Aidgylara." The first thing he did was to provide an elucidation to those present of the setting ablaze of the house of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia in Lidzave. Achba assessed this as a provocation directed against leanings toward reaching a normalization of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. He reported also that, upon demand of the "Aidgylara" governing body, internal affairs organs had begun an investigation.

Zurab Achba went on further to state: "In view of the fact that we received our invitation to the convention late and did not manage to conduct delegate elections, 'Aidgylara' representatives were present at the convention as observers. We support the concept of electing the Georgian National Congress and hope that it will make its contribution not only to the unification of political forces but also to the erection of bridges between our two peoples."

The final accord of the first National Convention was an appeal to the Lithuanian people expressing solidarity with their struggle to attain Lithuanian independence.

On this the convention completed its work.

Crimean Oblast Official on Tatar Resettlement 90UN1949A SOYUZ in Russian No 20, May 90 p 1

[Article by Leonid Grach, secretary of the Crimean Okem of the Ukrainian Communist Party: "Crimean Tatars: The Solution Must Satisfy Everyone"]

[Text] The problem of the Crimean Tatars is one of the most complex among the USSR's nationality problems,

since it involves not just the economic or linguistic, but also the territorial self-determination of a people and its return to its historical homeland and the restoration of its national integrity. There is no question but that justice must triumph. But at the same time, it is necessary to recall that the resolution of the Crimean Tatar issue requires that numerous economic, social, geographic, demographic, environmental and political problems associated with life on a relatively small and well-developed territory inhabited by many peoples with diverse cultures be overcome in a shortened time frame.

Today the time has come to also think seriously about the problem of a new state structure for the Crimea based on the nature of its historically developed internationality community. A good many unresolved questions remain with respect to the other peoples deported from the Crimea during the war years: Crimean Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians. We cannot help being concerned over the fate and future of such relatively small peoples as the Karaims and the Krymchaks.

At present, serious social and political tension has developed in Crimea Oblast. The unorganized influx of returning Crimean Tatars is increasing. 19,700 families numbering more than 82,000 persons have already arrived. The desire to return more rapidly and under any conditions is creating considerable problems both for the new arrivals and for the local population in certain cities and regions. The level of people's social support is declining. The waiting list for housing in the oblast numbers 159,000 families, and 100,000 people are living in dormitories. In general-education schools, a substantial number of the students attend school on half-day shifts (43,000, or 15.3 percent). There are some schools that even need to arrange a third shift. During this school year alone, the number of children from Crimean Tatar families increased by more than 3,200. 20,000 children await placement in kindergartens. One in every two rural communities has no children's preschool institutions.

A considerable number of the villages lack any social-service facilities whatsoever. In 447 communities there are insufficient sales outlets, and 68 of them there virtually have none at all. There are difficulties with the food supply. This problem is aggravated by the growing influx of unorganized vacationers arriving in the oblast for treatment and recreation; they number 6-7 million people annually.

Nor should one forget that at present practically all the jobs in the oblast are filled. Only when employees move from one job to another do vacancies appear in the cities, and in the rural areas they develop only during the period of farm work.

At the same time, the Crimean Tatars are, to a significant extent, in a state of ethnic despair. They sometimes regard the current actions of state bodies of authority in both Moscow and the Crimea as creating a new knot of contradictions. Delays in the preparation and implementation of the State Program for the return of the Crimean Tatars to our oblast are arousing sharp criticism of the

work of the State Commission on the part of both the Crimean Tatars and a significant portion of the Russian-speaking population. Tired of waiting, and having lost their faith, the Crimean Tatars may already start moving back to the Crimea in large masses this year (following the end of the school year and spring agricultural work).

One also must not fail to take into account the fact that the activities of action groups influenced by the organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement and striving to speed up the solution of problems through the use of force are sharply increasing. In 1989-1990 alone such groups have held 92 rallies (of which 37 were unsanctioned) and up to 10 multiday picketing actions of state institutions, and have incited 12 instances of the unauthorized seizure of plots of land and construction of homes. For example, on 16 April several tents were set in the front of the ispolkom on Simferopol's central square. For the sake of objectivity, let me note that the organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement has been unwillingly entering into dialogue with Soviet and party agencies, and sets the task of being endowed with real powers as the people's sole representative.

Appeals are being heard not to wait for the local authorities to allocate plots of land for individual housing construction, but to use existing experience with "tent cities," occupy the land, and confront the authorities with an accomplished fact.

Once again, a tendency has emerged to put forward demands for the restoration of the Crimean Tatars' rights of ownership of real and personal property as of the time of their deportation, and the rights of the new generation to inherit that property, and for compensation for material losses and psychological damage.

All this has started to create conflicts. In Belogorskiy, Nizhnegorskiy, Bakhchisaraykiy and Dzhankoyskiy rayons, rallies by the Russian-speaking population have confronted local authorities with demands to put a stop to unlawful actions on the part of the Crimean Tatars and to temporarily stop their entry into the oblast. In a number of cases these conflicts (if one looks at the stages of their development) have assumed a new quality and reached the level of extreme situations.

The six particularly conflict-torn rayons presently have rayon and rural Russian-language committees and action groups that are continuing to organize various actions in defense of their own interests and security. Their representatives regularly travel to Moscow. The Russian-language committees' social base may expand on account of increased psychological pressure by part of the Crimean Tatars on the population. Consequently, the role of subjective factors, especially in places of potential and real ethnic tension, will continue to grow.

In our opinion, the processes of psychological adaptation to the Crimean Tatars on the part of the oblast's present population will be very long and not without pain. Just as the processes of the Crimean Tatars return to a new ethnic and cultural environment will be. So far, the

influence of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia on the nationality processes in our oblast is still very insignificant. We have established ongoing fruitful dialogue with writers, musicians and scholars from among the Crimean Tatars. The implementation of the party's policy on the nationalities question was examined at an oblast seminar-practicum of ideological workers and a scientific-practical conference.

Questions of internationalist upbringing have been defined as a priority area of ideological work for the Crimea Oblast Party Organization. They are constantly considered in the party obkom bureau. Good scholarly contacts in this area are being set up with specialists of the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In order to get a deeper sounding of public opinion, which cannot be ignored, a press survey of the population was taken on problems of nationalities policy in the region. With the help of scholars and members of the public, the party obkom drew up and distributed through the mass media, for broad discussion, a draft document titled "Basic Guidelines for the Oblast Party Organization's Activities in Harmonizing Internationality Relations in the Crimea." Taking into account the criticisms and proposals that were expressed, this draft was discussed, reworked and adopted this January by a plenum of the party obkom.

This February through April, these questions were also discussed at plenums of the party gorkoms and raykoms. The distinctive features of these discussions included their live broadcast over local radio and television, the organization of sessions of special sections (which permitted a large group of participants to speak), and the invitation to the plenums of representatives of the Crimean Tatars and other nationalities.

On the basis of an analysis of the situation, the party obkom and the local party committees have drawn up current and long-range plans of measures that give particular attention to the study of trends and attitudes among the Crimean Tatars and other national groups.

Having enlisted all the agitation and propaganda media in this work, we have attempted to think through and weigh the entire content of the information flow. A special group of scientific consultants has been set up and is operating under the obkom's department of ideology; it carries out situational analyses and concerns itself with forecasting the development of events and the resolution of contradictions. The party committees have been helped to act in a thoughtful and carefully considered fashion by oblast, city and rayon committees of the Commission on Internationalist Upbringing and Improving the Culture of Internationality Intercourse.

In addition, the party gorkoms and raykoms each have one or two employees who have specialized in the questions of internationality relations. The oblast's cities and rayons have been assigned special working groups consisting of party obkom members, employees of the

apparatus, the executives of oblast organizations, scholars and higher-school instructors; their job includes explanation of the materials and decisions of plenums of the Central Committee and the party obkom, analysis, and forecasting. A number of special political days have been held on these questions, as well as numerous round tables, meetings, and special-topic internationality evening meetings.

The party gorkoms and the city and rayon soviet ispolkoms have introduced regular meetings with the Crimean Tatar population at their places of residence, as well as citizens' assemblies, into their work practice.

This, in essence, amounts to the ethnic and social training of managerial personnel. Many of us have had to start, one would say, from scratch.

There are a good many positive examples of cooperation between local party committees and the Crimean Tatar population. Here is one of them. Taking into account the dissatisfaction of a substantial number of Crimean Tatars from the Rodina Kolkhoz in Kirovskiy Rayon with the leaders of their action group, the party raykom organized a meeting of the representatives of soviet and party agencies and public organizations with them. During it a program of joint activities supported by the absolute majority of the residents was worked out. The Crimean Tatars put forward new persons to serve on the action group.

The Chernomorskiy Party Raykom works in close cooperation with the action group. They managed to neutralize in good time some provocative rumors that were being spread around, and to work out coordinated actions to improve the psychological and political atmosphere. And the main thing is that they managed to demonstrate the effectiveness of consolidation and dialogue. Similar experience also exists in Belogorskiy, Sovetskiy and several other rayons. The harmonization of internationality relations is being objectively facilitated by Armenian, Azerbaijani, Krimchak, Karaim, Jewish, Greek and Georgian national cultural societies, and by the Center for the Revival of Crimean Tatar Culture. For the first time in the postwar period, the Crimean Tatar national theater has been revived in the Crimea, and exhibitions of artists, sculptors and masters of decorative and applied arts are being held. In the past two years the number of Crimean Tatar national amateur arts collectives has tripled. A weekly supplement to the oblast newspaper KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA is published in that people's language, and radio programs are broadcast in it. In the schools, the Crimean Tatar language is being more and more widely introduced into the classroom schedule, and it is being studied on an optional basis. Altogether, more than 5,000 students are studying it.

The consolidation of all peoples living in the Crimea is being fostered by the reassessment of the Crimea's political history, the filling in of its blank spots, and the restoration of historic truth with respect to the Crimean

Tatars and other deported groups. This purpose is being served by the Tavriya Izdatelstvo's publication of special collections in a series called "Krym mnogonatsionalnyy" [Multinational Crimea], by the publication by the party obkom's sociopolitical center of informational and methods bulletins, and by the organization of history readings on the problems of ethnogenesis and state development in the Crimea. Work has begun on a multivolume publication titled "Ocherki istorii Kryma" [Essays in the History of the Crimea].

I am certain that it will be proper if, in organizing the return of this people, we all rely on the Crimean Tatars' desires, the interests of the population inhabiting the Crimea, and the capabilities of the oblast and the state.

We are in favor of strictly adhering to the principle of the voluntary resettlement of Crimean Tatars. We are for ensuring their resettlement in an organized fashion and in stages, taking into account the realistic possibilities of providing them with work, and the creation of the

necessary conditions with respect to social and everyday services. And this can be done only with the help of a state program, the drafting of which must not be delayed.

We genuinely favor the systematic approach in solving this problem, and the reorientation of propaganda work toward explaining both the concept and the actual program of resettlement. Together with officials of the CPSU Central Committee, the country's Supreme Soviet and members of the state commission, the party obkom is prepared to take part in forming working groups for concrete political work along these lines, including in Krasnodar Kray and Kherson Oblast.

And one last point. The most important thing today is that party and soviet agencies not lose their prestige in the eyes of either the Crimean Tatars or the other peoples of our region. In my view, in it lies the guarantee of the harmonization of internationality relations, and the guarantee of civil peace and the personal security of citizens.

Georgia: Retaliatory Attack on Militia90UN2348A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 11 Jul 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Attack on Militia"]

[Text] One of the leaders of organized crime was mortally wounded by a criminal investigation employee on 8 July in the city of Poti in the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The vengeance of "godfather" assistants was quick in coming.

As early as 10 o'clock in the morning, a brutal crowd attacked the building of the city department of internal affairs and the public prosecutor. Thugs hurled stones and bottles filled with an inflammatory mixture. The militants broke into the premises and opened up safes in the duty section and offices, and they seized 50 pistols with ammunition. Soon the building was engulfed in flames. The medical sobering-up station and the home of a militia employee caught fire. The crowd completely blocked the streets and did not allow fire engines to get to the site of the devastation.

Now the situation in the city is returning to normal. Criminal proceedings have been instituted. Steps are being taken to arrest the active participants in the disorders.

Growth of Crime in USSR, West Compared90UN2078A Moscow *SOVETSKAYA KULTURA*
in Russian No 23, 9 Jun 90 p 5

[Article by Candidate of Psychological Sciences Leonid Radzikovskiy: "A Banker and a Bandit"]

[Text] Crime is disturbing the people, it seems, almost as much as the empty stores. We feel ourselves in danger and are afraid to walk the streets at night. You see a lone man on an empty street, and it's uncomfortable; but if you see a gang of juveniles—it's not good at all. How did this come about? For how many years have they been telling us tales about the fact that, you see, "at their place," in the USA, there are no cities—just jungles. But you see people riding along. You ask: "Is it true that one does not go out in the streets at night?" They look at you like you're a fool and ask, "Where on earth did you read that? Aren't you confusing New York with Perm or Chimkent? There you'd better not hang about on the streets at night. But in New York you can breathe freely. True, it's better not to enter all the notorious sectors, but elsewhere, you can go for a walk and enjoy yourself."

This does not jibe well with the crime statistics. If you believe them, we have many times less theft, rape or larceny and so on than America. We have better statistics—they have security. How can this be? I think, as much as I hate to say it, that our statistics, as always, are not convincing. In the number of murders, we have already nearly overtaken the United States. And that is understandable—you can't hide a corpse; you can't tell it, "Come back tomorrow;" and you cannot refuse to

take its statement. And so with murders, the statistics are nevertheless more or less accurate. As for the rest...

But no matter what the statistics are like, "It is not a matter of boring statistics; it is a matter of first-class law." A fact is a fact: the peaceful people are afraid. And this fear has grown strongly in the last two or three years; and that is worst of all.

One can argue endlessly about the reasons for crime. Murder and violence came down to us from Cain and will end along with humanity. The very same goes for theft and deceit. There has never been a time, nor a country, nor a social stratum in which crimes have not been committed.

However, this in no way makes the struggle with crime a pointless matter, like fighting a lunar eclipse. No, in various historical periods it has made a splash, and then went into decline. Our crime statistics are once again secret; therefore to say with confidence just when our crime has declined, say in the last 20-30 years, is difficult. But the fact that it has sharply increased, right before our eyes, seems incontrovertible.

The first reason is right before our eyes. At one time we used to write that New York is—"a city of contrasts." There are no doubt contrasts aplenty there. But here in Moscow, in any subway passage you will find beggars (sometimes several), sitting there with a few coins in their caps or kerchiefs. But on the crossing right over the passage, new Volvos or Mercedes' with private Moscow license plates pass by. Their cost is measured in hundreds of thousands of rubles. Right now the gap in the standard of living between the poor and the rich among us is simply monstrous. And every day the gap grows wider. Forty million people are living on 75 rubles [a month]—below which lies the official poverty line, at which hunger starts. And economists are arguing over how many hundreds of thousands of our people have annual income in excess of 100,000 rubles.

It is also clear that with the introduction of a free market, this gap will jump by another order of magnitude. But to reject the very idea of the market for this reason, to cry that the Mafioso and Soviet bourgeoisie will grab up everything (as if they were not taking whatever they want now)—is like not putting out the fire in your house, because the apartment of your rich neighbor would burn up along with it.

Without a doubt the blatant wealth of some and the extreme poverty of others create a fertile environment for the crime increase. But this gap is not important in and of itself. It is even more important that people do not accept it internally. No matter how many incantations are uttered on the "equality of the poor," about shameful envy, or about lawful enrichment of active and capable people—it does not help. The intellect accepts it, the spirit does not. I'm still a Soviet man and I hate the rich. Most of all—and this is the main point—I am convinced that they all (Well, maybe not all, but most of them) did not come by it honestly; either they stole it, or

they got it by speculation, and so on. Right here is the root of the longing for a strong arm, which would bridle the crime rate.

Actually we should not be surprised that we have a high crime rate, but by the fact that it is still so weak. If a young man cannot, by honest work, feed his wife and child (not to mention two children) by the time he's thirty years old or so, until which he has to live on his parents' income (if they even have enough to take care of him)—that means that society simply does not give him honest prospects in life. But that's only half the problem. The second half—there she goes, riding in a Mercedes. Before his very eyes people are becoming rich, whom he sees as thieves, speculators and swindlers. They live the way he wants to live but cannot; they live in a manner that—he is convinced—an honest person could not afford to live. The two halves come together: one cannot live honestly, but one can live dishonestly; I want to live, without denying myself, eat tasty food, dress well, own a car and take care of my family... The conclusion? There is only one. And it is our good fortune that thus far very few young people—in comparison with the general populace—have done so.

In America, as is well-known, gangsters did not spring up around just any kind of trade, but around forbidden trade: in the 1920's, around trade in liquor; in our time—around trade in narcotics and in human goods. But with us all trade is criminal. There is no familiarity with honest commerce, nor any faith in it, in our society; and, perhaps, honest trade itself hardly exists. This is the initial, unpleasant, inevitable period of early accumulation of wealth. Should one be surprised that, seeing this (After all, not everyone is blind!), thieves and extortioners are hovering around our nouveaux riches. But such crime is actually not specific; it is not localized only around speculators, traders and so on. An extortioner needs weapons—and there's another crime. And apparently they do not spend their money on philanthropic funds—so here is still another link to prostitution, narcotics, gaming houses, gambling dens and so on. In the final analysis an extortioner is sublimely indifferent as to whether his victims are thieves, or honest people. Most important is the fact that young people are attracted to the Mafia, and they are creating hotbeds for propagating crime. And they come out from them in waves: burglars and strong-arm bandits; and, most dangerous for the ordinary person—the "minor" street crimes (though hardly in terms of their viciousness and the fear they arouse) involving adolescents and youths.

We used to gloat: Over there in Italy everybody knows the "godfathers" of the Mafia, and they are walking around free. Now we too are convinced that our police know many "godfathers" too, and they too are at liberty. Little fish swim into the net. But has one "authentic" Mafioso or just one "godfather" been caught? And you see, they do exist; many of them are well-known; but they are untouchables for the law.

To the extent that the gap increases between those who have and those who have not, crime will increase. But one would like to think that as soon as a market economy is introduced in the country, a reverse process will begin slowly, but surely. The fact of the matter is, that a powerful system of honest commerce is gradually evolving (and with free trade, there can be no other kind of commerce), and the atmosphere in society will change. Wealth will cease to be regarded as criminal in origin, and traders will no longer be linked to the racketeers. But will this reduce the rackets?

There is a certain law of nature here: purloined wealth is a principal crime target. Why extortioners and thieves are particularly attracted to this is a special question, which we shall not study here. But that there is such a pattern is a fact. But for this very same reason crime once again begins to peak out when the economy stabilizes, and when a certain sensible correlation is established between the amount of work accomplished and one's income.

And one thing more. When the economy gets just a little bit stronger, then a normal future will appear for a young person—earn money, stand up on your own two feet, and acquire property. And all this—not from speculation, not from thievery, but from honest work.

We are living through an extremely tense period. A market economy is entering our society via the back door; and in its wake, racketeers are rushing to break in, trailing behind them all sorts of trash. But it is namely on a market economy (and as we have become convinced through the most bitter experience, there is simply no other kind) that we are pinning all our hopes—only a market economy will be able to root out the material and moral "wasteland" of crime. And this we must understand.

As someone once declared, "Bankers engender bandits." This is true, but only the first half is true: the second half is—"Bankers kill bandits."

Estonian Social Problems Minister Profiled

90UN2236A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 8 Jun 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Arve Kuddo, Estonian Republic minister for social problems, by T. Burlakova; place and date not specified: "There Are No National Problems, There Are Social Problems"]

[Text] Arve Kuddo is the Estonian Republic minister for social problems. He was born in 1954 in Tartu. He graduated from the economics faculty at the Moscow State University in 1978. He is a candidate of economic sciences and worked in the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute as chief of the social development and demography section. He was confirmed in the post of minister in April 1990. My first question to Arve Kuddo was this:

[Burlakova] How did you become minister?

[Kuddo] Unexpectedly. On Sunday 15 April I was invited during the evening to meet the new head of government, E. Savisaar. We talked for three hours and as a result I agreed to be a candidate, believing that now as at no other time my theoretical training and experience as a scholar could be put to good use.

[Burlakova] Practical work; is this a criterion of cognition? And to what extent are you, an armchair scholar, as it were, linked previously with practical work?

[Kuddo] The Economics Institute was to some degree a headquarters where a great deal of material was prepared for leading organs, and I had been involved in the preparation of directive documents. We also used to handle reviews and inquiries...

[Burlakova] That is, the work was done on orders from the authorities but did not stem from the dictates of life, is this not so?

[Kuddo] This was not the case. There were orders "from above" and there were initiatives "from below," but the main problem was that (I speak for myself) I was unaware of the state in which our society was finding itself. Like many others, I believed that all we had to do was take certain steps and everything would change...

Two circumstances helped what we might call my insight. Last year I spent six months in Sweden as a trainee. I made a serious comparison of our present life and the life that we should live, or perhaps could live, if the sudden changes of history had not occurred.

[Burlakova] When you say "we" whom do you have in mind?

[Kuddo] Everyone. What I have in mind is a normal life for everyone in a society that functions normally. The second circumstance that played an important role in my reassessment of values was that I returned to the subject of the mass repressions in Estonia in the 1940's and 1950's. The material I gathered forced me to reconsider

my views on the concept of socialism and its true embodiment in our reality. And this is not so much a matter of the scale of the evil-doing but of the very mechanism through which the system emerged and affected a structure of settlement and economy that had taken centuries to take shape.

Thus I came to an understanding of the need for changes, thus I came to the understanding that at this stage changes are not born out of the heads of scholars but realized in the actions of state figures.

[Burlakova] In contrast to some of your colleagues whose appointments signified personnel changes (to one degree or another), you did not have to alter the ministerial apparatus formed by your predecessor Juhan Sillaste—who, incidentally, was also a scholar, a candidate of economic sciences. Does this mean that there is also a certain link, a continuity in the directions in which the ministry is acting?

[Kuddo] I know Juhan Sillaste as a scholar, as one of our best economists in fields such as the economics of the nonproduction sphere, wages, and so forth. Previously we used to remove from their posts only those who were at fault. Now the situation is different, and although generally accepted in the world, it is still unusual for us for the new head of the government to form his own cabinet on the basis of his own criteria and considerations.

As far as I am concerned, I am carrying out my duties as I see them. I believe that leaders should now be first and foremost politicians who, each in his own sphere, implement government policy. Thus also the principles in forming a government: strictly political.

Now, about strategy. To be candid, when I came here to work there were already many pieces of draft legislation. Many of them had been lying here for months (let me qualify that: not through any fault of the ministry). For example, a law on immigration, a resolution on work by our citizens abroad, and so forth. But it was understood that the new ministers had been appointed to the government not for routine work but in order to carry out real economic reform in the republic as quickly as possible, along with the transfer to a market economy and realization of the concept of Self-Managing Estonia. Our ministry has been assigned an important role in this. We have to conduct expert examinations of all projects, without exception, from the tax reform to... well, the end is not yet in sight. And there is a whole series of our own strategic projects for which the Ministry of Social Problems and no one else is responsible.

The reform of prices and the principles of pricing are to play a key role in the economic reform. Our role is not only to participate in the review of the price scale for virtually all commodities, housing, and so forth, but also, and this is the main thing, to devise a compensation mechanism. No one must be forgotten: not those who are already living on the poverty line, not the rising generation (to give them time to get on their feet), not those

who are already of retirement age. They must all be protected from the extremes and collisions during the economy's transition to a market system. And those who are able bodied must be given the opportunity to work and earn wages. Devising a compensation mechanism is one of the most complicated strategic problems that we must resolve.

Another extraordinarily important problem is associated with population employment. Any changes in the structure of the economy will generate temporary unemployment, a re-grouping of forces. To the point, the concept of unemployment has been incorrectly interpreted here. Today there are up to 8 million able bodied people in the country who would like to work but are unemployed. Within the republic thousands of people are unemployed for various reasons. But given all this, both within the republic and the Union in general there are many times more work places available. To some extent this process is inevitable and natural: Some work places are eliminated, others are created. Retraining and study are inevitable. Accordingly, one of the ministry's most important tasks is to organize reorientation and retraining for the working person and to create a labor market. And to provide material support for those who have lost their previous jobs and have not yet found a new one.

The problems are complex and it is still difficult to foresee everything. Wherever possible we are trying not to re-invent the wheel but to make use of available experience, including the experience of Finland, where about 4,000 employees are dealing with employment problems.

[Burlakova] But in Finland this work is, as far as I know, funded from the state budget, but here we are trying to justify a cost-accounting employment bureau. Meanwhile both the public and the state have a mutual interest, and the labor market is equated with a list of vacancies, while both sides have an interest in filling each vacancy with the specialist best suited for it. This means that the task for the employment service is not only to provide jobs but also to make skilled selections.

[Kuddo] This is why the employment service is undergoing substantial changes. It is not needed in its present form and can be revived only as something new. The state task of making optimal use of the manpower potential should be resolved at the state level, and using government funding. People should be guaranteed their right to work, that is, the right to have the opportunity to work and earn a wage, thus insuring a certain living standard (according to their work) for themselves and their families. Social parasitism is well developed here: The state, they say, is obliged to provide everyone with some kind of budget, and so you need not worry. We see this as an achievement: We are assured, they say, of the morrow. But the individual himself should be thinking about the morrow. A higher living standard also requires a greater input of labor, including in study and in acquiring and improving skills. And the state should

provide the opportunity for self-improvement. But providing a specific job for everyone for his entire life is unrealistic. Offering a choice and providing help in reaching the right decision is another matter.

The ministry also has another strategic problem, namely, within the framework of social guarantees we should devise a new system for helping those members of society who may suffer more than others during the course of the reform (the risk group). These are people not yet old enough for a pension, large families, and indeed young parents with children in general, some sections of youth, the disabled and so forth. And henceforth we should keep in our field of vision questions relating to employment and social compensation for them.

The problem of interstate migration of the work force is a quite new problem for us: It is important to maintain sensible proportions.

But the most complicated task is reshaping the existing psychology and overcoming the ingrained stereotypes. We have been living in conditions of false goals and false values. Our soviets are a caricature of popular power compared with the organs that carry out similar functions in other developed states. Just consider: What kind of power can be exercised when there are no resources to do it, no material base?

The position of the new republic government, and of the situation in the Baltic in general, can be summed up thus: We want to separate ourselves not from the Union but from the system that was foisted on us by force and that is pernicious from the viewpoint of common human values. We want to rid ourselves of the stereotypes that have for so long grafted onto us. Our goals have a common human thrust, and the national question here is irrelevant. People of all nationalities want to live in a situation of stability, reliability, and confidence. The system in which we have existed abases any member of society, regardless of nationality.

In general, the talk about discrimination against the Russian-speaking population is, in my opinion, largely far-fetched. Moreover, in terms of a number of economic indicators it is precisely the urban population (and the non-Estonians in the republic live mainly in the cities) that enjoys more favorable and privileged conditions compared with the rural population. There are state living accommodations and food subsidies (subsidized products are sold mostly in the industrial centers and the difference from rural areas is some 20 percent). Spending from the state budget on the social infrastructure is also mainly in the cities. In rural localities there is in general no state trade, only the consumer cooperatives, with prices to match. As a result of the planned pricing reform, it is primarily the urban population that will suffer. That is the nuance. But we must acknowledge the fact that if up to now a certain position has been shaped with respect to things, this does not mean that it is the only correct way. For many years we cultivated a certain

direct confrontation under the guise of fairness: This was unfair to rural workers and to entire rural areas, if we bear in mind the distribution of capital investments.

[Burlakova] That is, criteria must be defined. We used to have many of them and we manipulated them to make the solution suit the question. So now let money become the universal equivalent, as it is in the rest of the world.

[Kuddo] And then, with respect to prices everyone will be equal. There is great inertia in social processes. Perhaps our greatest task is to halt the inescapable economic recession. To hope for any rapid improvement in the situation, and even more to promise it, is just irresponsible.

Our position today is very complex. Many of the problems that we have to resolve are occurring for the first time in the world, there are really no analogues and there is no one from whom to take an example. The government does not have the right to remain idle. Decisions must be made quickly, we can delay no longer. Risk? There is some. But we have no right to wait any longer.

[Burlakova] But does the government of Estonia intend to promote migration of part of the able bodied population out of the republic?

[Kuddo] I would answer thus: Non-Estonians, if this is precisely what you have in mind, are firmly integrated in the structure of the republic. Many key sectors of the economy are based in the main on non-Estonians. This is the reality. And I personally have not encountered the idea of forcible resettlement of Russians, Tatars, Belorussians or whatever.

[Burlakova] No deportations are expected, this is understood. But surely it is possible by other means to "create conditions" in which many will deem it good for themselves to leave voluntarily...

[Kuddo] And not only to the East but also to the West. And not only Russians but also Estonians. Again, this is not a national problem. People are inclined to go where things are better, and vice-versa. There you have yet another argument in favor of immediate reforms. To make changes for the better.

Russian Culture Association Renamed, Registered
90UN1970A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 20, 18 May 90 p 6

[Open letter from the Organizational Committee for Preparations for the Founding Congress of the Unity All-Russian Association of Lovers of the Fatherland's Literature and Culture: "For Unity and Community"]

[Text] Dear Friends! Compatriots!

Last summer the initiative group for the establishment of our association (its original name was Yedinstvo [unity]) appealed to you, to everyone who holds dear the fate of

our Fatherland—multinational and long-suffering Russia—to everyone who feels pride for our great past, pain for our present, and anxiety for our future and the life of our children and grandchildren. We appealed to all our country's citizens and to our compatriots living abroad with words concerning the need for unity and community in the name of reviving our native land and its chief treasure, its culture.

A terrible disaster looms over the spiritual treasury of the people of Russia, a treasury that took centuries to create. This, our chief virtue and property, which neither wars nor invasions could destroy, is now threatened with destruction. The best traditions of our culture, the accomplishments of literary and artistic geniuses, and folk arts and crafts are being subjected to oblivion and mockery. Erosion and extinction threaten that without which neither state sovereignty nor the very existence of the people are possible—national awareness, age-old foundations of morality, and the purity and distinctiveness of the language. Unfriendly, extremist forces also long to destroy the friendship among the peoples of Russia and the Union, and to arouse hatred for the very concepts of "Russian" and "inhabitant of Russia." Ethnic strife is already bearing its sad and bloody fruits.

These are the concerns that dictated our last year's appeal, which set the task of uniting the representatives of all the country's social strata, workers, peasants, the technical intelligentsia, people in literature and art, and all our society's healthy forces in a cultural, educational, public and patriotic association known as Yedinstvo.

Every new idea should pass a certain test of time and mature. The event-filled and sometimes tempestuous months that have passed since our appeal was published have shown that the dangers it mentioned, dangers threatening Russia and its peoples and culture, have not only become more obvious, but have intensified many times over.

The nationalistic arrogance and demagogic anarchy that have captured a monopoly on the leadership of perestroika and glasnost and on a self-styled pluralism are more and more violently shaking our multinational ship of state. Having seized the principal publications and other mass news media and advanced their own "plenipotentiaries" to state bodies of power, "progressivists" and "populists" of various stripes, who have joined with the corrupt party and state oligarchy and the latter-day "cooperative" bourgeoisie, have done everything possible to destabilize the situation in the country and bring about the collapse of the Union—and to denigrate and bury in filthy slander the very idea of the revival of Russia. The campaign to kindle anti-Russian sentiments has reached incredible dimensions in the union and autonomous republics. Those who support a genuine, rather than pro forma, strengthening of Russian statehood and who are fighting for the distinctiveness of the culture of every people in Russia are being subjected to ostracism and discrimination in the press and on Central Television. They are being labeled (and not only by

journalists of the "pluralistic" press, but sometimes even by "statesmen") "great-power chauvinists" and accused of having an "imperial mentality" and of many other sins.

In recent months the former true servants of stagnation, spitting on Russia's patriotic forces, have repeatedly ascribed to them the desire to arouse a "wave of pogroms." Of all things! To some extent these predictions have come true: hundreds of thousands of Russian refugees from various union republics who are today seeking shelter under the wing of Mother Russia and longing to be rescued from that same, repeatedly cursed and despised "hand of Moscow" are witnesses to the fact that pogroms really have taken place. But the victims in them have been and continue to be those who have been dubbed with the derogatory name "migrants," simple Russians.

Today we have come to the crisis point beyond which lies either the complete destruction of Russia and annihilation of its spirituality under the onslaught of "mass culture" and all sorts of pseudoeconomic "market" adventures and innovations, or the incredibly difficult, slow ascent, associated with painstaking, daily work, of the peoples of Russia to true brotherhood, to the restoration of our republic's real independence, and to a new assertion of our national pride, spirituality and culture.

Under such dramatic conditions and circumstances of these days, the establishment of the Unity All-Russian Association of Lovers of the Fatherland's Literature and Culture and the holding of its founding congress are becoming an urgent task. In the past months this idea has proven its viability and timeliness. The necessary material and nonmaterial prerequisites have been created for holding a founding congress. First of all, the initiative group for the establishment of the association has received a huge number of letters from various cities and villages, krays and oblasts of Russia, from all the union republics, and from compatriots abroad. The authors of these letters express ardent support for the idea of the association's founding, and a desire to take part in its work. Secondly, the following founders have decided to provide moral and financial support to Yedinstvo: the RSFSR Writers' Union, the All-Russian Culture Foundation, the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, the Sovremennik Izdatelstvo, the All-Union Yesenin Committee of the USSR Writers' Union, the Fellowship of Russian Artists, the magazines MOSKVA, SLOVO and SOVETSKIY VOIN, the Russia State Culture and Leisure Association, the Fatherland Society of Russian Culture, Moscow Clock and Watch Plant No 1, the All-Russian Book Society, and the Moscow Institute of Musical Pedagogy imini Gnesiny. And finally, we have achieved that which many new societies, foundations and committees striving for creative activity have not managed to do: Yedinstvo has been registered by the RSFSR Council of Ministers as a juridical person having a current account, a foreign-currency account, and other

accounts in bank institutions as a self-governing, all-Russian public organization. This will permit the association to carry on full-fledged publishing and charitable activities. Now matters are up to the founding congress. It is scheduled for the middle of this June. (The specific date will be indicated in invitations that will be sent out.) The organizational committee for preparations for the congress is working at the address: 119807, State Official Post Office No 3, Moscow, Komsomolskiy Prospekt, 13, Yedinstvo Association; telephone numbers: 246-64-59; 246-58-29.

What do we expect of Yedinstvo's founding congress? The establishment of a full-fledged and realistic program of action for Yedinstvo, the sort of program that will help every member of the association, whether it be an individual or a collective, define its place in work aimed at the revival of Russia's culture and its economic, intellectual and moral potential. This program should become both a moral bulwark and a specific plan of action for people of the most diverse nationalities and occupations living in the most remote towns and villages of the country, but united by a desire to work for the good of the development of universal human culture. It is necessary to understand that the revival of our republic, country and Federation is, first and foremost, the revival of the so-called "out-of-the-way places," for they are the very heart of the people.

We see that the problem of many societies, foundations and fellowships that have been established lately with the best of educational and charitable purposes is that they have been unable to enlist in their membership and work the best, deep, healthy intellectual forces of the masses who live far from the capital, have been unable to embody their good intentions at the local level, and have become intensely "Moscow" phenomena, or have closed themselves off in office- or, just the opposite, rally-oriented activities. Yedinstvo must first of all avoid this danger and become an organization that not just in words and on paper, but in deeds and constant creative work unites its fellow citizens from the Baltics to Kamchatka, the Kuban and the White Sea coast. The activities of the association should be such that not just the lovers of Russian literature, artists and performers, but toilers of the factory and fields can find their place in it; such that the representatives of all the RSFSR's nations and nationalities receive equal opportunities to create cultural assets of their peoples. We say "No!" to racism, chauvinism, Russophobia and nationalism. Our rejection of genocide and propaganda for the superiority of one nation over others should be embodied in daily activities and be a real rejection, not just a matter of a slogan.

We believe that our founding congress will give additional strength to all of our fellow countrymen who are striving for unity in the name of humanism, good, justice and the brotherhood of peoples.—[signed] The Organizational Committee for Preparations for the Founding Congress of the All-Russian Unity Association of Lovers of the Fatherland's Literature and Culture.

Writer Venedikt Yerofeyev Dies; Life, Work Eulogized

90UN1970B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 20, May 90 p 24

[Article by Lev Aleynik: "Only He Could Live That Way"]

[Text] The news of the death of Venedikt Yerofeyev was searing. On Pushkin Square, a photocopy of his portrait with the words handwritten on it in pencil: "Venechka, darling."

What was printed about him in VECHERNAYA MOSKVA, in a black box signifying mourning—"After a severe and prolonged illness, a prominent Russian writer has died"—was unquestionably true. But immediately following that sentence, the statement that the funeral service would be held in the Donskoy Church was already dubious: Numerous people rushed from the churches of the Donskoy Monastery to the right one, the Church of the [Rizpolozheniya], which thankfully is located on the not-so-remote Donskaya Street, as its old name goes. And the statement that the burial would be at the Vagankovskoye Cemetery at 1 pm was absolutely false: Once again, many people never made it from there to the Novokunetsevskoye Cemetery to pay their final respects to the writer—a writer secretly beloved and famous among our people.

Back then, exactly 20 years ago, in a dormitory at Moscow State University, a typescript of the narrative poem "Moskva-Petushki" bearing his corrections and given to friends for the night attested with stunning indisputableness to an unparalleled writer's gift. Amid the snobbish Moscow public of hangers-on around literature and science, to us homeless provincials who had gone into internal emigration he was a brother by origin and biography, a biography which could be divined behind the transparent and deeply hidden literary and philosophical reminiscences. Freely gamboling over all the alpine multilingual meadows of the spirit, running his fingers with virtuosity over the keyboard of some first-class world masterpieces—in a thick mixture of our Russian life, with its merriment through grief, through the tragicomical alcoholized and moronic people's carnival. And language! Dialects and subjects—of the lumpen, the educated, the intellectuals, the lower classes—the whole diversity of the most characteristic and the unique traits, traits recognizable by a word or a hint, traits which most likely are **untranslatable**. After all, a nonprovincial, a non-Russian, anyone who has not been born in the element of the Russian language will not understand his narrative poem—it doesn't matter who he is by blood, or extraction, or whatever other official points of identification, as long as he is not one of us, not from the 1950s and 1960s.

And Venechka was from there. From Kirovsk in the Arctic Khibiny Mountains, with a top pupil's gold school medal, he came to Moscow State University to study

further and more at the juncture of eras, and he understood a lot, and he studied briefly, brilliantly completing three semesters in the Philology Department. People who have known him closely for two and a half or three and a half decades of his half-century on earth attest to the striking charm of his personality: he liked very much to associate with the most diverse people, and never thought about personal gain. He was a strikingly healthy person at first, and there is a striking truth: throughout his whole life, not even once did he get into a fight.

What a life it was! His closest friend claims, and I quote: Venechka worked in various capacities and almost everywhere—as a loader at a food store, as a mason's helper, as a stoker, as a duty officer in a militia division, as a receiver of returnable alcoholic-beverage bottles, as a driller with a geological party, as a gunner with the VOKhR [expansion unknown], as a librarian, as a collector on a geophysical expedition, as the manager of a cement depot, as a telephone installer, as a laboratory assistant on a parasitological expedition, as a laboratory assistant for combatting blood-sucking flies, and so forth. I believe that he never got into a fight, and I believe that every installation-workers' dormitory where he lived started writing poems to the man—as to what sort of poems they were, there is nothing to be said. But he had something to say.

He had words for everyone. And whoever reads them knows how many people he, perhaps without ever thinking of setting himself such a goal, taught to see, understand, love, take joy, and suffer. And as to what was beyond, he knew—or isn't that evident from "Valpurgiyeva noch" [Walpurgis Night], which is unquestionably a masterpiece of our country's drama? It was terrible to be deceived, and one could not bring oneself to reread his narrative poem in its castrated form in the magazine TREZVOST I KULTURA—what's more, with that foreword. (Oh, how typically Jesuitical of us—and yet, that was the first time it had been published in the homeland.) But how many people were forced to rethink, re-experience, understand and forgive in a little over three hours by the fools' house of our phantasmagoric Yerofeyev Walpurgis Night.

Let us be grateful; let us love one another; let us be gentle, but firm, and let us never confuse him with something else. After all, how long ago was it that that rare poet Bella Akhmadulina said: "People don't live that way, speak that way, write that way. Only one person can do that—Venedikt Yerofeyev. It is only his life, like a style, his language, always his own, his talent. What good fortune to have talent! And what anguish to know clearly what its fortunate owner must endure."

Yes, he endured. Now books and articles will follow, as it always happens in our country, when a person enjoys worldwide fame during his lifetime. Or is this life not a lesson, and are its warnings incomprehensible? Was he not a prophet? Was he not a member of the intelligentsia? Was he not a writer of the people in the most all-embracing sense of that boundless concept? Peace to

him, who bore witness to peace in his Russian word and left in us the aspirations for a life-suffusing goodness and an expanding freedom. We are not parting, Venechka—destiny is eternal.

Likhachev Urges 'Radical Reform' of Soviet Culture Fund

90UN2043A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
3 June 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "We Must Not Become a 'Culture Obkom'... A Fear Shared by Chairman of the Soviet Culture Fund D. Likhachev."]

[Text] In 1985, at the cultural forum of participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Budapest, I became aware for the first time of the need to create a special fund to return to the Homeland treasures taken out by the first emigration, mainly personal and family archives which, as the result of a change of several generations, are of no interest to anyone and are being lost. Gradually, other questions were added to this problem of saving and returning cultural treasures of foreign Russia. We must not limit ourselves to only Russian cultural treasures, but we must also not ignore the multitude of other problems connected with the need for a general resurrection of culture in our own country, for support for the intelligentsia and intellectual life.

The connection is perfectly clear between raising the cultural level and restoring the moral climate in our country. I have often spoken and written on this topic. No laws work in society if morality in the country declines. Laws shape and order economic and social relations and people's personal relations with each other. But if these relations are abnormal from the beginning, it is useless to shape them by laws. It is impossible for laws to be implemented by sheer fright, by stiffening punishments. History clearly testifies to this, especially the history of our state.

But it is also extremely difficult to simply raise culture in our society. The problem is too great. This is why the Soviet Culture Fund must have a clear program of what it must do first of all, of which organizations to help and what to create. There must be a concept of the Culture Fund. So far, there is none.

The starting point in creating this concept must be the following proposition: our sick society above all needs cultural and moral stability. This must be the starting point and foundation of all the Fund's activities.

It is clear that our numerous cultural ministries have their own problems. That is why a public mobilization of all the cultural forces of our country is necessary, a uniting of the intelligentsia, the nationwide creation of circles, clubs, public organizations of collectors, local history buffs, those interested in various cultural activities, the arts and philosophical discussions, or simply friends of various historical areas, museums, defenders

of old architectural structures and ensembles. They are too numerous to count. All this initially seemed to me not only necessary, but simple to achieve. I assumed that cultural figures will work in the Fund on a voluntary basis, assisted by a small staff of paid secretaries and typists. Public culture funds do not depend on each other, they sometimes work in parallel in different regions, and there is no problem if they work in the same region. There cannot be competition in the field of culture. After all, this is not business!

That's how it seemed to me when I presented the initiative to create the first culture fund. But as they say, every good initiative is "punishable": the first conference or congress was convoked (I forgot how it was called then), and I was elected chairman of the fund on a voluntary basis in addition to the numerous public duties which I already had at that time.

Things increased from there. To the few paid secretaries were added my deputies, their departments with their own managers and their staffs, elegant offices, black "Volgas" and so on and so forth; and most important, business trips abroad, on which usually the same people go... My bureaucracy is located in Moscow, and to "force through" one of my directives I must overcome its "competent resistance." I call this resistance "competent" in quotation marks. It always rests on some "competent" hitch: "this question must be agreed," this one must be "considered" (i.e., delayed indefinitely), "we don't have the money for this," and sometimes more crudely: "What's the fat in it for the Fund?" This "fat" has become a major disaster for the Fund compared with its relatively few accomplishments. One gets the impression that the Fund has begun to exist for its own interests. In other words, it has become just another self-serving institution.

Unquestionably, a good undertaking of the Culture Fund, in my opinion, is the journal "Our Heritage." But it is the Fund's only publication, and it cost me considerable effort to obtain a qualified editor for it. The journal's first issue was held up for an entire half year in 1988 while I fought for the appointment of the chief editor, V.P. Yenisherlov. I don't regret my efforts. The journal's success is due to the editor. But how much has not been done in the Soviet Culture Fund! How many aborted beginnings! The museum of personal collections achieved with such passion by the deceased I.S. Zilbershteyn sank into oblivion with his death. The creation of the large, widespread youth organization "The Classics" was limited to classes with two or three groups of students, and that only in Moscow. I had envisioned "The Classics" as an alternative to the mass American culture engulfing our youth, as an entire movement in our country to rekindle interest in classical literature, classical music, popular classics in all their forms, etc. I was on the point of reaching agreement for free tickets for young members of "The Classics" to museums and classical music concerts. But all this again sank into oblivion. We in the Fund are forgetting much of what we once considered important, and the loans granted to

organizations are not monitored. We have become overgrown with dozens of cooperatives, associations and the like, of which I personally, as the chairman, have only a faint understanding, and in many cases know nothing... Funds are distributed without a clear program unifying the Culture Fund's activity.

I thought that an organization like the Culture Fund should serve as a model of the cultural relationship with the people who turn to it, and of relations among the workers of the Fund itself. Nothing of the sort. And all those who come to the Fund feel this. For some reason they call it a "Culture Obkom." Maybe from the habit of "receiving visitors" in bureaucratic institutions? Visitors to the Fund feel themselves in the position of humiliated supplicants.

Most unpleasant of all is that no one in the fund is personally responsible for anything. There are various sections with their "commanders," and if an action fails there is no one to ask. Only a few people do everything themselves, and those are the people who work voluntarily for the Fund.

The most important thing is the organization of the publishing work. I consider this the most important duty of the Fund towards our culture, because we have our own sphere of publishing. No one really is in charge of publishing in the Fund.

This is why I believe that a reorganization of the entire work of our culture funds is absolutely necessary, starting with the three located in Moscow: the Soviet Culture Fund, and the All-Russian Culture Fund and its Moscow branch.

First, the activities and goals of the culture funds and their branches must be defined, and a concept of the funds finally developed. Second, the bureaucratic system of departments must be eliminated, in which persons responsible for the failure of an action cannot be found. A specific action should be entrusted to a specific person.

All reports and plans should be drawn up not in a general form, but concretely: what must be done and by what deadline. Work with multiple layers and objectives should be eliminated. Funds should work on accomplishing large, practically feasible tasks. Expenditure of hard currency rubles for travel abroad should be strictly monitored. The chairmen should monitor trips abroad and their success. The number of such trips should be substantially reduced, to free hard currency for obtaining items genuinely necessary for our culture. Empty "making contacts," usually referred to by those setting off for a trip abroad, must not be a goal in and of itself.

I have already stated in the press that small scientific collectives are usually more effective than "leviathans," which we had such a passion for since the first years of the revolution, when it was understandable. Small collectives of funds, associations, clubs and the like should exist in every city, in every large village. The Soviet Culture Fund should unite this mass of public cultural

organizations under its common leadership, especially in those areas in which it has highly qualified, professionally trained people. The Soviet Culture Fund can at present direct nationwide local history studies, work to return historical treasures, and issues of the culture of small nationalities. We have competent managers for this among our volunteer scholars. I believe the Pushkin Society should be a fully independent organization. I do not believe it should be subordinate to the Fund, but rather to the Pushkin Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Fund should have associations of the intelligentsia in our country's different corners and capitals, and have an authoritative scholars council for this consisting of distinguished specialists with a clear distribution of responsibility for various sectors of work. Culture should be approached professionally, not bureaucratically.

In sum, the Soviet Culture Fund's work should be radically reformed: the bloated staffs should be reduced to those necessary; the magnificent premises belonging to the Fund should be made available more frequently for meetings of the intelligentsia, which presently suffers from a genuine hunger for cultural contact and is tired of useless meetings, of politics and intrigue.

I don't know how this should be done. Living in Leningrad, it is very difficult for me to implement, since the Fund needs above all new cultural forces, interested in the highly responsible cause of raising the country's cultural level, whose decline we all feel so clearly today.

Editorial note: "In publishing this—frankly speaking—unexpected article, the editors would like to hear readers' opinions: What should the Culture Fund be, and what should be its orientation and long-term program?"

Bolshoi Theater Problems Prompt 'Warning Hunger Strike'

90UN2043B Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 4

[Interview with Yu. Grigoryev, secretary of the Bolshoi Theater party committee and people's artist of the RSFSR, by correspondent T. Alekseyeva: "Will They Hear the Voice of the Party Committee?"]

[Text] On Sunday at 1800 began a 24-hour warning hunger strike of six members of the Bolshoi Theater party committee. The secretary of the party committee, People's Artist of the RSFSR Yuriy Grigoryev answers questions from our correspondent T. Alekseyeva.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, what is the reason for such an extreme protest?

[Grigoryev] Much has been written and said about the misfortunes of the Bolshoi Theater. I will list but a few of them: the unhealthy moral and psychological climate in the staff; the forced exit from the troupe of world-renowned artists; the refusal of the stage of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses; and finally, the signing with the English firm "Entertainment Corporation Limited" of a

"Consortium Agreement" extremely unfavorable for the Soviet side. The party committee tried to oppose the senseless, voluntaristic actions of the administration, which evoked the wrath of the directors.

[Correspondent] How was that expressed?

[Grigoryev] The theater's reelection system offers a very easy way to deal with troublemakers. In particular, the distinguished singer and party committee member Artur Eyzen was not certified. And now he has also not been recertified as an opera soloist, despite his positive artistic qualifications.

[Correspondent] Is the hunger strike a means of self-protection?

[Grigoryev] Only slightly. We have all worked many years in the theater. We are worried not about our own welfare—otherwise, why "stick out," as they say?—but about the fate of the pride of our domestic art, the USSR Bolshoi Theater.

[Correspondent] And how did the theater's directors react to your action?

[Grigoryev] We did not inform the administration of the hunger strike. Frankly, we see no point in continuing unproductive talks. If they do not hear the voice crying in the wilderness, then we must go to a crowded intersection...

Association of Independent Writers Formed

90UN2043C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 23, 6 Jun 90 p 7

[“Statement of the Association of Independent Writers”]

Convinced by the experience of recent years that various politicized associations of writers are bringing into our midst tension, enmity and conflict, and that slogans of progress, culture, and national dignity often hide the most unseemly self-interest and personal ambitions and bring not benefit, but damage to the urgent task of perestroika, we announce:

- the creation of an association of nonpartisan, independent writers who, each according to his own abilities, will contribute to the harmonious development of life through his literary work and public participation;
- the association does not propose its own charter, formal membership or particular representation anywhere except in literature;
- it proposes professional friendship within the USSR Writers' Union, comradely mutual assistance, devotion to its cause, and protection of the honor and dignity of the writer;
- inner agreement with this statement is sufficient for membership in the association of independent writers.

Aleksandr Mikhaylov, Viktor Astafyev, Vyacheslav Shugayev, Vadim Safonov, Anatoliy Kim, Vasiliy Subbotin, Sergey Antonov, Gleb Gorbovskiy, Gleb Goryshin, Aleksandr Panchenko, Sergey Yesin, Georgiy Kunitsyn, Viktoriya Tokareva, Viktor Smirnov, Yury Rytkev, Oleg Volkov, Anatoliy Tkachenko, Yevgeniy Kutuzov.

Results of 1989 Census for Moscow

90UN2083A Moscow VECHERNAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 14 May 90 p 2

[Article by Yu. Ventskovskiy: "What Is Concealed Behind the Figures?: Initial Results of the All-Union Census"]

[Text] There has been a considerable increase in the capital's problems during the decade which has elapsed since the last census.

One can become convinced of this if one studies the collection prepared by the Mosgorstat [Moscow City Statistics Department], based on the results of the census which was conducted in January 1989. This collection will, most likely, become a desk-top reference book not only for sociologists, demographers, and economists, but also for the deputies of the Mossoviet [Moscow City Soviet] and those of the capital's rayon-level soviets.

Z. KSENOFONTOVA, deputy chief of the Mosgorsoviet, talks to us here about some of the data cited in this publication.

Statistics and statisticians are supposed to be disinterested and passionless, but we were, honestly speaking, disturbed and disappointed when we thoroughly analyzed the figures obtained as a result of the All-Union Census. Nevertheless, everything is in order. The number of Moscow's population amounts to 9 million persons. Men constitute 45 percent of this total, while women account for 55 percent. This indicator has improved somewhat: 30 years ago women accounted for 43 percent in our city, whereas men constituted 57 percent. The male population of the capital is younger than the female: 44 percent of the men have not yet reached the age of 30, while the corresponding figure for women is 36 percent. Length of life also differs: on an average Muscovite men live for 66.1 years, while Muscovite women live for 74.2 years. There are not too many very old persons: a total of 221 women and 24 men celebrated their 100th birthdays.

The city is "aging" tangibly. The number of pensioners has increased and now comprises 22 percent of the population. The graph showing "population increase" has some negative dimensions; the influx of persons who have come here from the outside to live exceeds the natural increment.

The drop in the birth-rate has been especially noticeable during the last few years. This should have been a cause of concern already by 1988 for the city's social services, medical officials, and the Mossoviet. Mothers, families

with many children, and young families need effective help. Last year (1989) there were fewer children born in Moscow (by 4700) than Muscovites who died.

The typical Muscovite family consists of a husband, a wife, and one child. I understand how difficult it is for the layman to picture the following figure, but I'm going to cite it anyway: the number of persons in the average Muscovite family is 3.1. There are almost 700,000 "singles" living in Moscow. Divorces have become a genuine scourge: during the last 10 years the number of divorced persons has increased by 28 percent. Every year 40,000 marriages break up (either by divorces or by the death of one of the spouses). There are now 498 divorces per 1000 marriages, which is considerably more than this figure for the Soviet Union on an average.

The population growth in our city is taking place by means of a migration of persons of various nationalities: Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Armenians, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Kirghizes, Turkmens, and Tajiks. But the number of Latvians, Estonians, and Jews in Moscow has declined. The Russian population in the capital increased by 700,000 persons, but its proportion within the total number declined slightly: from 90.2 to 89.7

percent. However, our capital's ethnic homogeneity is still significantly higher than that of the other union republics' capitals.

There are no illiterate persons in Moscow. Some 53 percent of the employed population have a secondary education, while 32 percent of them have a higher education.

Certain doubts are evoked by the indicators attesting to what "heights" we have attained in emancipating women: the coefficient of the "fair sex" (i.e., women employees) amounts to 95.4 percent, which corresponds to an analogous percentage among men. This scarcely gives cause for rejoicing.

More detailed information is available in a reference work which can be obtained at the Mosgorsoviet. An information-reference service has also been organized in our department. By calling telephone number 927-20-03, scientists and practical staff members, instructors and lecturers, undergraduate and graduate students, planners and economists, propagandists and journalists, as well as individual or private citizens can obtain information for a fee concerning various indicators on Moscow's industrial development, the city's economy, science, culture, health care, or various other types of information.

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DATE FILMED

5 Aug. 1990